



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

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## **MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT**

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**The Choice: Social Representation and  
the Formation of the Hellenic Armed Forces**

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**By: Efthymios Domazos  
December 2008**

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**THE CHOICE: SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE  
HELLENIC ARMED FORCES**

Efthymios Domazos, Lieutenant Commander, Hellenic Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

**MASTERS OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

from the

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# **THE CHOICE: SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES**

## **ABSTRACT**

As societies of the developed part of the world evolved, new trends of military staffing have been coming up. The basic trend that used to exist globally till the end of WW-II was the conscription system, through which all citizens were obliged to serve. During the 20th century, when globalization became the new world concept, when terrorist attacks devaluated armies, when people became wealthier and more independent; military staffing, as an issue closely related to the society, was also affected. The new trend nowadays is towards the All Volunteer Force.

The present military conscription system of Greece is constituted by two types of soldiers: the draft soldiers and the volunteers. The recent trend in the same country is towards the All Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, that trend has raised many arguments about the effect of lack of Social Representation, which is directly connected to Military Efficiency.

Our purpose is to cover an aspect of that dilemma: The Social Representation factor in the structure of the Hellenic Military. As our compass we will use USA and other countries' examples, along with the Military Representation Model created by Mark J. Eitelberg. Our destination is the military effectiveness of the Hellenic Armed Forces.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW .....	9
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	9
B.	MAIN PART .....	13
1.	Military Efficiency – The Conscription System .....	13
a.	<i>How Social Representation Affects Military Efficiency.....</i>	18
b.	<i>The Greek Case – Recent Trends .....</i>	20
c.	<i>Political/Socioeconomic Representation.....</i>	22
2.	The Factor of Women’s Representation .....	25
3.	Conclusion .....	29
III.	PRIOR TO THE ARMY .....	33
A.	FACTORS AFFECTING YOUNG MEN’S DECISIONS TO VOLUNTEER OR TO SERVE AS CONSCRIPTS IN THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES .....	33
1.	Why These Factors are Crucial .....	34
a.	<i>What Does the Military Offer to the Volunteers?.....</i>	35
b.	<i>What the Military Demands from Volunteers.....</i>	35
c.	<i>The Supply and Demand Economic Theory .....</i>	36
2.	How is Socioeconomic Status Defined in Greek Society?. .....	45
a.	<i>What is the Socioeconomic Factor? .....</i>	45
b.	<i>Analysis of the Elements of the Socioeconomic Status in the Greek Society.....</i>	46
3.	What are the Future Job-Alternatives for Each Socioeconomic Category of Youngsters?.....	50
4.	How Would a Differentiation in the Future’s Economic and Social Wellbeing Alter the Choices of the Youngster?.....	53
B.	WHAT IS THE CASE FOR WOMEN IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY FORCE ?.....	57
1.	History of Women in the Hellenic Military Force.....	57
a.	<i>Women and Draft .....</i>	57
b.	<i>Women and Military Volunteerism.....</i>	58
2.	What Would Be the Consequences of a Women’s Military Draft, for Women Themselves and in Greek Society Generally? .....	60
a.	<i>The Beneficial Factors of Obligatory Women Service .....</i>	60
b.	<i>The Negative Factors of Obligatory Women Service .....</i>	63
c.	<i>Weighs the Positive and Negative.....</i>	65

3.	Which is a Potential Women's Draft Case that Would Be Beneficial to the Hellenic Military and Society?.....	66
a.	<i>What are the Problems to Be Alleviated by Proposing a Women's Draft?.....</i>	66
b.	<i>What are the Disadvantages of Recruiting Women that We Should Overcome? .....</i>	66
c.	<i>What We Should Provide for Drafting Women? .....</i>	66
C.	A QUICK LOOK AT THE MIDDLE AND HIGH-RANK PERSONNEL OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES .....	70
1.	Who is Choosing to Enter Military Academies? .....	71
2.	Are the Officers in Greece Considered Reliable and Representative of the Society? .....	73
IV.	INSIDE THE ARMY .....	79
A.	VOLUNTEERS; WHAT DO THEY HAVE TO OFFER TO THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES? .....	79
1.	Analyzing Three Main Factors .....	79
a.	<i>Economic.....</i>	79
b.	<i>Operational.....</i>	80
c.	<i>Mobilization .....</i>	83
2.	How are the Volunteers Viewed by the Society? .....	85
a.	<i>The U.S. Case.....</i>	86
b.	<i>"The Police-like Armies": (A Personally Developed Analogy of Society's Perception for AVF Militaries).....</i>	89
B.	WHAT DRAFTEES HAVE TO OFFER IN THE MILITARY?.....	93
1.	Analysis of the Three Main Factors .....	93
a.	<i>Economic Factor.....</i>	94
b.	<i>Operational – Training – Learning Factor .....</i>	94
c.	<i>Mobilization .....</i>	98
2.	How are the Conscript Soldiers Viewed by Greek Society?.....	99
a.	<i>Society's Opinion of Draftees .....</i>	99
b.	<i>Opinions among the Soldiers' Close Social Circle .....</i>	102
C.	MILITARY LEADERS AND OFFICERS: WHAT KIND OF SOLDIERS DO THEY PREFER?.....	105
1.	Examining the Three Main Factors .....	105
2.	How an Officers' Job is Affected by Social Intervention on the Draftees' Service?.....	110
D.	WHICH FORM OF MILITARY STRUCTURE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATION? .....	112
1.	What is "Representative"?.....	112
2.	Why Do We Need a Military Representative of Society? ..	118
a.	<i>Validation of the First Factor of the MRM Model: Political Legitimacy.....</i>	119

	b.	<i>Validation of the Second Factor of MRM: Military Effectiveness.....</i>	124
	c.	<i>Validation of the Third Factor of MRM: Social Equity.....</i>	133
E.		SYNOPSIS OF THE MRM MODEL.....	140
F.		IS THE MRM MODEL VALID IN GREEK REALITY, IN RESPECT TO SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS?.....	142
	1.	Validation of the MRM's Two Main Principles.....	142
	2.	Applying the MRM model in Greek Reality: The Solution	145
	a.	<i>How We will Proceed .....</i>	145
	b.	<i>The Application of the MRM model – The Solution for the Military Design of Greece.....</i>	146
G.		CONCLUSION .....	158
V.		THE SOCIAL SPACE OUTSIDE OF THE MILITARY –THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND THE SOCIETY IT SERVES.....	161
	A.	WHAT ARE THE INTERCONNECTION EFFECTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY WHEN ALL PEOPLE SERVE? ....	165
	1.	Who is Closely Related to the Conscript? Who Cares for Him?.....	165
	2.	Interaction of the Upper-Socioeconomic Classes with the Government .....	166
	a.	<i>Rich or Famous Families.....</i>	167
	b.	<i>Professors/ Teachers.....</i>	168
	c.	<i>Higher-Level Public Employees.....</i>	169
	d.	<i>Journalists or Others Connected in Some Way to the Media .....</i>	169
	3.	What Results from the Influence of Soldiers' Relatives?. ..	171
	a.	<i>Society Effects .....</i>	171
	b.	<i>Military Effects .....</i>	174
	4.	Does Society React Similarly to an AVF and a Conscript Force?.....	176
	a.	<i>The Upper Forty Percent Portion of the Society ....</i>	176
	b.	<i>Lack of Representation of Low Economic Classes on Military Decision Making.....</i>	177
	B.	WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF DRAFTEES AFTER LEAVING THE ARMY? .....	179
	1.	Affection and Knowledge on Military Issues.....	179
	2.	Being a Knowledgeable Voter on Military Issues .....	180
	3.	Willingness to be Mobilized .....	181
	4.	The Social Relations among Different Socioeconomic Groups.....	183
	a.	<i>Military (Draft) is Even More Representative than the School.....</i>	183
	b.	<i>Discovering Ours and Others' Personalities .....</i>	184

c.	<i>Tight Relations among Different People in Cases of Harsh Conditions</i> .....	185
C.	THE “INTERCONNECTING MILITARY-SOCIETY” MODEL (IMS), OR “YOUNG BEES ON SOCIAL FLOWERS” .....	186
1.	IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of a Draft Force.....	188
2.	IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of an AVF ..	191
D.	DOES SOCIETY AS A WHOLE NEEDS TO HAVE A SAY IN MILITARY ISSUES? .....	194
VI.	PROPOSALS.....	197
A.	TYPE OF MILITARY STRUCTURE .....	197
B.	SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY .....	198
C.	WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY.....	199
D.	RESERVE FORCE IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY .....	202
E.	FURTHER RESEARCH POINTS.....	203
VII.	NOVEL - “THE CHOICE” .....	205
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	205
B.	THE BOY’S FRIENDSHIP AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD.....	207
C.	THE STATUS.....	211
D.	THE PARTY .....	216
E.	THE CHOICE .....	218
F.	INSIDE THE MILITARY .....	221
G.	THE CONSCRIPT SOLDIER .....	226
H.	THE INTERCONNECTION .....	230
I.	THE INCIDENT .....	232
J.	THE EPILOGUE.....	235
	APPENDIX A. A SYNOPSIS OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES HISTORY .	237
	APPENDIX B. BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN SERVING IN THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES .....	239
	APPENDIX C. THE GREEK EDUCATION SYSTEM .....	241
A.	THE STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM .....	241
	APPENDIX D. THE INTERVIEW OF COL. COSTAS MOUTOS U.S. ARMY RET.	245
	APPENDIX E. PRESENTATION OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATION MODEL (MRM) .....	247
A.	BACKGROUND .....	247
B.	SUMMARY .....	249
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	251
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	257

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1.	The Three phases Under Examination in the Present Project, Referring Mainly to the Greek Army. ....	4
Figure 3.1.	Supply – Demand Curve for Military Jobs .....	37
Figure 3.2.	Supply – Demand Curve for general and military jobs.....	38
Figure 3.3.	What is to blame for unemployment? .....	41
Figure 3.4.	What Greeks would do if unemployed. Most probable possibility (in percent) .....	41
Figure 3.5.	Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor during war. ....	44
Figure 3.6.	Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor when future perspectives are positive. ....	54
Figure 3.7.	Percentages of those that agree, in each country, to the statement: <i>“A mother should give priority to her young child rather than to her work”</i> .....	59
Figure 3.8.	Birth rates per couple in Greece .....	61
Figure 3.9.	Percentages of population by age group .....	62
Figure 3.10.	Percentages of Married military personnel by gender and by rank.....	64
Figure 3.11.	Points required to be admitted in the Hellenic Public Universities (2008) .....	71
Figure 3.12.	Confidence for the Armed Forces by the respective country’s society. ....	75
Figure 4.1.	Learning Curve Theory (Reduction of expenses, due to the repetition of a procedure). ....	82
Figure 4.2.	Fears of Europeans .....	90
Figure 4.3.	Roles of the military, according to Europeans .....	90
Figure 4.4.	Breakage of learning curve of the military, due to the duration of the draftees’ service. ....	95
Figure 4.5.	Hypothetical comparison of Volunteers’ and Draftees’ Learning Curves .....	97
Figure 4.6.	The pyramid of youngsters willing to volunteer.....	104
Figure 4.7.	Reserve Ratio (RR) of European Countries in 1996-1997.....	109
Figure 4.8.	Elements of the Factor of Political Legitimacy, applicable to the Hellenic Reality.....	119
Figure 4.9.	Elements of the Factor of Military Effectiveness, Applicable to the Hellenic Reality.....	125
Figure 4.10.	Roles of the military, according to Europeans .....	126
Figure 4.11.	Confidence of the military by the society it serves.....	128
Figure 4.12.	Elements of the Factor of Social Equity, applicable to the Hellenic Reality .....	134
Figure 4.13.	The reverse Correlation between GNP and the Conscription Ratio, in European Countries.....	137
Figure-4.14.	Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation (MRM)....	142
Figure 4.15.	Trend of high level educated Youth in Greece (1987-2005) .....	151

Figure 4.16.	Ratio of High School Students entering the Public Universities in 2008 .....	152
Figure 5.1.	The Three Powers of the State and Depiction of Military and Society Feedback.....	161
Figure 5.2.	The Inner Construction of the Social groups and the Military .....	163
Figure 5.3.	Various ways that Upper Socioeconomic Groups Might Influence the Executive Power of a State. ....	167
Figure 5.4.	Dimensions of Confidence in the U.S. Military.....	174
Figure 5.5.	The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the case of a draft Force.....	187
Figure 5.6.	The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the case of a potential Hellenic AVF.....	192
Figure E.1.	Convergence / Divergence Model of Military Representation (MRM) ..	249

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1.	Armed forces and postmodern Society.....	129
Table 5.1.	Whose preferences prevailed in the post-Cold War era in U.S.? .....	172

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## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

To the two women of my life; Maria, who brought me to life, and Katerina, who gives me life.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

Military Effectiveness is a goal that has been sought by nations for ages. Various factors affect Military Effectiveness, such as economic resources sufficiency, training, procedures, manning issues, and others. Obviously, social representation is not a common factor to think of when considering the military establishment. This factor became important to many, some years after the Second World War, when some countries reduced their armies while, at the same time, hiring volunteers. As years went by, more and more European countries, along with the U.S., based their Armed Forces (A.F.) on volunteer soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

This at first caused military operational capabilities to rise, as volunteers were trained for longer periods and were fully embedded into the military culture. The U.S. followed this military structure trend after the Vietnam War in 1973. Analysts who focused only on the operational effectiveness of the military were very optimistic about the new volunteer-type forces.

After years of implementing this type of military structure, some deficiencies were evident. One of the first to identify the disadvantages of volunteer forces was Charles Moskos, a Greek-American professor who lived and taught in Illinois and California. Professor Moskos identified a gap being created in the U.S. between the society - and specifically the elites - and the military force.<sup>2</sup> This gap was not only in ideologies and perceptions, but tended to be a idealistic gap, too.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a situation as progressed in European armies regarding the volunteers' participation, see Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> See Charles C. Moskos, *The Military: More than Just a Job?* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988); Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> This is evident in: Roth-Douquet, Kathy, and Frank Schaeffer. *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 30; where "we" is the society and "they" is the military or vice-versa.

Moskos indicated that this gap was being created because the military was unrepresentative of the society that it served. This was the beginning of numerous discussions, articles and books - especially in the U.S. - about social representation in the military. Many felt that this factor not only affected society by discriminating among people, but also resulted in operational deficiencies in the military.

Mark J. Eitelberg, influenced by Moskos and other military sociologists at the time, continued these studies on military issues related to sociology and psychology.<sup>4</sup> Eitelberg created a conceptual model for evaluating social representation in the U.S. military according to three “measures:” political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity<sup>5</sup>. This model evaluated the degree of social representation in the U.S. military, and determined a method of identifying whether it is within acceptable limits. Of course, as a conceptual model, it does not give specific values and limits for the proper representation. Nevertheless, it provides a compass to follow toward better social and military outcomes, according to the factor of social representation. For shortness, we will abbreviate this model as MRM Military Representation Model.

The current discussion has concerned the social representation of the U.S., a country which has had an All Volunteer Force (AVF) for more than thirty-five years; more than a generation long. Greece, on the other hand, took its first steps toward volunteerism in the A.F. only as late as 1989. The interesting part with the Greek case is that it now finds itself in transition, where volunteers coexist with conscripts<sup>6</sup>, in a ratio of 30 to 70, respectively.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For a complete bio of Professor M. Eitelberg go to Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 21, 2008).

<sup>5</sup> For more on that model, see Appendix E.

<sup>6</sup> The terms conscript, draftees, and draft force are used in this thesis when referring to soldiers in compulsory military service. On the other hand, volunteers are the soldiers who are picked by the all-volunteer military. and get paid as military employees.

<sup>7</sup> See John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).

All Hellenic political parties have been discussing new potential military structures for at least five years now, primarily increase military effectiveness along with social satisfaction.

This project aims to find a solution for the future of the Hellenic military structure, taking into account the factor of social representation. Of course, the approach is not as simplistic as it appears. We not only examine if all social groups are represented in the military, but also focus on all related military aspects such as training, financial budget, operational demands, and others.

As a compass, we use the U.S. experience, and specifically, the MRM model. At first, we examine if the MRM model works in the Greek system, and if it is successful, we will apply that model and find out the best solution for the future Hellenic military structure.

Right now, the U.S. happens to be a major military force with many ongoing operations. The U.S. military passed from the draft system to an AVF. As this appears to be the trend in Europe and in Greece, the U.S. experience should provide a very good chance to see some potential outcomes for the future in Greece's military. As an analogy to that comparison, we can imagine a sailing boat ahead of us, which experiences some weather situations that we, too, will face when passing that same spot; we might choose not to follow that route, as it might be too dangerous for us.

This describes generally the aim of this project and the direction it follows. Next, we provide a more detailed “road map” of the project.

At first, due to the nature of social representation, we not only focus on the military, but also look at the inputs and the outputs of it. In other words, we look upon the youngsters of Greece entering the military “family”, and those exiting into society after completing their service. Figure 1.1 indicates the three phases under examination in the present project. As the diagram shows, all phases are interconnected.



Figure 1.1. The Three phases Under Examination in the Present Project, Referring Mainly to the Greek Army.

In the first phase, we identify young people who are willing to be volunteers and those who are not. We examine their differences and the reasons for their choices. Then we examine their socioeconomic status, which is crucial for the whole project. The socioeconomic status of these individuals in Greece is further defined. Through this distinction, we identify those who would prefer to volunteer based on specific socioeconomic criteria, which give an idea of the socioeconomic structure of the volunteer force specifically.

We continue by examining potential obligatory service for woman, which yields some very interesting results for Greek society, based research results.<sup>8</sup> At present, women in Greece are not obligated to serve as soldiers. Nevertheless, they have served for more than twenty years as professional volunteers for example petty officers in the navy, and a decade ago, they were allowed to enter military academies to become officers. The contemporary dilemma in Greece is whether women should be conscripted to raise the declining numbers of soldiers eligible for conscription. On that issue, we provide clear answers based on analysis and ample survey data.

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<sup>8</sup> Throughout the project, we use reliable sources for acquiring survey data such as the “Eurostat” and the “Hellenic Statistical Agency.”

Next, we make some generic observations about the Hellenic Military officer academies, so that the reader can better understand this extra option for youngsters, and also get a more general idea of the whole military structure of Greece, apart from the lower soldiers' base.

In the second phase, we examine the military by itself, as a closed system. We start with the analysis of the two distinct lower bodies of the military: draftees and volunteers. we search out the pluses and minuses of their service according to specific factors: economical, operational, training, and, finally, mobilization. That issue is explored in a more detailed manner when the MRM model is discussed.

In a volunteer-conscript comparison, we also add a sociological flavor by trying to estimate how society views each group. This again will be useful in the last phase of the project, where the focus is on the society itself. Apart from the perception of society, we analyze what types of soldier military leaders prefer. This aspect of senior officers' perceptions provided a wider view of how volunteers and draftees are seen by all of the groups related to them.

After that, we touch on the critical concept of representation. We try to answer the question of what representation is and why it is needed. What are the specifics in the Hellenic Military that support the feature of representation? In analyzing these questions, we arrive at with a new concept the "Modern AVF armies that act as a global police force." This concept creates a perception in society that the military is equivalent in some way to the police force, so, only those hired for this purpose should do the job and the society in general has nothing to do with them. We ultimately reject this new perception, drawing upon plenty of military and sociological-related arguments.

After completing the examination of all the above inquiries, we came to the conclusion that social representation is a critical factor in the Hellenic A.F. To determine just how critical it is, we utilized Eitelberg MRM model. First, we had to test if its characteristics are applicable to the Greek situation. This proved to be

quite an interesting quest; apart from validating it for a European country, we also identified some generic limitations on the type of countries for which the MRM model should be used. The MRM model focuses on three basic balances along with attitudes and ideologies concerning social representation in the U.S. military: racial/ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic. Especially for the Greek case, we tested and used only one aspect of the MRM model: the socioeconomic representation of the society groups in the military force. We excluded racial/ethnic issues because Greece does not face any of those issues in its military force. Additionally, we did not examine any gender representation issues. For this aspect of social representation, we proposed a different way of evaluating the unit measurement of male-female representation. Considering that no country in the world has 50-50 representation in its military, there should be a deficiency in the way we measure representation. Our views were that we do not have to count for this male-female division individually, but rather by viewing families. Traditionally, families elected to have their men represent them in the army and their women to stay behind. Therefore, if the proposed unit measurement is the family, there is no gender distinction to be observed.

Therefore, the only representation issue that we considered critical was the socioeconomic representation of draftees and volunteers in the military. To our understanding, this socioeconomic representation factor is the most critical one in Europe, and especially in Greece.

The application of the MRM model had many surprises; although we believed that it would be only a qualitative approach with no specific proposals, it turned out that this model, along with the mathematical logic tool of “Proof by Contradiction,” provided a specific solution for the future Hellenic soldier-base structure. Of course, we do not provide specific number ratios for the level of draftees or volunteers. However, we do provide a specific structure proposal for the whole army.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> In that project, we use several words interchangeably to refer to the military, including Armed Forces (A.F), Army, and services.



With that proposal, we conclude the second phase of the project. The final phase focuses on how society interacts with the military in Greece. This is a very interesting analysis, as we observe the draftees who complete their service, return to society, and interact with the rest of the civilians. The outcome of proper social representation shows its results first in society, and later in the military. The lack of social representation caused problems in society by creating a mental and ideological gap between civilians and military personnel. The final outcome of this gap becomes evident in the A.F as a lack of military effectiveness and efficiency.

In that phase, we introduce the concept of “Horizontal Control” of the military by society, a concept that was also analyzed by Born, Caparin and Holtmer.<sup>10</sup> We suggest adding this “Horizontal Control” factor to the MRM model as a fourth factor for evaluating social representation, or perhaps making it a sub-factor under political legitimacy.

In Chapter V, we present a new model created for this project: The “Interconnection Military Society” model (IMS). Through this model, we examine the value and the outcome of social representation in the Hellenic Military by considering the factor of the “Horizontal Control” of the military by the society. Apart from interconnecting social groups among them, this type of control helps to continuously keep the military in the focus of society and politicians, and consequently sustains its effectiveness and improves its efficiency.

We conclude the first section of this project with Chapter VI, which provides a brief presentation of the proposals that came out from this project.

The project does not end there. There is a second section that will be considered an innovation for theses and projects, especially for NPS. The advisors for this project, Professor M. Eitelberg and Professor B. Hudgens, along with the author, developed the idea of creating a novel-type part for this project.

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<sup>10</sup> Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” *ERGOMAS Research Project* (2000): 1-7.

Inspired mainly by the best-selling book, *The Goal*,<sup>11</sup> we thought that this feature would provide several beneficial features to this project. So, apart from being innovative, this short novel will also help in the following ways.

- Provide a story based on general facts from the survey that could make teaching more amusing for the students and easier for the teacher
- The story will be remembered by the students, and they would try to find analogies to themselves and their social environment
- It will ignite lively discussions, arguments, and opposing views, which supports in teaching a subject
- It will provide a foundation for building on other stories in the future, so as to create a relevant trend in teaching
- Finally, the novel has the unique characteristic of expressing the feelings of its characters. The lack of such feelings is a deficiency of an official research paper, especially when the focus is on a sociological issue. For example, in an official paper, we cannot express the sorrow of the hero when losing his/her loving mate when enlisting, or, the feelings of an elite child about socioeconomic status when he is ordered about by petty officers who are seen as being socially beneath him.

In summary, this project seeks to analyze the factor of social representation in the Hellenic Military, and how it influences military effectiveness. The advantage of this research is that, being qualitative; it provides many arguments and perspectives on the issue. Even if some might consider the models we used to be questionable, the analysis stays in place, and can also be used separately for decision-making. In general, we tried to follow logical ways to prove our arguments and exploit sound evidence to answer potential readers' questions.

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<sup>11</sup> Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, *The Goal*, 20th ed. (Massachusetts: The North River Press, 1984). Another case of a novel-type book is Kathy Roth-Douquet, and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. INTRODUCTION

Military effectiveness is a goal that mankind has sought from the first civilized societies. The first discussions about the construction of a powerful army took place in China.<sup>12</sup> Later on, in 500-400 BCE, great arguments among philosophers of that era<sup>13</sup> developed over manning<sup>14</sup> the armies of ancient Greek cities. Plato, in his “ideal Republic,” initially attempts a partition of society. He says that the genesis of a society has as its initial cause the specialized needs of the individual that one cannot fulfill on his own.<sup>15</sup>

Plato recognizes, however, that the needs of the society will eventually grow larger, and the resources of the Republic will eventually not be sufficient, so the need for war will arise. For that purpose, Plato assigns a new caste: the “Guardians.” This group of citizens should be specially educated to defend the city effectively. Therefore, Guardians would be the military men who could maintain social justice and guarantee a peaceful social life.

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<sup>12</sup> For more on China's ancient civilization, see Maurizio Scarpari, *Ancient China*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Athens, Greece: Karakotsoglou, 2000).

<sup>13</sup> Great were the intellectual fights between Aristotle and Plato about manning the Athenian Army.

<sup>14</sup> In fact, even the word “manning” starts to be excluded from the military vocabulary, as nowadays an increasing number of countries use women to staff their forces. Moskos, Eitelberg, and Shields have analyzed some aspects of this new emerging reality, as we see later in this paper.

<sup>15</sup> Thus, four or five men constitute the first society that Plato names the Republic: a farmer, a shoemaker, a builder, who has as their aim to serve the human needs. Gradually, these needs are multiplied as the population increases, and new kinds of professionals deal with these new needs. Each one of the members of this Republic shall be specialized only in his field.

Apart from that, the ancient philosopher does not agree with the representation of the society in that organization, as he believed that only those who had high physical and mental abilities should be part of the Guardians.<sup>16</sup> Plato had in mind a purely qualification-based system of conscription in the army.

In the philosopher's "Republic," women are considered as totally equal to men, enjoying the same education and the benefit of participating in the commons.<sup>17</sup> The selection of women for the Republic's army was the same as men's selection, with the only provision being that they would first give birth to their children and then enlist. In fact, this project later presents the same need in contemporary society: filling positions in the army with women, while at the same time dealing with the problem of a low birth-rate.<sup>18</sup>

As Eitelberg notes:<sup>19</sup>

One could say that Plato argues against the notion of population representation, since he assumes that a selected few are capable of performing the task of defending the Republic. At the same time, it would argue against massive conscription, since the arm of a military draft would pull in many people who might best serve the Republic in some other capacity. Further, if we take a closer look at Republic, we should find that women are expected to take their rightful place as Guardians, alongside their male counterparts, even in combat. This is interesting from several perspectives regarding gender representation – and not the least of which is Plato's place (ancient Greece) and the fact that he seems so far ahead of his time. The trend of the past twenty years in many "modern"

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<sup>16</sup> Plato's "Guardians" should combine natural and acquired qualifications. They need to have good sight, speed, and agility, and also resistance in rough conditions. Furthermore, they are supposed to have also mental talents, be brave and have powerful wills and proper education.

<sup>17</sup> While men are compelled to provide military service from 20 years until 60 years of age, women have the same obligation, but it begins only when they give birth to their children and it continues up to 50 years of age. Their military education is reasoned by the wise excuse that cities which have women enlisted would have the double number of soldiers than a men-only army of another similarly-sized city.

<sup>18</sup> For more, see Neoklis Sarris, *Ancient World* (Athens: Kaktos, 1997), 293-349.

<sup>19</sup> Mark Eitelberg, personal communication, October 6, 2008.

militaries, particularly those that have abandoned conscription, is to allow women greater access to previously-restricted military jobs (for example, combat-related positions).<sup>20</sup>

The later Roman Empire utilized an early volunteer system for the military, where the higher ranks of the army were a stage for all politicians to go through in order to retain their social status in the aristocracy.<sup>21</sup>

In Europe, knights, who were mainly upper-class soldiers devoted to local aristocrats, prevailed until the 16<sup>th</sup> century. During this period, whoever could pay more would have the best army. Apart from that, the weapons used had some technical aspects (cannons, building barriers, etc.), making specialization a critical factor. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the form of armies was somewhat common all through Europe: officers came from the aristocracy, and soldiers from the low socioeconomic ranks.<sup>22</sup>

In Germany of 1860, Prime Minister Bismarck made two state institutions obligatory: school and the military. That was the main trend during the two major World Wars. Later on, the Cold War era, the downfall of the former USSR and the tactics of terrorists' started to change our perspectives on building armies.

As societies of the developed part of the world evolve, new trends of staffing the military have arisen. The basic trend that used to exist globally until the end of WW II was conscription, through which all citizens were obligated to enlist in the military of their country. A view of the U.S. conscription system can be found in G. Flynn's<sup>23</sup> book about the draft in the U.S., while a view of the Greek system can be found in the official website of the Recruitment Department

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<sup>20</sup> For example, we've seen this occur in the U.S., Australia, Canada, and the UK, as well as in a number of other European nations. Proponents of allowing women to serve in the military without restriction have often cited Plato's position.

<sup>21</sup> For more on that era and earlier on see George Steinhouer, *War in Ancient Greece* (Athens: Epimetron, 1996).

<sup>22</sup> N. Toskas, Gen. Ret. "Conscription: Can it be Upgraded?" *Strategy 18* (2008).

<sup>23</sup> George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

of Greece.<sup>24</sup> During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when globalization became the new world concept, when terrorist attacks devaluated armies, and when people became wealthier and more independent, military staffing, as an issue closely related to society, was also affected.

The new trend started to be toward the Volunteer Force (VF) and, in some cases, toward the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Conscription, or the draft system, is being slowly devaluated as a VF takes its place.<sup>25</sup> A general view of the U.S. VF is given in the book *The All- Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*.<sup>26</sup>

The new social “contract” between countries and their societies, that people want to have the ability to decide whether or not to participate in the military, was first made possible because the countries that accepted the V.F. forecast that they would be able to pay for the volunteers, and that a mass-war - where a great number of draftees would be needed - was highly improbable.

Under that prism, our main focus is on military efficiency and how it is affected by social representation. Charles Moskos<sup>27</sup> and Mark Eitelberg have contributed the most to that area. In fact, Eitelberg has created a model called the “Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation,”<sup>28</sup> or the Military Representation Model (MRM). This model serves as a tool for examining the reality in a country other than the U.S. with distinct social and economical differences. That country will be Greece.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Hellenic Recruit Office, <http://www.stratologia.gr/> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>25</sup> For more about international trends in the '90s see Volker Gelhausen, “The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the Successful implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force,” Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis (1998).

<sup>26</sup> Barbara A. Bickler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Wagner, *The All Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*, 1st ed. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004).

<sup>27</sup> Professor Moskos passed on in May 2008.

<sup>28</sup> For the sake of economy, we will refer to that model throughout this thesis by the name Military Representation Model (MRM).

<sup>29</sup> Greece is a European Country, participating in **all** world institutions and has a very distinct culture; thus, it is a great case for examining if it is valid for that country also.

Prior to 1997, Greece's military corps was totally based on draftees.<sup>30</sup> Dimitrios Smokovitis<sup>31</sup> gives us a picture of the Greek military during the '80s. In 1997, Greece inaugurated the use of volunteers to substitute the demand for draftees.<sup>32</sup> This came up as a need of the modernized army as well as the modernized society. As of this writing, the mandatory service for a draftee is twelve months, while a volunteer must serve at least four years.<sup>33</sup> Greece is now on the crossroads of deciding whether it will cease the draftee force in favor of the AVF.

This study covers one aspect of that dilemma, the social representation factor, for each of the two available conscription systems: draftees and the VF. Our goal is military efficiency and our guide is the example of the U.S. and other countries, along with the MRM tool.

## **B. MAIN PART**

### **1. Military Efficiency – The Conscription System**

As the dual system of conscription in Greece is relatively new,<sup>34</sup> few bibliographical resources or other tools are available, that examine this social - military area.

After the Vietnam War, the U.S. transitioned to an AVF system,<sup>35</sup> and now there are several discussions as to whether another system is needed. The

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<sup>30</sup> The Greek military is divided mainly into three parts: officers, petty officers and draftees. The last is the biggest part, and will be the core of our study.

<sup>31</sup> Dimitris Smokovitis, "Greece," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 249.

<sup>32</sup> See Hellenic Law: N. 1763/88 «Recruitment of Greeks» (FEK 57 A') as replaced by the articles: 5, 7 and 12 of N. 2510/97 (FEK 136 A').

<sup>33</sup> See Hellenic Law: N 2936/2001, "Professional Volunteers and Other Articles," FEK 166/25, July 2001.

<sup>34</sup> It was fully implemented in 2000 and is still evolving to an unknown destination.

<sup>35</sup> George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

fundamental research on that aspect was done by Moskos.<sup>36</sup> In framing his core question, “Military Institution or Occupation?” he defines the Institution as the draft system, where military service is considered as an obligation to the country. His Occupation mostly refers to the AVF system, where the soldier considers his military duty as a job, mainly measured by monetary and other relevant benefits.<sup>37</sup>

The debate over Institution vs. Occupation (I/O) is considered by Moskos similar to the debate over Economics vs. Sociology in the military. In Exhibit 1, we present a part of Moskos’ study that lists the I/O Factors.<sup>38</sup>

Analyzing these two military systems, Cotton<sup>39</sup> explicitly supports the Institutional structure for the following reasons:

- The military should not be isolated from democratic society, as a potentially different military culture/ideology might be a threat for the democratic political structure of a country.
- A military model based on market rules is isolated from civilians and, furthermore, lacks cohesion among its soldiers.

Moskos<sup>40</sup> adds that the Institutional model evaluates its personnel by “whole person” criteria, which means that a draftee is considered as a paradigm of a good general attitude toward the military and society.

On the other hand, the Occupational model focuses on how one practices a job only while on duty: this kind of private company–like evaluation takes away the ethical element that unifies in peace and at war. In general, motivation is

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<sup>36</sup> Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988).

<sup>37</sup> For that phrase and for the whole study, we are using he/his as an indication of a person in general. We do not intend by that to underestimate female personnel. In fact, female personnel are part of this study and typicalities in the use of language are more of a burden for the reader than recognition of female equity. We will try to enhance and support that equity through the actual content of the present study.

<sup>38</sup> Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 16.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 19.



based on individualism and materialism for the Occupational model, while for the Institutional model, motivation is synonymous with altruism and moral concerns.<sup>41</sup> T. Parsons has examined that shift from collective to individualistic pattern variables,<sup>42</sup> which is evidence that the military follows the general trends of society. In fact, this is an advantage for the military, as we show later by using the MRM.

The draft system in Greece was much appraised, as is evident from Smokovitis' research<sup>43</sup> in 1996. Nevertheless, the validity of the results of that research might be questioned, as the research was conducted only among young military cadets and not through a more representative sample of Greek society of that time. Nevertheless, the answers given at that time by a part of the Greek youth are very interesting. The youth who were interviewed believed mainly that the draft system is a link between democracies and conscription.<sup>44</sup>

Finally, Eitelberg recognizes the Institutional aspect of conscription, and at the same time criticizes the lack of that aspect in the AVF.<sup>45</sup> The author presents eight common views that implicitly support the Institutional model over the occupational.

- Unrepresentativeness of society in AVF
- Low number of individuals who are willing to enlist
- Higher cost per recruit

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<sup>41</sup> Charles Moskos, "Institution or Occupation" in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 25.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>43</sup> Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999), 321-322.

<sup>44</sup> It is interesting to read the author's reasoning about the values of the Draft: "The above findings express a traditional value and the public opinion that the military transmits and preserves the social ideals and values of Greek society. Also, that the military is a "school" for the socialization of young people to a "Greek" way of life, to ideals and attitudes prevailing in Greek society and to ethnic values, very important for the preservation of Greek society. On the other hand, conscription is considered as a democratic institution which brings together young men from different social strata, who acquire same socialization, same experiences and same feelings of comradeship and a common lot." Ibid., 322.

<sup>45</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 21, 2008). Similar findings can also be found in other books by the same author (see Bibliography).

- Lower quality of recruit
- Missing recruiting goals
- High attrition rates
- Increased personnel costs
- Inappropriate manning<sup>46</sup>

The first reason listed above is, according to the author, the most crucial one and will be further analyzed later on.

In addition, Moskos<sup>47</sup> analyzes the results of Occupationalism driven by the AVF in three categories.

- Mission Performance: Moskos suggests that performance is not getting higher through individual interests and economic means
- Member Motivation: Moskos argues that Occupationalism replaces intrinsic motivation with extrinsic rewards<sup>48</sup>
- Professional Responsibility: Moskos' main argument is that the Occupation model is based on decisions made under the sole rule of cost-benefit analysis. This way of professional decision-making undermines ethics and military benefits, other than profits.

Despite the fact that Moskos elucidates that clear division, he also admits that both types of the model exist in any country's Armed Forces.<sup>49</sup> Cotton agrees in general with Moskos on the I/O model and its values. Nevertheless, he presents a fault of Moskos' model, by arguing that he observes the group and system perceptions, not the values of the individuals.<sup>50</sup> In his words, "Moskos

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<sup>46</sup> Keeping soldiers for an extended service-duty or extensive use of retired personnel.

<sup>47</sup> Charles Moskos, "Institution or Occupation" in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 4-6.

<sup>48</sup> For motivation through monetary and other rewards, see: Kenneth A. Merchant, and Wim A. Van der Stede. *Management Control Systems*, 2 ed. (Essex, England: Pearson Ltd, 2003).

<sup>49</sup> J. Faris has the same opinion as Moskos. He believes that I/O models are not mutually exclusive. See J. Faris, "Social Psychology of Military Service," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 58.

<sup>50</sup> C. Cotton, "Institutional Organization Model and Military," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 42.

does not focus on the issue of individual values but on group and system perceptions, inside and outside the Military. This writer has measured individual values and role orientations, but did so primarily to document the character of the Military as a social system.”

Later,<sup>51</sup> Cotton discusses military participation and focuses on youth participation in the Armed Forces. His main point is that middle and upper classes do not participate proportionally, and the quality of recruits is problematic. He suggests an expansion of the recruitment base by working toward a more national social representation. Despite his wish, he also admits that it is a social fact of life in liberal democracies to find youth who avoid a military career. For that reason, he proposes a two-tier system with both volunteers and draftees.<sup>52</sup>

As we can see, we were led through the discussion of military efficiency and the evaluation of the existing alternatives of draftee force and VF to the general idea of I/O model. This model implicitly uses social representation as a measure of efficiency<sup>53</sup>.

We perceive social representation as a critical factor in general. Moreover, when we talk specifically about a choice between draftees and VF, it is the one affected the most, along with perhaps the country's economical resources factor.

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<sup>51</sup> C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 50-52.

<sup>52</sup> His proposal is linked to a National Service for all youth with other than monetary incentives for draftees (e.g., training/education). This approach was developed at that time (late '80s) in Canada and was advocated by Moskos in the United States.

<sup>53</sup> Of course, there are many other factors of military efficiency, such as economical resources used for the Armed Forces, political support of the military, political “use” of the military, training and many others. Still, we consider social representation as one of the most critical factors for achieving military efficiency.

**a.     *How Social Representation Affects Military Efficiency***

This is the first intellectual “Gordian Knot.”<sup>54</sup> That knot is made even more complex through multiple other knots, expressed by the following questions:

- Why do we want representation?
- Does social representation affect military efficiency, and how?
- How do we measure military efficiency?
- Do we want an accurate representation of civilian society in the Armed Forces?
- If not, what are the acceptable limits of representation?

The sword, or the tool, for untying those knots might be found in the MRM.<sup>55</sup>

Eitelberg focuses on military efficiency through social representation, and his basic thoughts are the following.

- Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” representation, a miniature reflection or copy of the larger population
- The idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under normal conditions- and may not even be desirable. For that reason, it is necessary to establish some boundary of “approximate representation.”<sup>56</sup>
- The application of (MRM) involves complex value judgments and reality judgments associated with representation<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> The Gordian knot is said to be the practical problem of untying a knot, that Great Alexander of ancient Greece (Macedonia) was called to handle in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Century BCE). Nobody until then had succeeded in untying that knot. Great Alexander put out his sword and cut the knot in two, solving the puzzle through the power of the sword and the mind.

<sup>55</sup> The MRM model is presented in Appendix 5.

<sup>56</sup> The perfect and approximate representation is depicted in Eitelberg’s model, presented in Appendix 5. The boundaries of E. M are defined by three factors, which also serve as national goals: 1. Military Effectiveness, 2. Social Equity, 3. Political Legitimacy.

<sup>57</sup> This model might be criticized for using the problem to resolve the problem. Yet in the case of representation, most arguments- most judgments about proportionality – have been of an abstract nature.

- Those who are no longer responsible for serving their country may never gain a full appreciation of civic duty, possibly resulting in widespread public apathy and acquiescence concerning the military affairs of the nation<sup>58</sup>
- Military representation is linked, through the quality of individuals, who join, to military effectiveness. When the modern draft ended, there was no yardstick for assessing the quality of new enlistees.

After the above analysis, some people might worry about the degree of unit cohesion and morale in an unrepresentative force.

The response could be given by Guy Siebold,<sup>59</sup> who draws a connection between military effectiveness and cohesion of troops. Presenting the ancient Spartans as an example of cohesion, the article concludes that cohesion is a military efficiency multiplier.<sup>60</sup>

So far, we have connected low cohesion with low military efficiency. The only line left to be connected that between social representation and cohesion/unity of the military. But how do we define social representation? Which are the distinct social groups that form the society?

As we see, we have again fallen into another case of a Greek myth: That of “Lerne Hydra.”<sup>61</sup> That is probably the problem of digging into military efficiency; after answering one question, two new ones appear.

We use the sword tool of MRM for first defining what forms the individual social groups that should be represented. Eitelberg refers to four evaluative categories in his model.

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<sup>58</sup> Actually this might be the case today in the U.S.-society and military gap.

<sup>59</sup> Guy L. Siebold, “The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion,” *Military Psychology* 11, no. 1 (1999): 7-10.

<sup>60</sup> There are several other interesting sources presented in that book that enhance our understanding about cohesion: to list a few: “Durkheim and the 4 Cohesion Types,” Siebold G. L. “How Small Unit Cohesion Affects Performance,” and others.

<sup>61</sup> In that myth, Hercules tried to cut off the many heads of a monster called Lerne Hydra: for each one head cut off, two new emerged. (For more on Greek myths go to [www.erevos.com/mythology](http://www.erevos.com/mythology).)

- Minorities (Racial, Ethnic)
- Women
- Military Political Views or Political Representation<sup>62</sup>
- Recruitment

These four categories apply to the U.S. situation; this is the first point where we should depart from the U.S. and focus more on Greece.

### ***b. The Greek Case – Recent Trends***

What has been stated prior to this point fits the Greek situation, too: the dilemma of draftees vs. AVF, the target for military efficiency, the goal of cohesion. Nevertheless, in Greece, differences in social groups are minor. The National Sociological Studies Research Institute of Greece<sup>63</sup> gives us some fundamental information for the Greek population.

- There are no significant religious minorities. More than 90 percent<sup>64</sup> of the population is Greek Orthodox Christian.<sup>65</sup>
- The total population of Greece is close to eleven million people, with less than one million immigrants; the National Statistical Service of Greece lists immigrants as making up 7.3 percent of the population in 2007.<sup>66</sup> Immigrants come mostly from the Balkans.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> This social category is the most crucial for our study and includes the gap between civilians and military in a number of issues, along with the gap of the socioeconomic representation in the military. In fact, we consider the socioeconomic representation in the Hellenic Armed Forces as the generator of the political representation in them and the core of society's perceptions of the military.

<sup>63</sup> EKE, <http://www.ekke.gr/> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>64</sup> Less than ten percent, mostly immigrants, belong to another religious dogma. In that single-digit number, there is no prevailing religious minority. Apart from that, for the needs of the present study, in the Hellenic Armed Forces religious issues are not a determining factor, as only the Greek Orthodox religion is accepted for soldiers.

<sup>65</sup> Orthodox Christians are not divided according to religious beliefs into Greek, Russian, Bulgarian, etc.; it is only an administrative division, and the religious dogma is the same.

<sup>66</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, *Hellas in Numbers* (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007). This ratio will not affect our study, as these people are not allowed to enter the military. The reason has to do with ethnicity and is explained in the passage that follows.

<sup>67</sup> The geographic area east of Italy and west of Russia and Turkey. Countries like Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania are considered the poorest in Europe. Some of them were recently accepted into NATO and have begun official negotiations with the EU for entrance into the European organization.

- The numbers of women and men in Greece are fairly balanced, with women having a small lead.
- The birth rate in Greece is very low: 1.3 births per couple;<sup>68</sup> this means that, while the military needs stay at approximately the same level, the number of youth available to cover those needs is declining.
- The socioeconomic structure is based on Eurostat's<sup>69</sup> very reliable Office of EU; many political measures proposed by the EU are driven by Eurostat's statistical findings criteria.<sup>70</sup>

The subjective decision we have to make for this project is whether we should consider the children of immigrants as a minority in the military, or include them in the general-population socioeconomic categories. For this project we chose the latter option, immigrants' children as a homogenous group in the overall socioeconomic categorization and not as a minority. The reason is that soldiers, in order to be admitted as draftees or volunteers, have to be Greek in origin and citizenship.<sup>71</sup> To gain citizenship is fairly easy: one has to stay legally and work in Greece for more than five years. To gain origin is more difficult; a person has to be born in Greece, to parents who have at least Greek citizenship.

As a result, the child of immigrants who chose to join the Armed Forces, would have to have been educated totally in Greek schools, and his family must have lived in Greece for at least 24 years.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> A sustainable population is said to have at least a 2.1 birth rate.

<sup>69</sup> European Statistic Office. <http://epeurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>70</sup> Poor is defined as a person earning less than 1000 € per month.

<sup>71</sup> Hellenic Law Directory, [www.teialm.gr/nomothesia/syntagma](http://www.teialm.gr/nomothesia/syntagma) (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>72</sup> Five years for the parents to get citizenship and then nineteen years for the child to go to the military.

“He who receives Greek education becomes a Greek citizen.” This was an empirical “rule” set by the ancient Greek philosopher Isokrates.<sup>73</sup> History has taught us that this rule is true for all the historical eras of Greece.<sup>74</sup>

Based on the above thoughts, we use Eitelberg’s MRM for only two<sup>75</sup> of the sub-categories of Social Representation.<sup>76</sup>

- Political/socioeconomic groups
- Women

### **c. Political/Socioeconomic Representation**

Regarding Political/Socioeconomic representation, Eitelberg argues that<sup>77</sup> “...the U.S. Military is less representative of American Society. Military service is not shared equally across all segments of society. This disparity is one of class, not race, as most people mistakenly believes,” He also strengthens his opinion through reports from the Department of Defense that come to the same conclusion using other research.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Isokrates made that speech, from which the above abstract comes from, in front of the Parliament of ancient Athens in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BCE. He initially intended to integrate the “immigrants” of other ancient city-states to the leading city-state of ancient Athens. For more on ancient sayings, see [www.greekquotations.googlepages.com](http://www.greekquotations.googlepages.com) (accessed 12 October 2008).

<sup>74</sup> For integration of Greek ethnic groups through history, see Konstantinos Paparigopoulos, *History of the Hellenic Nation* (Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975). The greatest example of all is the nearly 400 years of Ottoman occupation of Greece (1453-1821) when the religious and educational system of Greeks did not change, despite the fact that the foreign population element was not only significant but had also the power to rule the Greek population and the society in general.

<sup>75</sup> Eitelberg has also considered the war and peace as very critical factors for determining military efficiency according to social representation. See Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations,” paper presented at the *Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, Baltimore, MD (October 1989).

<sup>76</sup> These two sub-categories will lead us to examine the embedded factors of education and ability of the youngsters that choose to become soldiers.

<sup>77</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 21, 2008), 3.

<sup>78</sup> Mark Magee and Steven J. Nidler, “Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror,” *Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report* (December 2002): 4 (DoD Report) and 6.



Cotton<sup>79</sup> seems to agree with Eitelberg by proposing the use of indicators of internal and external military integration. He also creates a simple model based on the principle that “the greater the external adaptation, the bigger the internal integration.” Cotton defines external integration as: “the Social and normative links between the Military and society,” and internal integration as: “the social and normative links between the Military.” Cotton wishes for high integration in both aspects.

E. Schein<sup>80</sup> offers Cotton his definition of the term culture:

The pattern of basic assumptions which a given group has invented discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.<sup>81</sup>

Military culture is a wide area that is directly related to the leaders of the military and the quality of their followers, the soldiers. We do not focus on that area, as it is beyond the scope of this project. However through many readings,<sup>82</sup> it is evident that culture is affected by social representation in the military, and these two together affect Armed Forces efficiency.

In Greece, there are no recent studies about social representation in the Military. During the '80s, D. Smokovitis<sup>83</sup> presented the historic trends of the social status of military personnel. Officers in the Greek military during that

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<sup>79</sup> C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 45-50.

<sup>80</sup> Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Brass, 1985).

<sup>81</sup> C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 45.

<sup>82</sup> See Williamson Murray, “Does Military Culture Matter?” Article presented at the *Foreign Research Institute Conference, Philadelphia*, July 1998; also Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

<sup>83</sup> See Dimitris Smokovitis, “Greece,” in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 250.

period were considered to be upper class and, in some instances, higher than the politicians, while soldiers – mostly draftees at that time - were considered prestigious and were honored by Greek society, mainly because of the patriotic institutional model of the Armed Forces that used to exist. Nevertheless, Greece had a black page in its history; the dictatorship of 1967-1974, led by a group of medium-rank Army officers.<sup>84</sup> That incident changed social perceptions regarding the military structure needed in the future. First, society demanded military officers to be chosen according to their abilities, and not according to family or social relations. Second, society also required a more professional conscription: draftees to be placed in positions according to their skills, and the Greek Military Model to be changed to a more occupational trend, hiring volunteers for technical jobs.

The trend towards occupationalism was aimed to force the military to look after its own business and not other civil matters. Both Smokovitis and Radbruch<sup>85</sup> agree with this opinion. The latter expressed an opinion toward occupationalism in Italy during the '80s, as he believed that it would reduce the praetorian tendencies of The Armed Forces.

A more recent look at the matter of social representation comes from an NPS thesis by Volker Gelhausen (1998).<sup>86</sup> In that thesis, social representation is examined for several countries in Europe and elsewhere. There are a lot of interesting data-tables and theories regarding the type of military system each country uses (draft vs. VF) and the social representation that

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<sup>84</sup> Their rank at that time was equivalent to Captain in the Navy, O-6 for U.S. Army.

<sup>85</sup> Hans E. Radbruch, "Institutional Versus Occupational Model in Italian Military," *Military Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1985): 3-35.

<sup>86</sup> Volker Gelhausen, *The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the Successful Implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998).

evolves. Gelhausen also uses some very helpful elements of Nadler's Organizational Behavior Theory,<sup>87</sup> which are also practical for understanding Moskos' I/O theory.

## **2. The Factor of Women's Representation**

This is the second subcategory of social representation that we examine in our study. Eitelberg<sup>88</sup> looks upon that issue, first historically. In 1980, women made up 11 percent, of the U.S. military while the proportion of women during the Vietnam-era draft was fewer than two percent.

Despite that increasing trend, women's proportion in the U.S. Armed Forces is far below their proportion in society (which is close to fifty percent). He then looks at the general argument that was made at that time – and it is still made today – for restricting women's participation in the military.

- Lower individual ability (compared to men)
- Lower unit cohesion
- Lower effectiveness (compared to all male units)<sup>89</sup>

In another work of the same author,<sup>90</sup> he adds one more concern: combat competence. This is another issue that was raised by opponents of women in the military. The author, by presenting opinion polls from various media, supports the ability of women being capable of undertaking the same combat burden as men. But, even if women are indeed capable, will it be a good evolution to have an exact representation of women (fifty percent) in the military? Will it be good for society? Will it be good for the core of society? For the families?

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<sup>87</sup> David A. Nadler and Michael Tusman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior," *The Organizational Behavior Reader*, 1991.

<sup>88</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, "Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations." *Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, Baltimore, MD, October 1989.

<sup>89</sup> These arguments were similar to the one made for restricting blacks' participation during the late 40s.

<sup>90</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, "Your Mother wears Combat Boots. But Should She Pack a Gun?" *Presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association*, Boston, MA, August 1990, 12, 14.

If we consider M Segal,<sup>91</sup> who presented family and military as contradicting greedy institutions, which both have great demands with respect to loyalty, time and energy, then we could easily pose the question: Could the traditional core of family, the mother, who takes care of her children, change to a father who takes care of his children? In the same article,<sup>92</sup> Rose and Lewis Coser present a similar argument and question the ability of society to take the burden of a wife that is devoted to the military instead of her family.

In addition, P. Shields<sup>93</sup> examines the perspectives of women in the U.S. Military under Moskos' (I/O) Model. She believes that an unplanned consequence of the draft's system would be an increased reliance of the U.S. military on women. She also foresees the trend increasing rather than decreasing, as official DoD reports suggest.<sup>94</sup> The interesting part of her study is the suggestion that women "vaccinate" the Armed Forces with several beneficial characteristics, besides the fact that no efficiency-related issue has been raised for them since their proportion in the military became bigger. Referring to the U.S. Occupational Model, the author suggests that, in spite of their volunteer job, women perceive the military in a more institutional way, keeping discipline and adventure as high priorities.

Nevertheless, the aspect of "family as greedy institution" implicitly becomes an argument of Shields, as she believes that a woman in the military has her "Institutional Identity" eroded by family responsibilities, since the military does not really accommodate women. For the Institutional Model of the military, the author believes that the typical female enlistee is probably more institutionally-oriented than her male counterpart. In general, she believes that

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<sup>91</sup> Mady Wechsler Segal, "The Military and The Family as Greedy Institutions," *Armed Forces and Society* 13, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 9-38.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>93</sup> Patricia Shields, "Sex Roles in the Military," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 111.

<sup>94</sup> DoD, *Manpower Installations and Logistics, Military Women in the Department of Defense, II* (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 3.

women today are integrated in the U.S. Armed Forces, and furthermore, they are institutionally-oriented with relevant embedded values. At the same time, she recognizes the hindrance that the military poses to a woman on family creation and motherhood.

In Greece thirty years ago, the picture was the exact opposite of what is in the U.S. today. During the '70s, Greece had a pure draft system; there were no women in the military, and the social value of family was in its highest level. Furthermore, not many women worked in jobs outside the house and the proportion of educated women was far below that of men<sup>95</sup>.

The evolution of Greek society along with the military for the past thirty years is really amazing. In 1982, the prime Minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, signed a law that established legal equity between men and women. The military followed society and, in the late '80s, the first women as five year volunteers, became reality<sup>96</sup>.

As Greece was integrating with the European Union, many European laws, practices, and jurisdictions applied to Greek society, moving the country forward in a more developed and civilized state.

Still, many disagree with the positive social impact of the EU in Greece, as they believe that over-capitalism and globalization destroyed the core of Greek Society, the family. This was mainly because wives departed from their typical role of child raisers and housekeepers and entered into the job market. As a consequence of having a job, women gained more social/economic power and self-esteem, a fact that broke the traditionally-defined family of the past century. As an indication that supports the above argument, divorces continuously rose

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<sup>95</sup> For relative research topics, see National Social Research Office of Greece: <http://www.ekke.gr/> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>96</sup> Dimitris Smokovitis, "Greece," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 252.

over the past 30 years, and today, they occurring approximately 25 percent of marriages.<sup>97</sup> This concern is very difficult to answer if we further consider the low birthrate of Greece.

As the military is a “greedy institution” for Greek women, it might also be an “unsuitable” one that goes against the Greek social norms and traditional family values. Despite the “traditional” social and military values in Greece, women in the Armed Forces are continuously increasing in numbers.

In general terms, the participation of women in the Greek Armed Forces is broken down to the following categories.<sup>98</sup>

- Officers: Women entered in the Military Academies with the same perspectives/career opportunities as men in late '90s.
- Petty Officers : Women entered the Military Petty Officers' body in 1999.
- Volunteers:<sup>99</sup> Women were accepted in the volunteer force with equal obligations to men in 1989.<sup>100</sup>
- Draftees: Women have not been drafted. Nevertheless, during the past five years, there have been some discussions regarding a possible draft for women.

As we can understand, the issue in Greece with women's representation is dual:

- Should they contribute proportionally to the military?
- Should they also be called as draftees?

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<sup>97</sup> All relevant data can be found in National Social Research Office of Greece: <http://www.ekke.gr/hellasinnnumbers> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>98</sup> Data found by the Greek recruitment Office <http://www.stratologia.gr/> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>99</sup> Volunteers have at least five year obligation.

<sup>100</sup> There were special admissions to the military for women prior to that. The first women entered the Armed Forces in 1979.

The National Greek Bureau of Statistics,<sup>101</sup> in its 2006 report,<sup>102</sup> gives us analytical data that conclude the following.

- Men and women are in approximately equal numbers in Greece
- Marriages declined, while divorces increased
- Fertility has declined radically<sup>103</sup>

The above facts, along with other research projects conducted by the Eurostat, help us define the role and the significance of women in Greek society and military.

### **3. Conclusion**

With the help of Moskos' division of Institutional and Organizational aspect of Military, which mostly reflects the draft and volunteer forces, we look upon the organizational effectiveness of the military. In more detail, we focus on social representation in the military and we are led by the analysis of Eitelberg based on the Military Representation Model (MRM), which is focusing on three goals/directions:<sup>104</sup> political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity. These are the goals of a proper social representation; our aim is to try to define the "proper" social representation, while implementing it in the Greek military.

The reasons for our attempt are basically two: first, to check the validity of MRM in a foreign environment, and second, to find solutions or new perspectives for the Greek military based on that model.

Social representation in Eitelberg's Model has various subcategories; nevertheless, we analyzed the reasons why we will examine only those two that apply in Greek society.

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<sup>101</sup> The official department of statistics regarding Greece and its population: <http://www.statistics.gr/> (accessed October 12, 2008).

<sup>102</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, *Hellas In Numbers* (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007).

<sup>103</sup> From 2.09 births per couple in 1981, it declined to 1.31 births per couple in 2003.

<sup>104</sup> See Appendix E.

- Political or socioeconomic representation
- Women's representation in military

Greece's case presents an extra interest for the following reasons.

- Greece has a great and long history, where many real social/military incidents can be evaluated
- The country is also under a transition period, both in society and military terms
- At present, the military is based on a dual system of draftees and volunteers
- Women are participating in the Greek Volunteer Force, but not in the conscription. At present, there are many discussions about conscripting women, even for social job conscription.<sup>105</sup>

The main advantage of this research is that, until this point, there has been no other research in Greece that has officially dealt with social representation and the military efficiency of draft and volunteer systems. In addition, we are in an era when every suggestion on that has an extra value, due to the transition phase of the political views regarding this issue.<sup>106</sup>

As for the quantitative part, we borrow some critical statistical data from the National Statistical Agency of Greece, the National Centre of Social Research of Greece and the European Statistics Office of the European Union. This should help us enhance our arguments and find a quantitative steady base for our qualitative pillars.

At this final part, we left a last book to be commented upon: *The Goal*<sup>107</sup>. This book has no direct relevance to our subject, as its content is about the

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<sup>105</sup> Social job conscription might be translated as serving the needs of the country in non – military positions according to each one's abilities/ education (e.g., teach in a remote village, technician in a university, help in a hospital etc.).

<sup>106</sup> Several articles have been written in Greek newspapers regarding the best military system to be followed.

<sup>107</sup> Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, *The Goal*. 20<sup>th</sup> ed. (Massachusetts: The North River Press, 1984).



inventory management of a factory. The reason we refer to it is that it offers an innovative way of presenting inventory management theory and principles through a very engaging novel.

Being inspired by this book, we will try to create a separate part of the project uses some characters as “sociological torches,” first in Greek society, and then in the Greek military. This last part of the project offers an interesting way of teaching through discussion and more interaction with the students. Of course, all of its points will be based on the scientific part of the study presented earlier. Through this method, we hope to understand the wills and the perceptions/emotions of the individuals, answering at the same time the criticism of Cotton to Moskos for not including individual values but only collective values in his model.<sup>108</sup> Some basic autobiographical data are presented in the note below.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> See present chapter, 8.

<sup>109</sup> As the basic author of this paper, I feel it is important to present my strengths, weaknesses and a short biographical profile, as the project contains many sociological and psychological aspects. First and foremost, I have no predetermined opinion about draft or VF. I have been an officer of the Navy for almost 19 years and I have lived and experienced both systems on a ship and in an office. Except for being educated in the Naval Academy, I got an undergraduate diploma in Social Studies at Athens University. I am married to Catherine, who has also served in the Navy as a Petty officer for 19 years now. Both my parents were working, and my father (Dimitrios) had served in the Coast Guard as a Petty Officer at first, and then as an officer. My mother, Maria, is retired and used to be an accountant in private companies. My economic status used to be and is right now between middle and upper middle (according to Eurostat's Criteria). My political beliefs are not at the far end of the political spectrum and I consider myself politically balanced. I have not faced any incident in my personal life or in my working environment that stigmatized me in any way.

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### **III. PRIOR TO THE ARMY**

#### **A. FACTORS AFFECTING YOUNG MEN'S DECISIONS TO VOLUNTEER OR TO SERVE AS CONSCRIPTS IN THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES**

In this chapter, we examine the “who” and the “why” of the manpower part of military.<sup>110</sup> That means:

- Who is willing to volunteer?
- Why is he willing to do so?

One might ask whether a pro-military examination of military manpower is needed. Our reason for examining the choice of youngsters is a direct effect of the issue of manning the armed forces, as, in any procedure, the incoming “raw material” generally determines the “final product.” In our case, the final product is the military efficiency of the Hellenic A.F.

Aside from who looking at incoming military personnel, we later benefit by examining those who volunteer. That benefit is the easier implementation of the MRM model, which is based on the socioeconomic factors of those participating in the Army force. As a result, we then have an idea of the socioeconomic status of volunteer groups.

Additionally, in this chapter we refine the meaning of socioeconomic status. Although we might not offer a detailed refinement, we show which the most critical element of socioeconomic status is at least for Greek Society. Again, this fact is extremely useful later when implementing the MRM model in the Greek military and society.

Armed Forces' efficiency is dependent on two key factors.

- Quality of manpower and administration
- Quality of technological means/weapons

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<sup>110</sup> As we are examining the present situation of the Hellenic Military, we take as granted that every man has to serve anyway as a conscript, so the freedom of choice lies only on whether he should be a volunteer.

By examining who is entering the military pool, we can determine the first factor, quality.

This examination of the quality factor of manpower will be very useful when we focus on the interrelation between those entering the Armed Forces and the society in general.

To understand the factors affecting the choice of a youngster to enlist, we should first see what the military has to offer, as well as the conditions that might make the military's benefits most appealing.

### **1. Why These Factors are Crucial**

Instead of examining this subject theoretically, we chose to examine it using more qualitative factors and more realistic theories. So we use the microeconomic principles along with the tools of supply and demand curves. In that way, our analysis is more solid and easier to capture, as most of the conclusions in this part came through the supply-demand graphs.

As is evident, we fully embed the occupationalism theory of Moskos for the volunteer force, and we consider the military profession as a labor part of the general labor market. So, we use the "Free Market" principle as the one that mostly formulates the decision toward military volunteerism. It is also our belief that, especially during peacetime, these decisions depend mainly on realistic and not ideological criteria.

The way we construct the "Supply Demand"/ Economic Market Model is to correlate the "Military Offerings" to the "Supply" line, and what youngsters ask to the "Demand line," Of course, what people ask for is a semi-free choice that they make, as it is closely related to what it is feasible to get. For example, everybody would ask for a big salary, but they would also be happy if they could achieve a little higher salary than the average of their same-level colleagues. That is why we will use as the measure of demand the generally accepted current average of each monetary or other value earned as a salary or benefit from each job.

**a. What Does the Military Offer to the Volunteers?**

- First, a salary of about 1000 €<sup>111</sup> while the average salary of a low-level employee (one that has only finished school with no other education) is approximately 650 €<sup>112</sup>.
- Second, military service offers a steady job. This is a very valuable benefit, as the present trend in Greece, and in Europe generally, is toward privatization and part-time jobs.
- Third, the military offers full-coverage on health insurance. In Greece, health insurance is a kind of public good and everybody is eligible to enjoy free health benefits. Nevertheless, there are many cases where private insurance is required. In addition, the part-time occupation erodes these public-health benefits.<sup>113</sup>
- Finally, military service is valued by Greek society, so the volunteer would be esteemed by the society in general. Surveys of Eurobarometer<sup>114</sup> show that the majority of the society (87 percent) sees the military job as a highly esteemed.<sup>115</sup>

The above are the basic elements of what the military offers to a person who chooses to enlist. There are several others, such as health coverage of the parents, traveling to other places in and out the country, etc., that we chose not to focus on in the present study.

**b. What the Military Demands from Volunteers**

Of course, there is also another side the military: what it asks from volunteers. Thus, the military often means the following.

- In general, a demanding job, requiring continuous training and long hours of work

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<sup>111</sup> John Androulakis, "Volunteers," *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).

<sup>112</sup> National Law, "Minimum Wages for 2006-2007," April 13, 2006, [http://hta.org.gr/pdf%20files/egsse\\_2006\\_2007.pdf](http://hta.org.gr/pdf%20files/egsse_2006_2007.pdf) (accessed October 26, 2008).

<sup>113</sup> For more information see Hellenic Ministry of Public Health, <http://www.mohaw.gr/gr/yegeia/index.html> (accessed October 24, 2008); National Statistical Office of Greece, *Hellas in Numbers* (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 9.

<sup>114</sup> Eurobarometer Survey, 48 and 54.1; completed 1997 and 2000, respectively.

<sup>115</sup> For more analysis on that subject, see Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003).

- A strict hierarchical job, where one loses some parts of personal freedom
- A job that obligates the member and his family, in most of cases, to move often from one's home.
- A job that generally affects one's personal and family life, regardless of the time of the day, while on duty or not
- A potentially dangerous, life-threatening job<sup>116</sup>

### ***c. The Supply and Demand Economic Theory***

The offerings of the military mentioned previously help to formulate the Demand (for military jobs) line of the Microeconomic Supply/Demand graph for labor. This line will not be anchored to some specific points. For example, we do not have, and it is very difficult to collect, data relating to the specific number of persons attracted to the Army, when the salary is 2,000€. So, the positioning of the line will be in comparison to the relevant line of the general labor demand of the market. Of course, we always compare jobs with relevant prerequisite educational levels. Figure 3.1 shows the military labor “demand” line standing by itself in the supply/demand graph:

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<sup>116</sup> This feature of the military depends on the country's overall strategy. For example the level of danger is different when you enlist for the U.S. Army and the Hellenic Army. The strategic dogma of Greece is defensive deterrent as it is depicted in the relevant documents: “White Bible of the Hellenic Armed Forces,” and the site: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, <http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage356> (accessed October 24, 2008). In addition, the history of the past 30 years-after the dictatorship- also showed that, except for accidents, there were not any battle-losses for the Greek A.F.. As a consequence, this factor is slightly considered by the potential volunteers.




Figure 3.1. Supply – Demand Curve for Military Jobs

Now we have to incorporate in Figure 3.1 the private labor sector and the job demand attached to it. As we see, the demand is defined by the respective offering of benefits. So, for the current social situation - as analyzed earlier - the theoretical line of “military job” benefits ( $B_m$ ) will be placed above the theoretical line of “private-job” benefits ( $B_{pr.}$ ). This means that for the same pool of high school graduates, the military offers more benefits than a private sector job.




Figure 3.2. Supply – Demand Curve for general and military jobs.

To give a better understanding of what Figure 3.2 shows, we explain it briefly. For a specific educational or technical-level job, there is a general job supply depicted in the “general labor supply line.” This line denotes that, whenever higher benefits are given by employers, a larger number of employees is attracted to that job, or a stronger demand is created.<sup>117</sup> So, moving in the right direction on the job-supply line, we increase the benefits and we attract more employees. This is the case for the military as depicted in Figure 3.2. The military gives higher benefits ( $B_m$ ) than the private sector ( $B_{pr.}$ ) and it

<sup>117</sup> Of course, this must fall within the limits of employee’s pool of the society. Specifically, in Greece and in most European countries, due to the unemployment rate (roughly 10%), there is a continuous demand for jobs, so the employee pool it is not supposed to be eliminated.



attracts more employees ( $Q_m$ ) than the private sector ( $Q_{pr.}$ ). This means that all prospective employees are first filling the vacant jobs in the military sector and then they are looking for a job in the private sector.<sup>118</sup>

At this point, and before examining the other part of the graph – the Demand, - we should consider that we base our “Supply and Demand” analysis on the institutional/ occupational model of Moskos<sup>119</sup> and especially on the side of occupationalism of the Military Volunteer-job, which means that a position in the military is seen and valued as an ordinary job with its advantages and its weak points.

But, why are we picking the occupational explanation of the Model for the case of Greece? Why, for instance, did we not add an important intrinsic benefit to military occupation: that is, having the satisfaction of serving one’s country? The reason for doing so is given by the responses of the specific focus group (the Greek youth in our case), through surveys conducted by Hellenic and European official institutions. These responses mainly form the military labor Supply and Demand<sup>120</sup>. There are two main factors that affect both the Supply of military jobs and the demand for them.

- The military operational needs of the Country, in the historic period under examination and
- The personal needs of individuals, during the same period

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<sup>118</sup> This will be evident in the next chapter, as we will present real data of the applicants for a military volunteer position. The number of applicants in 2003 was more than triple the positions requested to fill.

<sup>119</sup> Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, *The Military, More than Just a Job?* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988).

<sup>120</sup> We should not forget that the “demand” for a job and especially a military one is related to the socioeconomic status quo of the country and the focus group in particular (the high school graduates in our case). For example, the benefits of a third world country’s military are much less compared to the benefits of a developed country’s military. Nevertheless, the youngsters of an undeveloped country still enlist as they find it attractive, compared to the benefits of other jobs in their country.

For the first one, if the country is at war or in a state of tension with another country, there are multiple ways that individuals might react; they might believe in the country's superior need and enlist; they might be mostly affected by the individualism trend of capitalistic societies and avoid the service. There is no clear answer on the issue, and we will not attempt to give one without having relevant data. Nevertheless, the above described uncertainty serves as an argument for a draft, since a draft, allow a country to easily mobilize civilians when they are needed. These civilians, as ex-conscripts, would have a short period of military experience, and be able to offer their services to the armed forces immediately when needed.<sup>121</sup>

As for the second factor, personal needs change according to the economic status of the whole country and of our focus group (the youngsters between 18 and 26 years of age).<sup>122</sup>

Observing the official statistical findings of the Hellenic Statistical Agency,<sup>123</sup> we can see that the unemployment rate is relatively steady at roughly 10 percent of the labor force in Greece.

A more detailed survey on the employment and financial position of Europeans, and specifically Greeks, can be found in the "Eurobarometer" findings of 2007.<sup>124</sup> As seen in Figure 3.3, Europeans are unable to find a job mainly due to the lack of opportunities and not to the lack of education.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> This is a very critical factor, especially for Greece, as its population of about 10 million people does not provide the luxury of a huge soldier pool to pick when manpower needs are increasing.

<sup>122</sup> This is the acceptable age in order to be enlisted. See the relevant announcement of the Ministry of Defense: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, <http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages56> (accessed October 24, 2008).

<sup>123</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, *Hellas in Numbers* (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 6.

<sup>124</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series* 202, 2007.

<sup>125</sup> Greeks replied that they cannot find a job due to a lack of job opportunities at a ratio of 54%, the second highest in Europe after Portugal with 63%; *Ibid.*, 56.




Figure 3.3. What is to blame for unemployment?<sup>126</sup>

In the same survey,<sup>127</sup> the new generation replies that, when unemployed, they would accept any satisfactory, stable job.<sup>128</sup> A summary of responses to this question on the survey is presented in Figure 3.4, below.




Figure 3.4. What Greeks would do if unemployed. Most probable possibility (in percent)<sup>129</sup>

<sup>126</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007): 56.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>128</sup> Greeks would take any stable job at a ratio of 42% while only 2% would keep on looking for a job considered as appropriate for them.

<sup>129</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007): 68.

This denotes that a military job is a potential solution, not only when someone is facing unemployment, but also as a general plan for the future.

In the same study,<sup>130</sup> there is one more interesting finding: the reason that young generations do not move from their parents' house is because they cannot afford to do so. This is critical, as the military's disadvantage of having to move out of one's home town proves to be not so important, since the youngsters' reason for not moving is usually their bad financial situation.<sup>131</sup>

Apart from those factors, the "demand" of the young generation toward the military occupation is mainly affected by their future expectations or beliefs. These are clearly described in another Eurobarometer survey.<sup>132</sup>

Based on that very recent (2008) survey, it is evident that:

- Youngsters in general are pessimistic for what is coming in the future.<sup>133</sup>
- What they believe is the worst part is the potential for future unemployment and the extension of their working lives,<sup>134</sup> along with less income.<sup>135</sup>
- Greece has the highest rate among countries whose citizens believe that, in twenty years time, they will not be able to afford proper medical treatment (84 percent).<sup>136</sup>

The reason for mentioning all the above fears of the young generation is that the same factors represent the advantages of a military occupation, where members are given stability, good pay, and medical insurance for themselves and their family.

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<sup>130</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007): 71.

<sup>131</sup> Again, Greeks have one of the highest ratios (61 percent) in that survey, in replying that they cannot afford to move from their parental house.

<sup>132</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Expectations of Europeans in 20 Years Time," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 227*, 2008.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

Finally, the demand of a youngster to volunteer in the Military is affected by another qualitative factor: the social appreciation of the job. For example, there are other jobs that make money and might have stability, but they are not considered as potential future employment by young people.<sup>137</sup> In this matter, we have a solid base to believe that, during the past thirty years (after the dictatorship), Greeks appear to hold the profession of the military,<sup>138</sup> in high regard.

The above analysis has sustained the results that came out of Figure 3.2, where an open market model is used for attracting volunteers. But what happens in the case where a war is probable or it actually occurs? How will this model react? The complete “supply-demand” graph for that case is depicted in Figure 3.5.

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<sup>137</sup> For example, in the survey The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202*, 2007, when youngsters were asked if they would work in the black economy they answered negatively by a percent of 92%.

<sup>138</sup> During the past 30 years, several surveys indicated that the Greek society expresses its confidence to the Military (For more see: Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999) (survey done in the 1980s); Eurobarometer 48 (1997); Eurobarometer 54.1 (2000). Another clear indication of that is that every year since the 1980s the required high school grade to enter to Military academies is increasing (See the relevant site of Ministry of Public Education: Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm)) (accessed October 12, 2008).




Figure 3.5.: Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor<sup>139</sup> during war.

As seen in Figure 3.5 the benefits and the quantities of employees between the military and the private sector jobs are reversed on the occasion of a war. The benefits of the military, in the instance of a war, are reduced, due to the great danger the Volunteer might face. In that occasion, the private sector offers a better job proposal for the youngster. As a result, the quantities of volunteers would lessen while the actual demand for them would increase. Thus, a volunteer deficit might be created  $((\text{Equilibrium } Q_m) - (\text{Needed } Q'_m))$ , forcing the Armed Forces to receive the last-resort employees who will neither be the best choice for the A.F., nor representative of the society they would defend.

<sup>139</sup> We are always focusing on the sample of youngsters who have a high school diploma. There is no indication that volunteers exceed the minimum requirements. Later on, we elaborate on the issue of the formulation of the volunteer force. Apart from that, from a wide experience of the author in the navy, it is very rare to find a volunteer having a university or high - technical diploma. In addition, those who plan to enter the military as a university graduate are most likely to attend a military academy.

The above analysis leads to the following two conclusions regarding the Greek situation.

- The criteria for choosing the military profession - especially in peacetime - are totally “open-market” criteria without any “institutional” thoughts
- At present, and for the lower educational level youth,<sup>140</sup> a military job is an appealing and more promising choice than a relevant job in the private sector

These young people must now be categorized according to their socioeconomic status to make MRM implementation in Greece easier. Of course, the socioeconomic factor is an abstract measure that differs among different societies and different eras. In the following section, we try to refine the socioeconomic factor that is relevant to today’s Greek society.<sup>141</sup>

## **2. How is Socioeconomic Status Defined in Greek Society?**

First, we have to define the meaning of “socioeconomic,” Then we can estimate it in Greek society and especially among those willing to volunteer.

### **a. What is the Socioeconomic Factor?**

Among many definitions that can be found in publications from sociology and economics, we picked the most important points in the writings of Teachman, Call, Segal and the U.S. Congress<sup>142</sup>. We extracted the following elements that mainly form the socioeconomic factors for a youngster.

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<sup>140</sup> High school graduates.

<sup>141</sup> Later on we will sustain that assumption with research data.

<sup>142</sup> For more see Jay Teachman, Vaughn Call, and Mady W. Segal. “The Selectivity of Military Enlistment.” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 21, (Winter 1993): 287-309; Congress of the United States, *Social Representation in the U.S. Military* (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1989).

- Financial level of the parents
- Educational level of the youngster
- Education of the parents.
- Social position of the parents.
- Race/ Ethnicity

***b. Analysis of the Elements of the Socioeconomic Status in the Greek Society***

(1) The Financial Status of the Family. This directly affects and defines the financial situation of their children, especially those who have recently graduated from high school and do not have a job of their own.

(2) The Educational Level of the Youngster. This is the second element of socioeconomic status. The educational level of a young person is mainly driven by three forces: the personal will to be educated, the parents' will to educate their child, and, finally the means required to do so. Greece is considered a country that promotes public and free education without creating the need for individuals to spend money, even through the completion of the Public University.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, reality seems to be quite different. As multiple studies have shown, educating a youngster requires great expense, to the point that a middle-class family does not have the means to do so. Research by a well-respected educational institution in Greece shows the following:<sup>144</sup>

- At least for the years 2004 to 2006, the cost of educating a child rose much more than the average increase in wages
- Private tuition is a big general educational expense, which most of the parents pay, irrespective of whether their children are studying in a public school or not

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<sup>143</sup> Books and tuition for anyone that chooses to attend public schools are free. This is also the case for those who pass the general exams for entering the public universities. There, too, books and tuition are free.

<sup>144</sup> "The Cost of Education for the Hellenic Household," ISTAME (Institute of Independent Studies), 2006.



- A great expense that most of families consider when their child thinks of studying at a university away from the family is rent and other living expenses. These expenses are estimated at 600 €<sup>145</sup>

So, a great consideration of the parents - especially those in difficult financial situations - is the economic need of their child while studying for at least four years in a university.

The situation becomes more difficult when the child's university is in a city far from the home city of the family. As a previous study<sup>146</sup> shows, the economy plays a major role in a child's decision not to leave the parents' home, even if that child is employed. So, if an employed young individual cannot sustain himself, one can imagine how difficult it would be for a family to sustain its child while studying and living in another city.<sup>147</sup>

To add one more bit of evidence to our findings regarding the close relationship between education of the youngsters, socioeconomic position, and economic status, we cite a recent survey that was conducted in Greece by a respectable educational institution. The survey examined the cost of education for each family from elementary school to the university,<sup>148</sup> and found the following:

- On average, between the years 2005-2006, the increase in the education cost for all grades was close to 20 percent, while increases in salaries were approximately three percent
- The cost of studying in a university away from the family house incurs an increased cost of 50 percent compared with five years ago (an approximately increase of about ten percent per year)
- The monthly cost of rent and utilities for a university student studying in another city on his own, would be close to 600€, which is the lowest salary that one can receive in Greece in 2008

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<sup>145</sup> To compare, the lowest country's legal wage is at the same level as that amount.

<sup>146</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series* 202, 2007.

<sup>147</sup> This relation, between the educational level of the young ones and the financial situation of their families, is a really wide one. In this part, we tried to sustain our position as briefly as possible, as we will discuss aspects of that relation in several points in this study.

<sup>148</sup> "The Cost of Education for the Hellenic Household," ISTAME, 2006.

Despite the great weight of the family financial factor on the child's educational level, there is another factor that might lead the child to higher education, even though in a difficult financial status. This is the prior education of his parents.

(3) The Education of the Parents. This might strengthen the will of the child to be more educated. In addition, the parents themselves would do their best to educate their child as they have been educated. A survey of the European Commission conducted in 2007 is very revealing:<sup>149</sup>

**How can better access to opportunities help reduce inequalities?**

The analysis presented in the Report suggests that promoting equal opportunities in the European Union could make a major contribution to both greater social cohesion and economic growth. For example, children of parents with a high level of education are four times as likely to attain a higher level of education themselves as children from a low education background. Higher education levels are of course associated with higher incomes and a much reduced risk of unemployment.<sup>150</sup>

Furthermore, another study shows that the parents of students who leave school are of low education and have low-income jobs.<sup>151</sup> Still, is this factor the same as the "Social status of the parents"?

(4) The social Status of People in Europe and in Greece. This used to be differentiated from their economic status a century ago.<sup>152</sup> Currently, it is evident that the only distinction in society is between the rich and

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<sup>149</sup> "Eurostat – Unit F.3 -Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities," European Commission, April 2008; European Commission, "Eurostat – Unit F.3 -Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities," April 2008, [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/spsi/reports\\_social\\_situation\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/reports_social_situation_en.htm) (accessed October 24, 2008), 3.

<sup>150</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>151</sup> Nikos Fakiolas, "Why Kids Leave School," *Hellenic Centre of Social Studies - Research Paper* (2000).

<sup>152</sup> A professor in a university used to belong in the upper-class of Europe and Greece in late 1800's and early 1900's without this meaning that he was rich. Nowadays, social castes are eliminated and in their position, economical castes have risen.

the poor, as it is evident from two surveys of the European Union. In a 2008 survey<sup>153</sup> by Eurobarometer, Greeks – as well as Europeans - responded that, in the future, the social problem would be the gap between the rich and the poor (and not the gap among social classes). In the same survey, Greeks indicated that they believe that personal efforts are a more important influence on their overall chances in life (66 percent) than is their family social background (32 percent).

In the same survey, Europeans indicate that they want to see the gap between rich and poor reduced in the future.<sup>154</sup> As an abstract from that survey states:

EU citizens were then presented with statements about expectations regarding social conditions, or *social reality*, in 20 years' time and asked whether they agreed or disagreed with them.

Respondents were the most likely to agree with the statements saying that, in 20 years' time:

- The gap between the rich and the poor in one's country would be wider (Percentage of those who agree: 82 percent) and,
- People's working lives would be extended (Percentage of those who agree: 80 percent).

Finally, if, there is no social distinction, is there any race or ethnicity distinction in Greek society?

(5) The Race or Ethnicity Distinction. This is a relatively new issue for Greeks.<sup>155</sup> Race issues have not been addressed before now. On the other hand, some issues have emerged, especially with regard to

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<sup>153</sup> The Gallup Organization, "Expectations of Europeans in 20 years time." *Flash Eurobarometer Series 227* (2008).

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>155</sup> It started in the early 1990's after some political decisions that allowed immigrants from the Balkans and specifically from Albania to enter Greece.

Albanians.<sup>156</sup> According to a survey conducted in 2007 by the Panteion University of Athens<sup>157</sup> on behalf of the European Union in 2007 the following was found.

- 7.3 percent of the whole country's population are immigrants (approximately 800,000 people)<sup>158</sup>
- Half of the immigrants (3.5 percent) come from Albania (approximately 440,000 people)

Apart from the relatively low immigrant levels, another fact keeps ethnic issues from affecting military volunteerism: Greece maintains a very strict policy determining Greek ethnicity status.<sup>159</sup> Greek ethnicity status is an absolute criterion for being accepted in the Greek military; so, until recently, immigrants have not been able to enter the Hellenic A.F.

Finalizing the analysis of the elements that form the socioeconomic status, we conclude that the most essential element is that of the financial situation of the family. This conclusion will help to treat socioeconomic status as the simpler family economic status, and to use it later in the MRM<sup>160</sup>.

### **3. What are the Future Job-Alternatives for Each Socioeconomic Category of Youngsters?**

Assuming a connection between economic and social status, one might ask: If a richer child does better in school, so as to gain a potentially higher

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<sup>156</sup> Albanians are the largest immigrant group and most of the people focus on their attitudes. In addition, they usually live in groups in close areas, resulting in minor incidents with the native social web.

<sup>157</sup> Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Immigrant Integration in Greece," *UEHR- Panteion University* (2005).

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>159</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, *Hellas in Numbers* (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 41.

<sup>160</sup> This equation concerns only the Greek society and is a little bit rough. Although, it depicts a quite true picture of the Greek reality. We do not have the ability to extend our analysis further on that. Nevertheless, the conclusion that we came up with, which is a direct positive relation between children's educational level and parents financial status, is also sustained by several research projects, such as the official report by: European Commission, "Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities," *Eurostat* (April 2008): 4-60.

educational status, wouldn't this result in higher social status? And following this line if reasoning wouldn't a person's high economic situation these become a hindrance to volunteering for the military?

At first sight, we might answer no. However, we need to look for relevant data, derived from reliable sources. To achieve that, we examine the alternatives<sup>161</sup> of each socioeconomic (or, as we have shown, economic) category.<sup>162</sup> Let us start with the higher economical status of families/children.<sup>163</sup>

The upper-economic status families would want their children to make as much money as they make, or at least to have an easy life. These criteria counter the military choice. Apart from that, they have plenty of alternatives. Some of them would be able to enroll in a university in another European country and earn a degree as valuable as the ones given in Greek universities.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Referring to alternatives, we focus on what the youngsters could do in case they don't succeed in the general high school exams that lead into universities. We will overcome the obstacle of answering the question of who is succeeding in the general exams, the rich or the poor, and we will focus on their understanding of the options they have in life in the case of failing to pass these exams.

<sup>162</sup> We will use the categorization found in official EU chambers such as European Commission, "Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities," *Eurostat* (April 2008): 4. In this report, we read: "In 2004, around 100 million Europeans (22% of the total population) had less than 60% of the EU median income of around €8000 per year for a single person or €22 a day." So roughly the high income could be 20,000 €, the average 14,000 € and the low 8,000 € per year per person".

<sup>163</sup> Regarding the ratio of youngsters living in their parents' house till late after graduating from university or high school; for some western societies and primarily for USA, the connection of family economic status to the status of their children might not be understandable. It is very usual in Mediterranean countries, for children to be financially helped by their parents until late in their lives (see previous cited survey: The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007): 71.)

<sup>164</sup> Most of the universities in Greece are public and you do not have to pay. On the occasion that a student fails in the University introductory exams, he has two options: Studying in domestic institutions that are not validated, or enlisting in a university abroad For validating foreign universities diplomas in Greece, one has to go over rigorous exams given by a public institution called DIKATSA, but sooner or later the students who go this route pass the exams and their foreign diplomas are considered equal to the Greek ones, which means that they can apply for work in the public or private sector.

Another option for rich families/children is to have a kind of a personal job funded by their parents. Many enterprise options also exist for these youngsters, one of which is to continue in the profitable job of their parents if the latter are self employed.

For the middle socioeconomic class, educational/occupational alternatives are reduced; nevertheless, they exist. Middle socioeconomic class youngsters could try for a not high-budget university of Europe, or even get a loan and start a business for their own children. The critical factor that affects the middle class, though, is future economic uncertainty, as described in a previously cited survey. As discussed below, this middle class, which tends to be the larger class, is a crucial determining factor of military personnel quality, due to the fact that the portion of this class entering the military affects the social representation factor, as described in Eitelberg's MRM. So the factors that most affect this social group are the future economic and quality of living forecasts. Due to the lack of funds, this group feels quite sure about the present, but is worried about its future prospects.

The lower financial social group is mostly concerned about the present and how to cope with economic and other difficulties. As a result, high school graduates in this category do not plan to go abroad for studies or to get a loan for a new business. They are mainly directed toward the prospect of stability and moderate income.<sup>165</sup> Finally, the only alternative for the lower financial social group is to learn a technical skill and be a technician or a farmer or a labor worker. All these labor-intensive jobs might be prosperous, but they do not guarantee the future economic stability of the Greek youth.

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<sup>165</sup> See related survey answers in previous cited surveys: The Gallup Organization, "Expectations of Europeans in 20 Years Time," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 227* (2008); The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007).

#### **4. How Would a Differentiation in the Future's Economic and Social Wellbeing Alter the Choices of the Youngster?**

This is a great concern when estimating the social representation in the military, as the occupationalism of the military service is quite evident today. As we stated in the previous part, the middle socioeconomic class is mostly affected by expectations regarding the economy and society. For example, surveys shows that, today, the greatest number of young people in Greece are afraid about their future employment and other issues related to their economic and social life. We could say that we are living in a pessimistic period, where the employment benefits of the military seem better than benefits in the private sector. This may help to explain why the Armed Forces are not current facing a problem in enlisting volunteers.<sup>166</sup>

Still, what would be the case when an optimistic future job perspective occurs? The middle class would most probably move away from the military. If we could consider that case as one where the private sector offers more benefits in general as compared with the Armed Forces, we would have the opposite of the initial (peacetime) supply-demand graph, where fewer employees would have a demand for a military job ( $Q_m$ ) and the larger part of the labor force would prefer a private-sector job ( $Q_{pr}$ ). This relationship between private sector and military jobs resembles the relationship between them seen in the case of war, which was presented in paragraph Figure 3.5. This happens as these two prospective employers compete to offer relatively greater benefits. That situation is represented in the Figure 3.6:

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<sup>166</sup> See the supply and demand graph in present chapter paragraph A1 and the relevant sources: Jay Teachman, Vaughn Call, and Mady W. Segal, "The Selectivity of Military Enlistment," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 21, Winter (1993): 287-309; John Androulakis, "Volunteers *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).




Figure 3.6. Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor when future perspectives are positive.

As seen in Figure 3.6, in the case, the military's pool of potential volunteers shrinks, and the advantage goes to private sector. A labor surplus is even created for private sector jobs. This means that a youngster would have enlistment as his third priority; his first priority would be the private sector; and his second would be to wait to go in the private sector in the future or even take a private job with fewer benefits than the army, with the expectation that things might get better in the future. In fact, it is the reverse situation of the one Greece is experiencing in 2008.

In addition to this difficult case for military recruitment, we should add the inherent weakness of the Armed Forces in adjusting to an open-market environment by increasing the benefits given to the volunteers. The Armed Forces cannot move the way a company does, according to future estimates of



the economy and profits, but rather, must move according to a relatively steady budget. As a result, the military has the disadvantage of moving slowly toward the equilibrium of demand and supply by increasing the benefits supplied slowly and without the ability to make large or sudden changes in its budget.

An additional factor applies to Greek society regarding the choice of volunteering or not: that is the future stability of the area and the international relations among Greece and its neighbors. Young people will weigh the forecast of a peaceful or a turbulent future to make their choice. For example, given the same benefits from the Army, when a peaceful situation exists and when a war is imminent or probable, the choice of joining the Army would be harder in the second case.

If we compare the demand and supply graph from Figure 3.2., this time we would have a transition of demand for military jobs to a lower level, resulting in fewer people volunteering for the Armed Forces.

As we can understand, the volunteer pool grows continuously smaller when moving from peace conditions to tension and, finally, war.

Here we face a Gordian Knot regarding recruiting for an All-Volunteer-Force in a tension or war situation. How will this type of Armed Forces cope with that issue? How will the military attract volunteers in such a harsh period? How could the Armed Forces, in addition to attracting volunteers, recruit in a small span of time and train those new recruits while that tension is progressing and numerous operational needs emerge? The above situations tend to be disadvantages for the All Volunteer Force in general and, more specifically, for Greece.

This issue has another face - the operational one - but we will now examine the issue from the perspective of problematic recruitment.<sup>167</sup>In general, when economic perspectives get better, or tension between the home and another country emerges, the volunteer pool becomes smaller, pushing the military job demand downward. This situation forces the state to raise the benefits to attract more volunteers.

In the latter situation of tension or wars, there is an additional problem: Armed Forces normally need more volunteers to cover new operational needs. That means that the supply for military labor is increased; however, while supply increases and demand decreases, a big military volunteerism deficit is created. This deficit is, in most cases, created quickly and without warning, as tension between countries or even war is not predetermined, and usually happens overnight.

In the same situation - tension or war- one might also recruit civilians. In a country that has a draft force, these civilians would be more experienced and trained than those of another country that uses AVF. This is mainly an efficiency issue for the Army and it is discussed further in the following chapter.<sup>168</sup>

Concluding the first part of the chapter devoted to the period “Prior to the Army,” we analyzed the following subjects.

- Who is choosing to volunteer?
- Why is he deciding to do so?
- What would be his alternatives in another economic or security environment?

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<sup>167</sup> Since the U.S.A is currently involved into at least two war zones (Iraq, Afghanistan) finding volunteers tends to be a rigorous task .More specifically, in the book by Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, another useful argument is presented: who is going to enlist when not only a war is in progress, but an unfavorable outcome is forecasted? In *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hearts the Country*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 167.)

<sup>168</sup> This study also includes an interview with an experienced retired officer, in recruiting service, Mr. Gus Moutos. (See Chapter IV)

To include the whole population of youngsters in the prior-to-the-Army age group, we should also look at the perspectives of the female group in Greek Society.

## **B. WHAT IS THE CASE FOR WOMEN IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY FORCE ?**

### **1. History of Women in the Hellenic Military Force**

Up until now, we have examined mainly the option that young men have between being drafted or volunteering for at least five years in the Hellenic Military force. In Greece, there is no such option for women; they are not conscripted, and only during recent years have they been accepted as volunteers.<sup>169</sup> Numerous discussions have taken place recently regarding this issue, and, more specifically, what military and society have to gain or loose from that decision.

#### ***a. Women and Draft***

Hellenic history up to now shows that women and the military are not two separate concepts. Women fought along with men in the front of several wars very effectively. That was the case in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1941-1945), and other smaller-scale conflicts.<sup>170</sup> From a first view, therefore, there is no evidence that women are not efficient in the Greek Army, or that the culture of the Army does not accept them. But what is their opinion about the Military? Do they want to be drafted? There is no specific survey to answer that question; nevertheless, a recent announcement that came out from the Hellenic Women Union, stated that

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<sup>169</sup> For a short history on Greek women in the military, see Appendix B.

<sup>170</sup> See Appendix B for more.

their position is clear and unanimous, and it is a rejection of drafting women.<sup>171</sup> The same opinion came from all of the political parties of Greece except the current ruling party.<sup>172</sup>

Women's main argument against being drafted is mainly the low birthrate that Greece faces in general, and the special role that a woman plays in the sustainment of a family. These arguments are examined below.

### **b. Women and Military Volunteerism**

In this part, we examine women's status in Greece on the issue of participating in the volunteer force. Although we do not have specific general surveys on that matter, we have even more valuable real data: those of the women applicants for volunteer positions.<sup>173</sup> These data show that the number of applicants is between three to five times more than the number of volunteer positions available. In this case, the same socioeconomic factors analyzed before apply both to men and women, making the demand for a steady job the strongest determinant.<sup>174</sup>

The equality of sexes is a second determining factor that raised the participation of women in the volunteer force. Two surveys by the European

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<sup>171</sup> This response came as a reply on various scenarios that were publicized by the Hellenic Ministry of Defense regarding the potential drafting of women along with other changes in the Hellenic Armed Forces. (See: Loukas Dimakas, "Hellenic women union is Opposing the volunteer conscription," *Newspaper "Ta Nea,"* April 4, 2006.)

<sup>172</sup> New Democracy is the governing party and is supposed to lie on the "right". The other two big parties that lie on the "middle" and "left" political wing, distributed announcements that opposed or at least did not support the idea of drafting women.

<sup>173</sup> For specific data see: John Androulakis, "VolunteersScopia.gr (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008); Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, <http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp> (accessed October 24, 2008).

<sup>174</sup> In order to get a live taste of what real persons (women) responded as to why they choose to volunteer, see Ilias Kapetanakis, "Conscripting Women: An evil or a necessity?(2006), <http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-main.asp> (accessed October 26, 2008).

Commission (EU)<sup>175</sup> show some interesting results. Specifically for Greece, the surveys show a transition in a common belief of the society regarding the equality of genders. The first-cited survey, (done in 1996)<sup>176</sup> has various elements that reveal a more conservative society.<sup>177</sup>

In addition,<sup>178</sup> as seen in Figure 3.7 the survey reports that Greeks have the highest percentage of respondents who support the role of women as children-raisers rather than job hunters.




Figure 3.7. Percentages of those that agree, in each country, to the statement: "A mother should give priority to her young child rather than to her work"<sup>179</sup>

<sup>175</sup> European Commission, "Study on Intergrading Women in EU," *Directorate-General For Employment and Social Affairs* (2002); European Commission, Eurobarometer, "Equal Opportunities for Women and Men," *Directorate-General for Employment* 44.3 (1996).

<sup>176</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer, "Equal Opportunities for Women and Men," *Directorate-General for Employment* 44.3 (1996).

<sup>177</sup> For example, on the debate of women staying in house or going to work opinions are divided in half (50% for and 50% against). *Ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>178</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer, "Equal Opportunities for Women and Men," *Directorate-General for Employment* 44.3 (1996): 36.

<sup>179</sup> Eurobarometer, *Report on Equality of Sexes* -44.3 (1996). The abbreviations represent the European countries. Greece (GR) is far right with the highest percentage.

As the years have passed, a more liberal aspect of Greek society has become evident. As a result, in the EU's survey of 2002,<sup>180</sup> Greece is positioned in a group of countries that believes in and supports, not only individually but also officially, the equality of sexes, especially in the employment area.<sup>181</sup>

The equality of sexes in Greek society brings us to the conclusion that the case of female volunteerism in Greece obeys the same open-market "laws" that were analyzed previously through Supply and Demand graphs. So, the only part of women's participation in the military that differs from that of men's is the draft, which will not be a free choice of women, but an obligatory service for them, as is the case for men in Greece today. The next part analyzes that issue based on the potential personal and social benefits and weaknesses of drafting women.

## **2. What Would Be the Consequences of a Women's Military Draft, for Women Themselves and in Greek Society Generally?**

If Greece conscripted women, what would be the outcome? Of course, it is a hypothetical question, but we try to answer it by listing the positive and negative results of that potential move, both in personal and social aspects.

### ***a. The Beneficial Factors of Obligatory Women Service***

First, let us start with the beneficial factors of enlisting women for obligatory Military Service. The most critical advantage of such an innovation for the Greek military would be to raise the number of soldiers. Greece has an

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<sup>180</sup> European Commission, "Study on Intergrading Women in EU," *Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs* (2002).

<sup>181</sup> More specifically, that survey showed that equality laws and procedures are in place in the public and private employment sector of Greece.

increasing need for soldiers to cover its military needs. Every year, the draftees' number decreases, mainly due to the low birthrate.<sup>182</sup> Figure 3.8 clearly shows that drop.




Figure 3.8. Birth rates per couple in Greece<sup>183</sup>

This is an argument that is supported by many officials, one of them being the Minister of the Hellenic Department (or ministry) of Defense. The Minister of Defense stated in an interview in 2007 that women are as capable as men and very useful in today's situation, where a lack of soldiers is evident in Greece.<sup>184</sup> Figure 3.9 shows the projected decline in the young population, and thus in the number of potential draft soldiers, in Greece.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Some interesting data for that issue are included in National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006): 4 where it is reported that birth rate fell from 2.09 in 1989 to 1.34 in 2004.

<sup>183</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006): 4.

<sup>184</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

<sup>185</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006): 8.




Figure 3.9. Percentages of population by age group<sup>186</sup>

The morale in the draft force as will improve, as the presence of more women reduces the loneliness of a male-only environment. Of course, many might pose some concerns about that issue, such as whether female soldier participation will dissolve the hierarchy and the obedience of the Armed Forces. This fear has been answered already in practice by the implementation of equal participation of women in the Greek Military academies and volunteer force. No general incidents have occurred to “loosen” military laws or customs. In fact, in many cases, women appeared more efficient than men.

Women’s efficiency in the military has been examined in various countries to lessen the fear that women might be inefficient in the Armed Forces. To our knowledge, no definitive study suggests that women cannot act efficiently in the military when observing the same rules and rituals as their male cohorts. On the contrary, there are many surveys and articles in Greece and the U.S. that support the opposite. For example Marina Nuciari<sup>187</sup> used data from an empirical study conducted in 1985, where the efficiency and cohesion of a male military

<sup>186</sup> National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006): 4.

<sup>187</sup> Marina Nuciari, *Women in the Military*, in Giuseppe Caforio, *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 290.



group was possibly improved by the entrance of females into that group.<sup>188</sup> After arguing for the positive points of enlisting women in compulsory service, we will consider the “gray” parts of that resolution.

**b.      *The Negative Factors of Obligatory Women Service***

The disadvantages of compulsory women’s service may not be many, but they surely have an increased gravity. First of all, we will refer to the great contemporary problem in Greece: the low birthrate.<sup>189</sup> There are two sub-arguments embedded in that low birthrate factor. First, the hindrance placed on women who want to get married or get pregnant during the period that they serve in the military.<sup>190</sup>

The second sub-argument is that, by knowing about this difficult situation, women will not think of marriage or a serious relationship before ending their service in the Military. Support for the position comes again from Moskos and Nuciari.<sup>191</sup> Figure 3.10 below shows the percentage married personnel by rank and gender in the U.S. military in 1997.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Later studies presented more ambiguous results. Nevertheless, they did not conclude any opposing argument about women’s efficiency in Armed Forces. For more information, see the above listed source.

<sup>189</sup> That was the main argument presented earlier, by the Hellenic Women Association, against the plans of the Hellenic ministry of Defense for recruiting women. See, Loukas Dimakas, “Hellenic Women Union is Opposing the Volunteer Conscription,” *Newspaper “Ta Nea,”* April 4, 2006.

<sup>190</sup> We should not only count for the time actually serving in the military, which most probably would be one year or less, but we should consider all the changes on a woman’s life that will also occur. These changes, such as leaving her family’s home, ceasing her studies, breaking possible personal relations, losing valuable time for looking for a job and an overall decrease in her financial status, is evidence that a valuable period of her life, much greater than the enlistment period, is lost.

<sup>191</sup> Marina Nuciari, *Women in the Military*, in Giuseppe Caforio, *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 290.

<sup>192</sup> There are no relevant data for Greece; still, we have no reason to believe that it would differ in its general principles.




Figure 3.10. Percentages of Married military personnel by gender and by rank.<sup>193</sup>

It is evident that women are at a disadvantage when looking to be married while in the military. We will show that this problem is a serious one for the country's future. In reality, the advantage of women participating in the army, and covering the male population deficit, proves to be an action that solves a problem in the short run by using rare resources, which worsen the same problem in the long run. These resources are the women, who at present tend to avoid giving birth to many children for various reasons. Will military service by more women help or not in that aspect? The answer is the latter, as women's financial condition will worsen so mean to due to current pay policies and by asking them to postpone their career or educational plans.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>193</sup> Marina Nuciari,, *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, 1 ed. *Women in the Military* Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 287. The Petty officer ranks are E-1 to E-6 , while the officers' are O-1 to O-6. The survey sample was derived from the whole U.S. military personnel.

<sup>194</sup> Some interesting facts on that argument can be found in European Commission, Eurobarometer, "Equal Opportunities for Women and Men," *Directorate-General for Employment* 44.3 (1996): 11.

Another issue closely related to the previous one is the problem of how married women with children will take care of their children while in the military. A counter-argument to this might be that husbands could take care of their children during that period. If we consider that solution, we find some other potential problems such as the following.

- Men usually have more stable jobs than women have, so this could result in a serious financial cutback if a husband lost his job<sup>195</sup>
- Women in that age (18-22) are best able to nourish small babies, something that poses difficulty when men try to undertake this task. Apart from that, mothers have the natural instinct for taking care of their children, especially young ones.<sup>196</sup>

After the previous analysis, we have to weigh the positive and negative consequences of drafting women for the Hellenic Military Force. Which weighs more?

### ***c. Weighs the Positive and Negative***

Using the tools of logic, we could easily come to the conclusion that one cannot solve a problem by using the same resources that initiated the problem. The number of draftees is steadily declining due to low birthrate.<sup>197</sup> The reason for this is the trend among new couples to have fewer children, influenced by increasing unemployment and economic difficulties. These factors would be adversely affected by drafting women.

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<sup>195</sup> Some interesting facts on that argument can be found in European Commission, Eurobarometer, "Equal Opportunities for Women and Men," *Directorate-General for Employment* 44.3 (1996): 23.

<sup>196</sup> This applies only when we have to make a choice between the two parents, as the best education/nourishing come from both parents. Evidence on this issue could be the court resolutions which decide who is to keep the children after a divorce; most of the times, mother is appointed to keep them.

<sup>197</sup> See National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006); Ilias Kapetanakis, "Conscripting Women: An Evil or a Necessity? (2006), <http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-main.asp> (accessed October 26, 2008).

Thus, by drafting women in Greece, we could make the problem of a lack of soldiers even worse for the future, when feasible solutions will be even fewer. But, is there any other type of women's draft that could help the state and the army?

**3. Which is a Potential Women's Draft Case that Would Be Beneficial to the Hellenic Military and Society?**

This subject could be a case for a separate analysis. Nevertheless, we can present some ideas that might have a positive outcome. But, before doing so, we should clearly list the aspects of the problem and the demanded outcome.

**a. *What are the Problems to Be Alleviated by Proposing a Women's Draft?***

- Declining number of draftees in the Hellenic military
- Equity issues in society; equal weight put to all citizens, regardless of their gender

**b. *What are the Disadvantages of Recruiting Women that We Should Overcome?***

- Not limit their ability to have and raise children, including indent
  - To not degrade women financially
  - To not eliminate their free time<sup>198</sup>

**c. *What We Should Provide for Drafting Women?***

At first sight, a rough estimation for satisfying the givens and the outcomes of that problem would be: a volunteer based type of draft for women, with some benefits attached to it. This solution is surely a generic one, but has the potential to alleviate the problem of low draftee numbers while not affecting the core problem of low birth rates.

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<sup>198</sup> By qualitative, we mean the free time that has the potential to be used as leisure/ relaxing or in a relevant manner. For example, you have a lot of free time when you are unemployed, but you do not have money to benefit from it. So, this kind of free time is not considered to have any quality elements.

Let us analyze the two pillars of the above generic solution.

(1) Volunteer-Based Drafting for Women with a Flexible Service-Period Obligation. While it is true that many women have financial or other problems that hinder them from considering maternity, there is still a significant number of women that are in good financial condition and can devote a short period of their lives to serving their country. In addition, an increasing number of women might delay pregnancy for various reasons.<sup>199</sup>

In any case, since a volunteer-based system is established, every woman could weigh her decision to enlist according to her situation. An additional feature for women could be the ability to serve for less than a full year, as is now the case with men, but for two semesters during a defined period of time. This feature could make a women's choice to enlist easier.

Before presenting the next element of our proposal, we should question whether a semester military position might be feasible and beneficial to the Hellenic A.F. Considering the Greek reality, we can easily answer this question. First, Greece has remote military bases on islands and near its borders that are very difficult to staff, as most of the soldiers try to avoid being stationed there. On the other hand, a woman who was born and lives in these remote areas would have the motivation to help the defense of her own region, along with the sustainment of the military base in her area.<sup>200</sup>

Second, we could easily come to the conclusion that there will not be a disadvantage for the Greek military, since men's service today is a year long, but most of the time, a soldier spends one semester per military unit. A

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<sup>199</sup> Usually these reasons are profession-based, as many women nowadays are focusing first on their occupation and later on to create a family. Another case would be women that cannot have children due to health issues.

<sup>200</sup> A base does not only offer security but also economic resources for the whole area.

woman's service for a semester turns to be the same for the efficiency of any specific military unit.<sup>201</sup> So, the period that a woman would serve in a remote area would be the same as a man's.

Apart from that, there are military positions, even in the central parts of the country, which could be filled for six months without losing any of their efficiency. Such positions are mostly technical, military educational, or generally administrative types.<sup>202</sup> For example, a woman can work in a military office for six months without much training and without leaving "unfilled" gaps after her departure from the office. She might also be assigned to a six-month school, after completing her relevant university studies.

A great advantage that accompanies the volunteer-based women's draft is the option that the Hellenic Armed Forces might use that for staffing specific positions. The essence of that option is that the military could estimate the lack of specific draft positions in some specialties or general areas and ask women voluntarily to serve in any of these positions. This option can raise the military's efficiency as there will be no wasted manpower in the new force of drafted women.

As we proceed in analyzing that option, we realize that we are formulating a system that stands in the middle between the pure draft and the pure volunteer force. As our solution approaches the volunteer system, it comes closer to the "occupational" system analyzed by Moskos, along with our previous analysis of supply and demand in the first part of this chapter. We must design the benefits of that roughly described system, which would stabilize the balance between benefits and demands for Greek women.

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<sup>201</sup> Hellenic Republic, "Conscription Law," 1763/88 (1988).

<sup>202</sup> At some military schools, soldiers of some professions teach a subject that they are experienced in (chemists, lawyers, computer experts and others).

(2) Proposal for Benefits for Women Participating in a Potential Woman Drafter Force. Apart from considering the “institutional” values served by women and their satisfaction from doing so, we should also propose some material benefits that might be appealing them. Assuming that full pay is not an option for the Hellenic Ministry of Defense - or else they could use normal volunteers - we should consider benefits that alleviate the basic problem of women and men alike in today’s Greek society. These problems are unemployment and the overall difficult financial situation.

Again, this could be a case for a different study; still, some proposals for benefits might be the following.

- After performing their one year or two-semester service, women could attend a military school of their choice. The list of available training schools should be made known by the Armed Forces beforehand. Such training opportunities might include computers, technical skills, communications and many of other training options already existing in the Armed Forces.

This benefit would be of great value for women, as they will acquire at no cost a diploma that might be useful for them in their job quest. On the other hand, it would be of no significant cost for the Hellenic Armed Forces, as these schools and training facilities are being provided anyway.<sup>203</sup>

- Another benefit might be giving medical coverage to women draftees and their close family members for a period up to twice the period they served. This is a significant offering, as we have shown previously in the case of the men’s volunteer force.<sup>204</sup> Again for the military and the state, this could not be a great expense, as most of the facilities are already in place.
- Finally, a valuable benefit specifically for the Greek situation would be offering some “points” or preference to women draftees, when they are applying for a job in the widely-defined government

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<sup>203</sup> The possible need to increase teaching personnel is not considered a big expense.

<sup>204</sup> See present chapter, paragraph A1.

sector.<sup>205</sup> In that point system, draft service from women could be assigned a specific number of points,<sup>206</sup> making their employment chances better than before they were drafted.

This concludes our generic view of the factors affecting the decision of men to enlist or participate in the military as draftees, which also touched on the possibility and the restrictions of having a women's draft.

Although our study is focused on the dilemma of choosing the form of the bigger part of the Armed Forces, that of low-rank soldiers, we find it appropriate to give a quick look on the other higher-ranking parts of the Armed Forces; that is, the middle-rank (petty officers) and the upper-rank (officers). This point of analysis will help us in fully determining the "raw materials," with which the "gun" of the Armed Forces is made. Nevertheless, the analysis on high and medium-rank personnel will not be exhaustive, as we intend to use it only as a benchmark of the whole army.

### **C. A QUICK LOOK AT THE MIDDLE AND HIGH-RANK PERSONNEL OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES**

Using the analogy, found in many of Eitelberg writings, of the military as the "gun" of the society, we will go on viewing who is choosing to enter the middle and high military academies,<sup>207</sup> or, in another way, what are the "raw materials" from which the country's "gun" is made.

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<sup>205</sup> Greece has a ruling committee called ASEP (High Committee for Personnel Selection) which is officially authorized to set national exams for employment opportunities in the widely-defined public-state sector. To get a position like that, which, in most of the cases, is a moderate paid but steady and stable job-career, you have to take part in state-held exams and in the same time present your diplomas and past experience which are translated into valuable points.

<sup>206</sup> Of course, this measure might raise some objection from men regarding equity issues of the men's draft.

<sup>207</sup> In general, there are two classes of military Academies in Greece: the ones that educate petty officers and the others whose graduates are officers.



## 1. Who is Choosing to Enter Military Academies?

It was not before the 1990s that petty-officers' academies were included along with the officers', in the highly-valued, post-high school general exams. At the same time, all the military academies relaxed their restrictions for admitting women, which resulted in an increase in women officers and petty officers. Especially for the petty-officers academies and for the recent years, the number of women entering the academies is close to or even greater in some years, than that of men.<sup>208</sup>

That means that all the cadets at least completed high school with more than average grades. Figure 3.11 below shows the base-points for acceptance into military academies compared with other civil higher education universities.




Figure 3.11. Points required to be admitted in the Hellenic Public Universities (2008)<sup>209</sup>

<sup>208</sup> Especially for 2008 the women's ratio of acceptance was approximately 35 percent. In 2005 women surpassed the number of men in the Navy Petty Officer academy (see: esos.gr., <http://www.esos.gr/80/52/naftiko-epitixontae-4-9-2008.htm>) (accessed October 15, 2008).

<sup>209</sup> For a more comprehensive explanation on the public based Greek education design, see Appendix 3. Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

The first line represents the points required on the public exams to attend the highest university school in Greece. The lines that follow are some other representative university schools; the green lines in the middle are the Officers' academies and the last ones on the right are the Petty Officers' Academies. As seen here, the distance between the highly estimated universities and the military academies is not at all big. Thus, those who enter Hellenic military academies in general are not seeking a job opportunity; it is a demanding job-choice, including studying and more than average performance.

To answer the initial question about defining the profile of the potential people willing to enter a military academy, we should briefly note some of the fundamental advantages and disadvantages of the military academies. The advantages of an officer career would be all the advantages referred in our present studies for volunteer-soldiers<sup>210</sup> along with the following.

- Steadier career than the volunteer's
- Better salary, pension, working conditions
- University education without financial burden for the parents
- Higher prestige
- Some of the disadvantages, again compared with the volunteers, include the following.
  - Greater responsibility in their assignments
  - Difficult training in the Academies, including military and an educationally intense environment
  - Obligation to stay in the force for longer period (at least 15 years)

We can assume that whoever chooses to be an officer should have high educational credentials along with the willingness to live a military life. The first characteristic could be obtained by children of most of the socioeconomic classes, even though it is found more in the middle and upper economic layers of society. What this denotes is that a young person who succeeded in a military

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<sup>210</sup> See present chapter, paragraph A3.

academy would have probably also succeeded in other universities. The determining factor now is the financial status of the student's family. Can they afford to sustain him for at least four years while in a civil university? If not, the military-type university seems an appealing choice.

The second characteristic, the willingness to live a military life, is a criterion mostly based on family perception and tradition, still not excluding the personal will of the youngster. For example, it is very easy for a child to be more familiar and acquainted with the military academy choice if a member of his family is an officer.<sup>211</sup> On the other hand, it is normal that a family that opposes the military profession will influence its child negatively in this regard. To our understanding, this factor is not connected to socioeconomic or economic criteria, and is tied to family perception and traditions.

Finally, based inevitably on the more clear first characteristic of the educational competence of prospective cadets, we could conclude that academies have as their input personnel, children of medium to high socioeconomic status, without excluding some exceptions of poor families that determined to educate their children properly.<sup>212</sup>

Although petty officer military academies have been much upgraded recently, it is the officers who rule the Armed Forces; so, we will give them a closer look.

## **2. Are the Officers in Greece Considered Reliable and Representative of the Society?**

As graduates of a military institution equivalent to a university, officers have a high educational base; this fact gives them a high level of prestige, as

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<sup>211</sup> This is my personal case, as my father was an officer; even though I was not even advised to enter in the military family, I did so. In addition to that, and without having certified data, a great part of my officer colleagues have a member of their families somehow related to the military.

<sup>212</sup> We should repeat that this is a rough estimation used to give us a generic idea of the higher-ranking soldiers. Some of its abbreviated conclusions are based on previous findings in the present chapter, paragraph A2, regarding mainly socioeconomic status and educational level.

they succeeded not only in military training, but also in high level educational requirements. Apart from that, the perception of the Greek military in Greek society is favorable, mainly based on the long history of Greece, which is closely tied to numerous battles from all services of the Armed Forces.

The only historic anomaly took place during the period of 1967 to 1974, when a group of Army officers orchestrated a coup d'état, imposing a dictatorship on the country.<sup>213</sup> Nevertheless, as the years went by, military officers gained back their prestige and reliability. Our conclusion above is enhanced by the research made by Smokovitis,<sup>214</sup> which clearly denotes the following points regarding attitudes that cadets of Hellenic military academies hold.

- They highly value the personal accomplishment and social commitment, while they do not believe in politics
- Their political preferences are somewhat in the middle between left and right
- They trust the military the most, but they did not feel the same about civil servants
- They support the conscription system and the idea of conscripting women, as a way of exchanging values between the society and military
- Their main goal is to defend their country
- They find life in the academy difficult but they seem to understand the need for that

Apart from that, we find useful elements on how the Greek military is seen by society in later surveys done by Eurostat.<sup>215</sup> In these studies, conducted in 1997 and 2000, we observe that Greeks are very fond of and confident of their

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<sup>213</sup> For more see C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: F. Watts), 1985.

<sup>214</sup> Research conducted in mid 80s. Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999), 321-322.

<sup>215</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327; Eurobarometer 48/1997 and 54.1/2000.

Armed Forces. Also, when compared to other European countries, their level of confidence is the second highest, after Finland.<sup>216</sup> A more comprehensive view of the subject can be seen in Figure 3.12.




Figure 3.12. Confidence for the Armed Forces by the respective country's society.<sup>217</sup>

In general, the Armed Forces are respected and highly regarded by Greek society. Still, are they representative of the society? In the following chapter, we examine the social representation inside the Armed Forces. Although the analysis focuses on the soldiers, we do need to have an idea of the social representation of their leaders.

<sup>216</sup> Finland also keeps a draft force and faces a kind of instability at its borders.

<sup>217</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327.

The requirements to enter the Officer's Academy define mainly the socioeconomic status of the cadet; as seen in Figure 3.11, one should have good grades and be in the middle to upper group of high school graduates. He also has to go through athletic tests to eliminate those that do not have the appropriate stamina and body qualifications. Finally, a candidate has to pass psychological tests that one generally considered reliable.

As we can see, no financial expenses are normally involved in one's decision to enter in a military academy, neither before entering nor during the cadet's stay, as the government pays for the tuition and the living expenses of cadets in the Academy. This institution turns out to be less expensive for the parents compared to a university, as in the Academy, cadets have limited leave; in addition, they get a small income<sup>218</sup>.

The only factor that restricts the wide representation of officers is the educational prerequisite, as described previously. We have also shown previously<sup>219</sup> that there is a relation between educational achievement and economic status. Still, the representation of officers is wide, and it is not affected by social-status, or closed castes, or even rich families.<sup>220</sup> This may help to explain why Greek society sees officers as a healthy and valuable part of society. In addition, another clue could be that the leaders of the army do not belong in a

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<sup>218</sup> At present, cadets get approximately 200 Euros per month and normally they get a leave every weekend, if not in training or under penalty.

<sup>219</sup> See present chapter, paragraph A2.

<sup>220</sup> This happens mainly due to the way that officers are picked through general exams, thus, avoiding external influences on their acceptance, by the military academies. An interesting finding of Smokovitis (Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999), 281) is that the political preferences of cadets are quite wide. This fact shows the big spread of the cadets in the socioeconomic levels of the country.

specific caste or do not rule by some common perceptions. They have the common logic of the society to which they belong, and they are closely related to that society.<sup>221</sup>

In this chapter, we attempt to depict the people joining the army by answering who they are. Which are their criteria to enlist or be drafted? Why only men? What other alternatives exist for women? Who are the prospective leaders of the army? Do they belong to a specific caste?

As these people move into the army to form the “gun” of the nation, they move along with their perceptions, strengths, weaknesses, and emotions. We will also try to observe them while they form the inner body of the Armed Forces, and we will also try to “measure” the efficiency of the “gun,” by using Eitelberg’s MRM.

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<sup>221</sup> A very interesting survey took place in the U.S. (Congress of the United States, *Social Representation in the U.S. Military* (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1989), 85, 91), which asked for the postal codes of the houses of officers. This method, without revealing identities and while respecting the personal secrecy, gives valuable results. The postal codes can be related to the worth of land in that area and consequently to the socioeconomic or economic status of the officers. This might be a proposal for a future study in Greece; plotting an officer class as cadets at first and again later on as officers. This survey could show useful results: first, what is their initial socioeconomic/economic status; second, what is their later status after being officers: is there any change?

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## IV. INSIDE THE ARMY

Looking now into the base of the Hellenic Military, we focus on two separate groups, volunteers and draftees, which coexist in the body of soldiers, and produce a common outcome for the Armed Forces. We more specifically examine which are the strong and weak points regarding the army's effectiveness and efficiency.

### A. VOLUNTEERS; WHAT DO THEY HAVE TO OFFER TO THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES?

#### 1. Analyzing Three Main Factors

Having already a rough idea about which group is most represented in the volunteer corps,<sup>222</sup> we further analyze the factors affected in the military establishment by the volunteers' participation. These factors are mainly three: Economic, Operational/Training, and Mobilization.

##### a. *Economic*

The basic economic disadvantage for the state, in the case of volunteers, is their salary. Their monthly allowances, specifically for Greece, are close to 1,000 € (as a first salary).<sup>223</sup> As a result, comparing Volunteers to the far lower-expense draft force brings to surface a clear disadvantage accompanying the Volunteer Force.<sup>224</sup>

At this point, we should acknowledge the argument that there are actually fewer expenses associated with the Volunteer force, due to their

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<sup>222</sup> In general terms, we could say that the lower to middle economic status groups are represented in the volunteer force. We will see that in more detail in the paragraph F(2)b of the present chapter.

<sup>223</sup> John Androurakis, "Volunteers, *Scopia.gr*, (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).

<sup>224</sup> The salary of draftees is approximately 50 € per month. Still, the military main expense for them is the cost for their meals and their military uniforms.

continuous training. For example, many damages to equipment happen because the operator is not adequately trained. As military equipment becomes more expensive, such losses represent a greater expense.<sup>225</sup>

The salary of volunteers not only affects the budget of the Ministry of Defense, it also affects the perception of society about their jobs. This factor is explored later in this chapter.

### ***b. Operational***

Embedded in this factor are the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency of military operations. Training, learning, cooperation, and cohesion are also elements of this factor.

Training of the personnel of the Armed Forces is a top criterion for achieving the overall goal of effectiveness. The degree of learning, along with the right procedures followed, forms the efficiency factor of an army.

On this factor, volunteers seem to be in a better position compared to draftees. Several factors support this position. For example volunteers:

- Have continuous training and an accrued experience
- Are assigned a specialty and, for the most period of their service, are working in that specialty field
- Attend more general and specialty courses
- Are regularly examined on all the specialty courses that they go through. Further, officers usually refer first to volunteers instead of draftees for accomplishing a job, a fact that gives them higher esteem and overall gained experience. Additionally, most of the time, volunteers are assigned to train the draftees. This places them in the position of an instructor, which enhanced their position in the organization. The training and experience gained by the Volunteers becomes a fundamental element of achieving the operational goals of the military unit and the Armed Forces in general.

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<sup>225</sup> Especially as electronic devices overarch modern military equipment, potential damage to them might result in thousands of Euros lost.

A useful concept that use for examining the operational factor is the “Learning Curve” theory. This theory is normally used in examining the incurred cost of every recurring procedure. The essence of the theory is that the cost of a general production or a specific product - which could be defined in various ways (e.g., labor hours) - continuously decreases as the procedure is repeated.<sup>226</sup>

This theory could be applied to the military-unit field, where most of the drills are repetitive and – especially in the case of volunteers - involve the same people. In this way, the operational efficiency for a military unit composed of Volunteers is increased over time, as the time needed to perform a task is decreasing.

To demonstrate the concept, we present below the graph of the “Learning Curve” theory<sup>227</sup> in Figure 4.1.

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<sup>226</sup> For more see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, *Maynard's Industrial Engineering Handbook* (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001).

<sup>227</sup> The theory says that the more labor intense is the task, the less cost incurs every time the task/product is repeated. The military field, being labor-intensive, is a perfect field for implementing that theory.

**Resources Expense (Money/labor hours)**




Figure 4.1. Learning Curve Theory (Reduction of expenses, due to the repetition of a procedure)<sup>228</sup>.

As shown in Figure 4.1, volunteers grow efficient in the tasks they undertake as they learn more and they eventually perform more quickly than draftees. Nevertheless, we also have to consider the number of soldiers demanded for each operation. For example, it will surely be more efficient to perform a training operation with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), but what happens

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<sup>228</sup> For more information see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, *Maynard's Industrial Engineering Handbook* (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001).

in the case of a war? Will the state be able to mobilize a great number of Volunteer Soldiers, exploiting only the AVF, without having any draftees for back up? This brings us to the next factor of mobilization.

### **c. Mobilization**

This is considered as a major disadvantage of the AVF, as it does not have the back-up force to quickly fight a major war, especially a defensive one.<sup>229</sup> This aspect of the military design of a country is closely related to its strategy and its geopolitical position. As discussed below, Greece is a country with a medium-to-small population compared to its neighbors, in a very strategic area which witnessed numerous wars in the past. Greece's strategic dogma is mainly to sustain a defensive and deterring army. All these characteristics of the country, and the region in general, reinforce the need for mobilizing quickly and effectively.

In an AVF, where no military experience is gained by most citizens, the possibility of having an easily and effectively mobilized army is very low. The advocates of this argument might argue that even today, where a draft is in parallel effect, the soldiers do not get adequate training,<sup>230</sup> and, moreover, they are not kept up to date in technologies and procedures after their service ends.<sup>231</sup> The argument might be correct; yet, it is better to have little experience than to have none. Additionally, this situation might be corrected by reviewing the

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<sup>229</sup> When attacking first, you normally have planned for the manpower reserves to be used.

<sup>230</sup> Nikolaos Toscas, "The Conscription, *Strategy 5* (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>231</sup> Normally, the current training of civilians who were former draftees is approximately ten days every year.

procedures and standards of draftees' training and not the draft-system itself. Especially for the factor of mobilization, we had the honor of interviewing Mr. Gus Moutos, a very experienced retired U.S. officer.<sup>232</sup>

According to Mr. Moutos:<sup>233</sup>

The nation of Greece must consider two areas in formulating a policy:

**A. Strategic needs.** For defense, the Greek Army needs to be as large as today's force to address the challenge of defending a nation with vast borders as Greece has with its great number of islands. Forces have to be permanently stationed there or quickly deployed within hours. The force has to be well trained and equipped and have the close relationship it now has with the Greek nation....The answer to small volunteer force is a well trained, equipped and available reserve of equal size or greater than the volunteer force.

**B. Costs.** A volunteer force will be expensive, in fact, very expensive, to the tune of four to five times as much. The soldier now becomes an employee. You have to pay market price for each soldier and when the economy is good the price goes up. ...Obligations will have to be established for volunteers to serve in the reserves when leaving active duty to insure reserve manning and quality levels for the reserves (efedries). The cost is an area of major concern. If inadequate resources to maintain the reserves are provided a small active army force is in great jeopardy in time of war.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Mr. Gus Moutos is an important member of the U.S. Military; while serving for more than 30 years, he also had the command of a recruiting department for many years. His Greek origin and his deep knowledge of both Greek and U.S. recruitment systems were helpful to me when I asked him various comparative questions about each country's military and social reality. Apart from his professional competence, Mr. Moutos happened to be a close friend to the late Professor C. Moskos, whose theories form the basis of this study. There were more than a few times, as Moutos remembers that he would pick up the phone and call Moskos to discuss a military-related subject. As expected, their common Greek origin reinforced those discussions.

<sup>233</sup> That discussion/ interview took place on the September 17, 2008 in California. Both parties were knowledgeable that the material of the discussion would be used in the present study.

<sup>234</sup> A full presentation of Mr. Moutos' views, can be found in Appendix D.

Returning again to the Greek Strategic reality, it is useful to further examine the mobilization factor. Apart from considering the disheartening factors of the small Greek population, the imminent threat from Greece's neighbors, and the defensive military dogma, it will also be useful to consider that Greece might be the one and only country in the EU whose borders are threatened by neighbor countries.<sup>235</sup>

Furthermore, mobilization is not only a matter of a number of men needed in battle. It represents also a qualitative criterion for the civilian population to participate in the decision of activating the Armed Forces when in danger. We could imagine a civilian that never belonged to the Armed Forces to be called upon in the midst of a dangerous situation. Apart from being naïve about what he should do, he would also counteract such a mobilization decision.

Even though we devote this chapter to examining the inner function of the military "gun," we will include the views that the society has for each soldier group: the volunteers and the draftees. These views are useful to our analysis.

## **2. How are the Volunteers Viewed by the Society?**

Before examining society's perception of the Volunteers, it is useful to explain why we include this kind of analysis in the study.

While officers are the leaders of the army, soldiers are the base, with no significant power of acting and contributing to the decisions, even though those decisions affect soldiers themselves. If we try to find their strength, it is most probable to find it mirrored by the society in general and more precisely by the politicians. So, by measuring the acceptance and the value of the Volunteers and draftees in the society, we realize the strength they maintain in the military establishment and we estimate more effectively the "gun's" component strengths.

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<sup>235</sup> For more see: Ministry of Defense, "White Bible," [http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all\\_publication\\_comhtml?dr\\_html\\_url](http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all_publication_comhtml?dr_html_url) (accessed September 15, 2008).

We start with volunteers. As Greece has a short history with this type of organization, we will draw comparative conclusions from U.S. history, which has used the AVF uninterruptedly since 1973 and the end of the Vietnam War.<sup>236</sup>

We try to formulate a picture of U.S. society through many sources, and finally through a personal concept about how societies view the AVF.

**a. The U.S. Case**

Authors Douquet and Schaeffer believe that U.S. society misunderstands and underestimates the military, mainly due to the fact that there is no representation of the powerful citizens, who are able to access the media and the state authorities.<sup>237</sup> That is the reason why a “gap” between civilians and the military is growing. They also comment that there is a social ignorance creating an underestimation of duty and, furthermore, of volunteer service as a personal choice. They continue by saying that military people are strangers to the American upper classes.<sup>238</sup>

In another book, Feaver and Kohn conducted research in the U.S. by asking questions on all aspects of social life.<sup>239</sup> The outcome of the answers reveals that a real gap exists between these two groups in most of their beliefs. In the same paper, the authors collected and summarized the collective opinion of elite groups regarding defense spending. Their results indicated that:

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<sup>236</sup> Greece started using volunteers in 2000 with quite a success, after passing a relevant law in the Greek Parliament. Later on, several competitions took place for recruiting volunteers. All of them were successful and the applicants' numbers were more than two times the positions available (John Androulakis, “Volunteers, *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).

<sup>237</sup> Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hurts the Country* 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 1.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 32. Also, in the same book (98) the authors present the evolution of that civil-military gap and how U.S. went from “us” to “them”.

<sup>239</sup> They questioned soldiers and civilians about political, religious, and finally foreign policy issues, (Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press: 2001), 20.



...prior military service and social contact with military people are associated with more support for defense spending and military service.<sup>240</sup>

In another article, titled “Equal Obligation versus Equal Opportunity,” Jeffrey Record presents a thorough description of the evolution of the draft and AVF in the U.S.<sup>241</sup> His views are mainly that the AVF was created for coping with domestic political problems that came after the Vietnam War. This decision to go to an AVF affected U.S. military efficiency, as the number of soldiers (active and reserves) dropped dramatically.<sup>242</sup> But returning to the initial question of what people believe about the AVF, the author discusses opposition of some politicians in the “Gates Commission” in 1969. The core arguments of the politicians who were against the AVF were that it “would be manned predominately by the poor and the black, and that it would encourage the emergence of a military isolated from society and antagonistic to civilian control.”<sup>243</sup>

As we see, the concern for a socially unrepresentative AVF arose from the first moment of its conception. On that issue, Eitelberg, in extensive studies, concludes:

- “...the basic concept of representation is a keystone in democracy...”<sup>244</sup>
- Practical necessity has opened the doors to military service for many ambiguous groups over the years<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press: 2001), 328.

<sup>241</sup> National Defense University, Fort Lesley, *The Anthro Factor in Warfare* (J. E. Endicott, Washington, 1988), 225-240.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., 232. Numbers were given for the period 1964 to 1986, where the active duty personnel felled from 2.68 million to 2.18 million.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., 233. The “Gates Commission” was created by President Nixon in 1969, to study and propose a future military system for the USA.

<sup>244</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations.” *Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 2.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., 18. During WW-II, 300,000 illiterate men and 100,000 convicted fellows were enlisted.

In 1989, Senator Sam Nunn and Congressional Representative Dave McCurdy, representing a common concern of U.S. society, proposed an act that would reform the existing U.S. military. The proposed act intended to “strengthen national defense by making the composition of the Armed Forces more representative of the country at large.”<sup>246</sup> Eitelberg notes on that issue that “[t]he Nunn-McCurdy proposal [for a system of national service] is probably attractive to many American citizens, who would agree with its fundamental goals of equity, patriotism, and civic responsibility.”<sup>247</sup>

Regarding the contemporary view that U.S. society has about its AVF military, we would base our remarks on the two major U.S. war operations in 2008: Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations started in 2001 and 2003, respectively, and at the time of this writing, U.S. troops are still deployed in these hostile regions. The losses for the U.S. Armed Forces in both fields are close to 5,000 soldiers, as of 2008.<sup>248</sup>

A great part of U.S. society argues that all these wars would have been more effectively designed, and losses of U.S. Volunteers would have been much less, if compulsory service had been in place. They mainly argue that those who were in powerful positions in U.S. society would have changed their attitudes if their own children, along with the rest of the society's children, was serving in a war zone.<sup>249</sup>

Finally, as a general conclusion on the perception of the AVF military by U.S. society, we would say the following.

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<sup>246</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations.” *Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 22. (Initially taken from “Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989” s.3, 101<sup>st</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 3-4.)

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> “News Report,” *CNN*, November 11, 2008.

<sup>249</sup> In fact, that was the case for Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hurts the Country*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

- There is an evident concern for a growing gap between the military and the society
- There is a lack of social representation, affecting military effectiveness
- There is great apathy on military issues. Furthermore, the losses of U.S. citizens are seen as a matter, that only affects the families that “offered” a volunteer to the U.S. military

As we see, society does not oppose the Volunteers themselves; rather, it reacts in apathy, which is evidence of the lack of society’s controls. As we show below, this situation can result in military ineffectiveness.

As we believe that any civilized western country would react the same way on that issue, and having the U.S. as a “guide” to our project, we assume that the same perceptions would be found in Greece, as well.

***b. “The Police-like Armies”: (A Personally Developed Analogy of Society’s Perception for AVF Militaries)***

This personally developed analogy serves to explain in a way the inner concept when a citizen views the AVF army. It is mainly based on two factors: first, the type of potential wars in the future, and second, the increasingly individualistic and over-capitalistic way of our lives.

To begin with, we will use a survey conducted in Europe in 2001 by Eurobarometer.<sup>250</sup> In that survey, as shown in Figure 4.2, the percentage of citizens who answered positively for the possibility of a world war, or a war in Europe’s territory was less than half (45 percent). On the other hand, those who believed in the possibility of terrorism or organized crime in Europe was far higher (74-77 percent).

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<sup>250</sup> Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 328.




Figure 4.2. Fears of Europeans<sup>251</sup>

This suggests that European citizens do not believe that a mass or national war would occur in their neighborhood. They are mostly afraid of terrorist attacks; at the same time, they agree about sending their Armed Forces abroad for operations to keep or reestablish peace at a level of 80 percent.<sup>252</sup>




Figure 4.3. Roles of the military, according to Europeans<sup>253</sup>

<sup>251</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 328.

<sup>252</sup> Ibid., 330; (From the initial survey made by Eurobarometer 5401, 2001).

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., 330.

The results shown in Figure 4.3 indicate that citizens understand the role of the military in maintaining the internal stability of a country by fighting terrorists or other dangerous group. They also seem to believe that the professional military is the long hand of the state's foreign policy to remote regions that need help and where their country has an interest.

The second factor, of the highly individualistic and materialistic societies of the developed world, is obvious, especially when compared to the era of the last massive war (1945). In this sense, all citizens want their safety, and they will pay to keep on with their lives and economic prosperity. This expense for the "hired professional guards" is, in our case, done through state taxes.

Finally, does not that perception of the contemporary military, seem too close to the "police force"? Most probably, yes. Implicitly or not, one can find several "similarities" between these two professional groups. We list some of them, as follows.

- They are both professional, law-enforcing groups (based on state or international laws)
- They are both paid by the government
- They both have the ability to carry and use guns
- They both call new members on a volunteer basis
- They have uniforms and hierarchies, and they are both placed under a Ministry/department

These and many other similarities raise some simple self-imposed questions, such as why not use all Volunteers in the Military, as in the case of the police force. Why would it not work for Armed Forces as it works with police? The answer could be that "The Military will be as efficient as the police when an AVF is imposed."

The will of most of the people to pay somebody to do the hard job of security finds its analogy in an effective corps with which all citizens are familiar: the police. The dangers of that analogy, though, are lurking underneath some facts that do not validate the simplistic equalization of the previous statement.

Briefly, the counter-arguments to that modern definition of the AVF Armed Forces as the “Country’s Foreign Police” are the following.

- While internally the country has precise and accepted laws and rules to follow, this is not the case with international laws and procedures. There is an inherent vagueness on those laws under which a military force should act abroad.
- Police are continuously doing the same task of protecting their co-citizens from unlawful persons or acts. Military tasks are not steady and are changing from one moment to the other as balances and actions of other countries change.
- Killing, and living with the consequences of it, is much different when it is done while chasing a criminal in one’s own country, than when it involves a foreigner in his own country under vague regulations and orders.<sup>254</sup>
- In the case of a defensive war, all citizens should contribute to the defense of the place they plan to raise their children.<sup>255</sup>
- Police are continuously monitored and controlled in a direct and indirect way,<sup>256</sup> while operating in common view of the citizens, giving them the ability to have a solid idea of the way the police function. This is not true for military, especially when they operate abroad. Not only there is a national interest in controlling the news that comes back to citizens from the war-frontier, but also people prefer to believe that their military is performing effectively, without examining their acts.

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<sup>254</sup> For more on that issue see Dave Grossman, *On Killing*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. *The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Canada: Little, Brown & Company, 1995).

<sup>255</sup> A very well-put argument on that was made by C. Moskos: “what kind of country excludes its most privileged members from defending it?”

<sup>256</sup> Direct could be observation and reporting of policemen during performing their operations, while indirect could be through democratic procedures and through relevant civic-requests/protests/law proposals.

- Finally, the issue of losses, which is somewhat connected to the previous argument. For that, we use an analytical hypothesis based on true data. During the ongoing Iraq War, the U.S. has already lost more than four-thousand soldiers; although there has been some protesting, the operation is continuing. What if the U.S. lost 4,000 policemen in the same period of time all around the country? Even being a pure assumption, it is evident that a lot of different citizen and state actions would have taken place, including protests by policemen/citizens, the demand from citizens for increasing the police force,<sup>257</sup> politicians alerted trying to pass new laws, and possibly many more actions.

The above arguments suggest that the analogy of the Military as a Police Force is not real, and it only rationalizes the need of some citizens to have their life going and pay somebody (or even anybody), to keep them safe, even by committing to lose his life.

In this way, volunteers are viewed by the society to which they belong to as a useful but separate body, with an obligation to defend the country, as police do, and by being paid to do so.

After examining what volunteers have to offer in the A.F., we now examine the same question for draftees.

## **B. WHAT DRAFTEES HAVE TO OFFER IN THE MILITARY?**

Some of the advantages of an AVF discussed previously constitute disadvantages of compulsory service, and vice versa. By examining the same factors as previously, this time for the draft soldiers, we compose a comprehensive picture of the military's base force.

### **1. Analysis of the Three Main Factors**

One can begin by reviewing the economic, operational and mobilization factors for draftees:

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<sup>257</sup> The same demand for increasing U.S. forces in Iraq occurred only recently.

**a.      *Economic Factor***

As we noted previously, this is a disadvantage for Volunteers, and it turns to be an advantage for draftees. Again, we do not have specific numbers, but as discussed above, the economic benefit of keeping compulsory service is large. At the same time, we must also take into account the expenses resulting from untrained draft soldiers. Further, we now have to examine the way in which draftees lead the military to savings.

Most of the time, soldiers who come from all the socioeconomic classes of society have already gained a level of expert knowledge of a subject that they studied beforehand. As a result, they help the unit, in which they are serving in many ways, saving time and sometimes money. Some fields of expertise in which knowledgeable soldiers could be useful include computer systems, engineering, plumbing, and many other technical jobs.<sup>258</sup> Of course, it is an economic/resource aid that cannot be effectively measured.

Overall, draftees have the advantage on that aspect, but what happens when considering the operational factor in drafting?

**b.      *Operational – Training – Learning Factor***

This time, compulsory service has a disadvantage compared to volunteer service. Operationally, a draft soldier does not get to the level of a volunteer, as the training of the former is less, and sometimes is interrupted due to the change in unit on his sixth-month period of service.<sup>259</sup>

The learning curve theory that we used previously for depicting the benefit from continuous Volunteers' learning, is again useful for another concept

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<sup>258</sup> In fact, from personal experience in working with draftees, there were a number of cases where a soldier who had previously studied mechanical engineering solved a mechanical problem that even officers could not solve; more often, soldiers organized and worked on the computer systems of a ship or an office better than their superiors.

<sup>259</sup> The system of Greek Draft, at present, is a year service in total (six months at a remote military unit and six months in a central one).



that is embedded in it: the breakage of the learning process. This happens when a production or task stops for a period and then begins again with the same working force. In our case, the military tasks are not interrupted, but in a draft system, the “working” force is changing approximately every six to twelve months. To visualize the breakage of the learning curve, see Figure 4.4, below.<sup>260</sup>




Figure 4.4. Breakage of learning curve of the military, due to the duration of the draftees’ service.

<sup>260</sup> For more information see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, *Maynard's Industrial Engineering Handbook* (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001).

This graph shows that roughly every six months, a breakage of task repetition takes place.<sup>261</sup> When level a on the “expenses” axis is the initial cost of a task, after a period, the cost drops to level b, and, if the procedure were not interrupted, the cost would fall more to an expense level of c, (or a labor hour level of c for completing a task). The next time we perform the same task with the new soldiers, it is sure that we will take level a hours again, clearly more than the level c hours needed before the breakage. The amount of hours needed after the breakage represents the loss of resources/working hours, or else the lessening of the effectiveness and efficiency of a military unit, due to the duration of service for the draftee soldiers. In other words, the graph reveals that, even though we repeat the military procedures/tasks, when there are draftees involved, we do not get better in the labor hours needed, and our military effectiveness and efficiency are seriously hurt.

One objection to this argument might be that draft soldiers are coming from all kinds of educational levels. Thus, as explained previously, some of them might be university graduates or even more highly educated. This could lead us to believe that their initial draftees’ learning curve is much more efficient than that of volunteers, whose education/knowledge level is from low to average.<sup>262</sup> So, even though draftees experience a breakage on their learning curve, they still might be even better than the respective “unbroken” Volunteers’ learning curve. To depict that argument on the learning curve graph, we created a diagram in Figure 4.4 showing the hypothetical superiority of the draftees’ learning curve.

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<sup>261</sup> For our case, it could be from six to 12 months when soldiers are reassigned or relieved from service.

<sup>262</sup> As we have shown in Chapter III- paragraph A, the greater part of the volunteer force is formed by high school graduates with no higher level studies.




Figure 4.5. Hypothetical comparison of Volunteers' and Draftees' Learning Curves

Of course, the above argument is hardly evaluated, even when knowing the portion of highly literate draftees compared to Volunteers. Another fact that devalues this argument on a draftee's potential superiority is that conscription calls all men in the country; as a result, not only the highly educated will be added in the military units, but also those who have less than high school education and possibly even the totally illiterate.<sup>263</sup>

<sup>263</sup> Specifically for Greece, the number of those who are lower than high school educated is very low. (Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

In a very detailed description of a conscripted soldier's training, P. Zorzovilis, editor of the Greek military magazine "Strategy,"<sup>264</sup> argues that twelve months of service under the current system, where a soldier spends two semesters in two units, lacks the perspective of proper training for the soldier, as the latter is also going to be used for other administrative or other labor-intense tasks. The same opinion is expressed by Vice General (retired) Hellenic Army N. Toskas,<sup>265</sup> who also offers proposals regarding the best way Greek soldiers should be trained and the tasks for which they should be used.

As a conclusion to the operational/ training factor, we find that a purely compulsory military service would lower the overall efficiency of the armed forces by incurring breakages in the experience levels of the force.

As we did previously in analyzing the Volunteer Force, we next consider the mobilization factor of a draftee force.

### **c. Mobilization**

As previously described for the Greek Volunteer Force, this factor is a very critical one for Greece. The country's sensitive geopolitical position, its small population, existing open issues with some neighbors, and its defensive military dogma, make the factor of mobilization a real and substantial one.

These factors are also discussed in an article by Smokovitis regarding the formation of the Greek military.<sup>266</sup> In another work, Smokovitis questions a group of cadets on several military and social issues<sup>267</sup>. His main

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<sup>264</sup> Periklis Zorzovilis, "Time for Decisions, *Strategy* 7 (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>265</sup> Nikolaos Toskas. "The Conscription, *Strategy* 5 (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>266</sup> Dimitris Smokovitis, "Greece," in *The Military, More than Just a Job?* ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 249-253. Even though the article is dated in '80s, the author gives a clear picture of the factors leading to the Draft Force at the time

<sup>267</sup> Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999), 314-331.

point in that article is that the Greek military represents a unique case in the European context due to the same factors as those referred to previously. The majority of his research subjects found that the most important possible task for the future Armed Forces would be the defense of the national territory. Based on the cadets' super-positive view on the draft system, we can conclude that the mobilization factor was implicitly considered in their minds.<sup>268</sup>

This research group leads us to consider the next literature question, of how conscripts are perceived by Greek society in general.

## **2. How are the Conscript Soldiers Viewed by Greek Society?**

We examine Greek society's perception in two dimensions: first, the more generic one, which is how the average person in society views conscripts; and, second, how conscript soldiers are viewed by their families, which represent a major part of Greek society.<sup>269</sup> These data are also useful when considering the interrelation of society and the military in the next chapter.

### **a. Society's Opinion of Draftees**

We have ample data to support the notion that, during Greek history, the soldier was considered a man of dignity and courage. This perception is also related to the numerous stories told after the many battles that the Greek Armed Forces fought over the years. It is also widely believed that serving as a soldier reinforces one's ties with his nation and affects the sentimental part of his

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<sup>268</sup> We have to note that this focus group does not represent the general social group; however, since they were only in their first years of military life, it is most probable that they still carried with them their civil-perceptions, and thus were a small but quite representative group of Greek youngsters.

<sup>269</sup> A rough calculation of the family members directly connected to a soldier while in duty would be:  $(50,000) \times (6) = 300,000$ , where 50,000 is an average number of draftees serving and six is a rough number of family members directly affected by him. So, in total, 300,000 people, usually politically active and voters, have a direct relation at all times with a conscripted soldier. It is interesting to consider that, in both the past two national elections in Greece in 2004 and 2007, the difference between the two leading parties was close to 300,000 votes.

logic, forcing him to consider the group instead of the individual. Numerous examples of sacrifice can be identified, not only during a war period, but also during peace.<sup>270</sup>

Of course, there are also some people who might argue that, specifically in Greece, the draft system is counterproductive and soldiers are disappointed instead of proud of their service.<sup>271</sup> Yet, a retired Greek general, N. Toscas,<sup>272</sup> notes the lack of draftees' training, and feels that their overall dissatisfaction would be addressed mainly by reviewing the training and other general procedures used in the draft system, and that this should not be a reason for demolishing the whole draft system. The majority of political parties agree with this argument.

Currently, there is a debate, in Greece over whether to cease the draft system. As many people, institutions and political parties take part in that open dialogue, we have a great chance of exploiting their views. We could start with the ideas of the most responsible person on that issue: the Minister of National Defense. In a TV interview in 2007,<sup>273</sup> he supported the draft system, considering it a vital part of the military and a supreme life experience for the youth. He also connected conscription with the ties among society members that are so much needed today. His view was that not only should the draft continue

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<sup>270</sup> This fact could be considered as self-evident; nevertheless, some very well presented examples of sacrifice in the military can be found in the article: Nikolaos Toscas, "The Conscription," *Strategy 5* (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>271</sup> To get a more live feeling of what a part of Greek society argues, see *Omiri.gr*, <http://www.omhroi.gr/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article> (accessed September 15, 2008).

<sup>272</sup> Nikolaos Toscas, "The Conscription, *Strategy 5* (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>273</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

to exist, but also that an earlier call for service at nineteen years of age, irrespective of the ongoing studies of the prospective soldier, should be considered.<sup>274</sup>

That last point, and the overall concept of draftees, raised some counter-arguments from the opposing political parties. The second biggest political party at the time (PASOK), which leans to the center-left side, is critical only of the current way the conscription system is working. Their opinion is not a definite yes or no to conscription, but rather a proposal to renew the idea of conscription step-by-step, from what it is today to a model of conscription of a modern type of Armed Forces. Specifically, the organized youth group of that party proposed a package of measures for reforming the present draft system, by even enforcing a soldier's ombudsman, who will resolve any issues reported to him by soldiers or other related parties.<sup>275</sup>

On the same path, even though in a more aggressive way, P. Korveis, a parliament representative of a smaller left-wing party (SYNASPISMOS), argued that we should consider changing the system that was initiated in 1911 when major wars took place.<sup>276</sup> He went on to say that the way that conscription is enforced today is useless and even counterproductive.

In conclusion, to estimate society's general view on the draftees, we can look at the opinions of their political representatives, which in the highest ratio agree on the following.

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<sup>274</sup> As of today, a youngster can get up to six years postponement in conscripting in the Army, if he is able to enter into a public university.

<sup>275</sup> "Time for Ombudsman in the Army." *Eleftherotipia Newspaper*, August 25, 2008, 2, <http://www.enet.gr/online/online> (accessed September 12, 2008). This, along with the rest of the proposals by PASOK, was driven by the unfortunate incidents of three soldiers' suicide during the summer of 2008.

<sup>276</sup> "Time for Ombudsman in the Army." *Eleftherotipia Newspaper*, August 25, 2008, 1, <http://www.enet.gr/online/online> (accessed August 13, 2008).

- Conscript soldiers are closely watched by society along with their political representatives
- Approximately 85 percent of society, as represented by the two major political parties, supports the draft system
- The same population (and even more) support the reform of the conscription system<sup>277</sup>
- All of the political parties seem very sensitive to the individual soldier's well-being<sup>278</sup>

This analysis, assumes that there are connections between the political parties in Greece and their voters, as well as the whole society. But what are the views of those directly connected to the soldiers?

#### ***b. Opinions among the Soldiers' Close Social Circle***

As we can understand, the soldiers' social circle constitutes a subgroup of the general population. Thus, they primarily follow the ideas described above. Still, their direct connection, and the fact that family in Greece is closely connected, produces more intense results. One of them is the interference of the parents in the positioning of their sons in their military duties. It used to be a general phenomenon - parents trying to achieve military positions for their sons as close as possible to their homes. That deficiency forced the Ministry of Defense to pass a law regarding the time period for a conscript to spend in remote and urban areas.<sup>279</sup>

Another point that evidently shows the youngsters' avoidance of service - and as a logical consequence the same logic by their parents - is that in most of the cases, youngsters postpone their military service to study. This can

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<sup>277</sup> The views of the political parties on how to reform the draft system might be different, but still they agree that a sort of action should be undertaken.

<sup>278</sup> This could be a direct result of the draft system and its political reflections on voting, as presented earlier.

<sup>279</sup> It was determined as six months at a remote base and the other six months at an urban base.



only be done with the financial assistance of their parents. This was what the Minister of Defense, Mr. Meimarakis, also noted in an interview in 2007:

Normally 80 to 85 thousand of soldiers should be conscripted every year; of those only 45 to 50 thousands appear for service. The rest 30 thousands are postponing their service, due to educational reasons. So, a ratio of roughly 40 percent is avoiding to be enlisted on time.<sup>280</sup> From those 30 thousand that avoid enlistment, roughly 10 thousand never serve, by using several ways of avoiding conscription.<sup>281</sup>

That clue became the basic argument for the Ministry of Defense's 2007 proposal to enlist youngsters at the age of eighteen, after the completion of their high school studies, and before they enter the higher educational level.

In general, what we keep from all these numbers is that at least 40 percent of the youngsters have higher dreams than becoming a soldier, not only a conscript but a volunteer, too. This fact of 40 percent avoiding conscription can be extremely useful to us, as, logically, the same portion of the youth is avoiding enlistment in the volunteer force, too. Their ambitions and their potential are well beyond the Volunteer Force offerings. So, this leaves us with the other 60 percent of the Greek youth, which forms the pool for choosing volunteers. In other words, Volunteers are chosen among the lower 60 percent of the educated Greek youth, while the upper-educated 40 percent remains out of the volunteer force and is also avoiding conscription. This can be depicted graphically, as presented in Figure 4.5.

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<sup>280</sup> This ratio is a very interesting one as, apart from showing the avoidance of obligatory military service, it also shows the portion of the youngsters that were successfully accepted in a university and preferred doing so rather than going to the military in general. This ratio will be cross-checked later through the official data from the Ministry of Public Education.

<sup>281</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).




Figure 4.6. The pyramid of youngsters willing to volunteer

The draft system suffers not only from the low birth-rate in Greece but also from the avoidance of service by youngsters. Even for those youngsters who enlisted properly and on time, their parents are greatly concerned for them, as most of the soldiers used to live in their close family environment before conscripting, and thus have strong and live connections with it.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> At the age of 18, usually a man lives with his parents and after his service, he most probably would return to his family house (see relevant data presented by Eurostat in the survey: The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," *Flash Eurobarometer Series 202* (2007): 70.

As a generic outcome of attempting to see through the eye's of soldiers' parents, we would say.

- Parents are very closely related to their soldier-sons and they watch them continuously
- Parents give priority – if they can afford it - to their sons' studies instead of letting them serve in the Army
- There is no sign from the parents of rejecting conscription;<sup>283</sup> still, they try to ensure the best living conditions for their sons during their service

These conclusions are crucial for the next chapter, where we show the connections between society and the military and how these connections affect military efficiency.

In the following discussion, we focus on the people whose opinions were not yet expressed in this study: the military officers and leaders. We try to find what kind of soldiers they prefer to have under their orders. This gives us a wider perspective on how volunteers and draftees are seen, not only in the society, but also in the military environment.

## **C. MILITARY LEADERS AND OFFICERS: WHAT KIND OF SOLDIERS DO THEY PREFER?**

### **1. Examining the Three Main Factors**

We have already tried to examine the Greek society to see its beliefs. We have already estimated the preferences of the youngsters themselves, and the options they have. Now, we try to understand the military part of the puzzle, and figure out what form of conscription military officials consider best for the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. We take into account perspectives of the Hellenic, European and U.S. military personnel, considering the mentality and the

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<sup>283</sup> The argument for that is that parents belong in the general population that was examined before and supports the draft; possibly under a better form.

culture of all these militaries as closely related.<sup>284</sup> Once more, we use the factors examined above: Economic – Operational – Mobilization, and try to estimate which of these has the greater gravity, according to military officers.

To start with the economic factor, it is evident that military leaders are least concerned about that, as the budget of the Armed Forces is not made by them, but by the politicians and the higher Ministry administration.<sup>285</sup> Military officers and leaders are mostly concerned on the effectiveness and efficiency of the “weapon” they are charged to operate. This is the reason for their shift of concern mainly to the operational and mobilization factors.<sup>286</sup>

The operational factor for conscripted and volunteer soldiers has already been examined and gives us sound proof that volunteers have the advantage on that. For this reason, officers generally prefer to have volunteers under their command.<sup>287</sup>

The mobilization factor is a critical one, too. Officers, and especially the higher-ranking ones, want to know that in a case of a military threat, they will be quickly given the soldiers they need, who preferably would have some experience in the duties they would be called to perform. So, as analyzed before, conscription has a positive outcome on that. Therefore, in the instance of

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<sup>284</sup> The NATO Armed Forces in particular have been working and operating together for more than 50 years, and have acquired a common understanding on building and operating an army, mainly on the operational field. For instance, the tactics used in NATO countries are the same, so what is demanded by soldiers in each country is about the same.

<sup>285</sup> An opposite observation is made in the survey conducted by Smokovitis, where a group of military cadets answered that AVF is difficult to be implemented, due to high costs. Nevertheless, their remark came as an answer to a theoretical question and they did not answer as experienced officers. (Dimitris Smokovitis, in *Military Sociology*, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999).

<sup>286</sup> It is sure that the higher rank officers overlooking the Defense Budget would be much interested in the economic factor. Nevertheless, in this part we consider the opinion of the majority of officers in charge of the command of an operational unit.

<sup>287</sup> From personal observations and experience while serving in the Hellenic Navy, before changing to volunteer crews on ships, most of the officers felt tired and disheartened after trying continuously to train a draftee and after a few months, lose that person and go all over again with a new one. This was also presented scientifically with the use of learning curves, earlier in this study.

immediate danger, officers would probably prefer to have a conscript system where the coverage of the army positions could be quick and by quite experienced persons.<sup>288</sup>

On the other hand, there is the continuous need of peacetime mobilization, meaning the soldiers needed to man the military units as a part of their service to the country. As mentioned previously,<sup>289</sup> 40 percent of the eligible draftees do not appear and postpone their service. This lack of soldiers is a degrading factor for military effectiveness and directly affects the officers, as they have to come up with ways to try and operate their units with fewer personnel than needed. This has a counter-effect on the previous factor, that of operational effectiveness.

Thus, mobilization has two aspects: first, in the short-term, for filling the current military positions needed; and, second, in the long-term, when a major mobilization might be needed under a military threat to the country.

Logically, for short term mobilization, officers would prefer an AVF, where the acquisition of soldiers needed would be more assured and more stable.<sup>290</sup>

Mobilization in the long-term is a clear advantage of the draft system. Still, middle-rank officers in charge of operational units do not usually consider that aspect of mobilization much, as they have first to manage short-term mobilization. Mobilization in the long-term is mainly a concern of the higher-ranking officers, who are in charge of the strategic structure of the Armed Forces.

As a result, a rough weight of the above factors gives a lead to volunteers, as they are more suitable than draftees when considering the operational and the short-run mobilization factors.

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<sup>288</sup> Usually mobilization affects mainly the Army and not the Navy and Air Force, where the combat units are fully manned by volunteers from the peacetime. For more on operational aspects of mobilization in the Greek territory see: Nikolaos Toscas, "The Reserves in a Battle, *Strategy* 6 (2008), <http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>289</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

<sup>290</sup> A volunteer soldier fills a position for at least four years, while a conscript for only one.

In addition, another aspect that leads officers to prefer volunteers, is that the chain of command is more stable and efficient. This happens because volunteers serve longer than conscripts, and, as a result, the hierarchical structure is steadier and more embedded in the military personnel. Apart from that, it is easier to command someone who is paid for doing something, than someone who serves his country without any return. It is normal to react with more compassion and less military professionalism in the second case.

A very interesting analysis of this issue, regarding the U.S. Army, comes from Colonel W. Raymond.<sup>291</sup> In a paper on the draft in the U.S. Army and the Armed Forces in general, he supports the reestablishment of a form of a draft system, mainly for the full mobilization of the Army while in operations. On that argument, he also adds that being drafted is a patriotic act, which shapes the youth and the society in whole.

In the same study, views from high-ranking officers of the U.S. Armed Forces are presented. General Gordon Sullivan, former army Chief of staff, stated in 2005: "The Army and, indeed all the services need an increase in end strength to meet the high operational temp that shows little sign of abating in the continuing war on terrorism."<sup>292</sup> Another opinion from retired Major General Edward Atkeson in 2005 was that "the all-volunteer force is close to breaking right now...when it does break, that's when you will see the draft come back."<sup>293</sup>

Of course, there are also many U.S. military officers who oppose the draft; still, we are getting an idea of the turbulence that the mobilization factor mainly brings into the U.S. volunteer Armed Forces.

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<sup>291</sup> William M. Raymond, "Uncle Sam says, 'I Want You!'" - The Politics of the Draft and National Service," *Monograph* (2005).

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

Looking now upon Europe, we analyze the data given by Volker Gelhausen in his 1998 NPS Master's thesis<sup>294</sup>. Reserve Ratio (RR), displayed in the table below, determines the state of readiness of a force, or, in other words, its mobilization ability. Thus, Reserve Ratio is defined as the ratio of Reserves to the total national active forces. As the author suggests, the role of the Reserve Ratio is getting even more important because military organizations usually reduce the number of active-duty personnel after implementing an AVF.<sup>295</sup> Figure 4.6 shows the RR of some European Military Forces.




Figure 4.7. Reserve Ratio (RR) of European Countries in 1996-1997<sup>296</sup>

Greece stands approximately in the middle of these countries, tending to have equal weight in its active and Reserve Force.<sup>297</sup>

<sup>294</sup> Volker Gelhausen, *The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the Successful implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 105-109.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>296</sup> Volker Gelhausen, *The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the Successful implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 105-109.

<sup>297</sup> This denotes that draftees have a substantial gravity when the long-term mobilization factor is considered.

Figure 4.6 and the accompanying analysis verify that long-term mobilization is a goal better accomplished having conscripts than volunteers, especially when the population of a country is not large enough to provide adequate numbers of ex-volunteers acting as reserves.

In spite of the draftee's superiority in the long-term mobilization, we believe that Greek officers prefer volunteers for their superiority in operational and short-term mobilization factors.

An additional reason that officers might not prefer having conscripts is the intervention they might have, from their military and civilian superiors, regarding the way draftees are treated, or, in other words, the pressure from society to the military for the wellbeing of the soldiers.

## **2. How an Officers' Job is Affected by Social Intervention on the Draftees' Service?**

Apart from the reasons examined before, officers face another difficulty with their conscript soldiers: the pressure that comes indirectly from the society via their superior officers for special treatment of soldiers. This is a negative aspect of the social control over the military. Most of the time, parents try to arrange for their sons to have the best treatment possible, and are sometimes driven to exaggeration.<sup>298</sup>

Apart from articles of newspapers and magazines, certain clues can be found showing that the Ministry of Defense, and more specifically the officers of military units, was disturbed by such attitudes. Therefore, several measures were implemented, to counter those phenomena, such as the following.

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<sup>298</sup> Numerous are the incidents described in the daily press for these issues. To get a comprehensive idea of that reoccurring fact visit: "Omiri," Site for Conscripts, <http://omhroi.org/modules/> (accessed November 15, 2008).



- Establishment of strict and specific criteria for reduced service time<sup>299</sup>
- Six months obligatory service on distant bases<sup>300</sup>
- Official proposal to not allow youngsters the choice of postponing their service duty and conscript them at 18 years of age whatever the circumstances<sup>301</sup>
- Acquisition of an electronic system to evaluate the capability of draftees, according to each one's strengths and weaknesses<sup>302</sup>

The above actions are, of course, beneficial; still, they reveal a need for action in that direction. That need was based on the injustice and the inefficiency occurring in military units, through the pressure of conscripts' parents on politicians or other powerful public employees. These, in turn, pressed the high-ranking officers for favors for the soldiers and, lastly, middle-ranking officers were losing abilities due to the decreased manpower they had in their command<sup>303</sup>. This attitude not only degraded the ability of a unit, but also devalued the officers in charge of the soldiers. Finally, the rest of the soldiers who did not have the ability or the will to use such means were disheartened and also carried the extra burden left to them by their colleagues.

As a result, we could say that we presented one more negative part of the draft force for the officers: the intervention by their civilian leaders, mainly on the way they could manage specific individuals under their command.<sup>304</sup> Overall, on

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<sup>299</sup> Source: Law N. 2510/97 (FEK 136 A').

<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>301</sup> Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

<sup>302</sup> The existence of that system was personally witnessed by the author.

<sup>303</sup> These favors, were also experienced personally, and included "easy" changes, excuse of certain jobs in the unit, extra leave or any other favorable treatment.

<sup>304</sup> As we will show in the next chapter, social intervention in the military is not always a negative type of control. Nevertheless, when this intervention occurs on an individual basis and not as a proposal for a new generic procedure/ control or operation, it is deflating to the morale of the military and produces inefficiencies.

that issue, we could support the argument that officers would probably believe that, specifically for completing their military tasks, a volunteer force would be preferred to a draft force.

We made the above brief argument for collecting more pieces of the puzzle, regarding the design of the military-soldier force. What have we seen up to this point? We observed that society and political parties question the form and even the existence of today's conscription in Greece; that at least 40 percent of parents and sons try to avoid military service; and that officers prefer volunteers to conscripts.

One might ask: why hasn't an AVF been created in Greece since it would apparently please most of the social groups directly affected by conscription? An answer this question comes from a related issue, representation.

#### **D. WHICH FORM OF MILITARY STRUCTURE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATION?**

This part of the study is crucial, as well as theoretical. The meaning of representation resembles the ancient Greek myth of Lerne Hydra; a monster with numerous snake heads; for every head cut, two more emerged. Finally, the monster was destroyed by the mythical hero, Hercules, who aimed with his sword into the heart of the monster and not at its heads.

The resemblance lies in the fact that for every answer given for the topic question, two more questions emerge, such as: How do we define representiveness? Why do we need a representative Armed Forces?

We attempt to respond to these questions by using the help of military sociology. Further, we employ the basic concept presented by Eitelberg in his MRM.

##### **1. What is "Representative"?**

As Eitelberg states:

**“The idea of perfect representation is perceived as a microcosm or specular image of the total population”<sup>305</sup>**

In another comment, the same author says:

Representation conversely classifies individuals according to groups; it draws attention to stereotypical qualities (i.e, statistics are segregated according to distinctive group traits or qualities), and it encourages, rather than obviates, consciousness of innate group differences.<sup>306</sup>

Eitelberg defines perfect representation, yet, he also states that this concept is an illusion and, apart from that, that perfect representation is undesirable within a highly specialized institution such as the Armed Forces. He also moves on to say that, even the concept of “approximate representation” is difficult to grasp in the abstract.<sup>307</sup> To elaborate on the above arguments, we pose some theoretical questions:

**Q:** Is it representing to facilitate all social groups in the Army?

**A:** No, because there are many groups such as criminals/ convicts, physically or mentally disabled, the very old or very young, the uneducated or ill tents, conscientious objectors, etc., that by definition might harm the army institutions.

**Q:** Is there a state institution that might be characterized as representative of the population?

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<sup>305</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, and Martin Binkin, “Military Service in American Society,” *Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service* (1982): 235-259.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 251. In that article and in his MRM model, Eitelberg suggests the blacks and the women as the distinct social/racial groups for measuring representiveness. This is quite similar to our analysis for representation in Hellenic military, as we use “poor” and women as distinct social groups. Blacks in today’s U.S. society, as the same author implicitly suggests in many points, are perceived as a low income social group and not a pure racial one. For example, an employer in U.S. nowadays, might not hire a black not because his skin color, but due to probable lack of education/ credentials. A strong evidence on that change of the U.S. society’s “color of skin perception,” is the recently elected African-American President of the U.S., B. Obama.

<sup>307</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations,” Paper presented at the *Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 3. Even though the “approximate representation” is difficult to specify we will use it, in rough lines, in the MRM model for checking the overall representation.

**A:** Yes, we might find similar social equality characteristics in other public institutions/ organizations. These might be the public schools, and the parliament. The common characteristics of all of these institutions are the following:

- Everybody in these “institutions” has an equal obligation to the society/ state in general (e.g., to defend it, to be obliged to follow laws passed in the parliament).
- Everybody is receiving the same benefits from the country (e.g., education, benefits of security).
- Everybody has equal strength say/vote (representiveness of the deputies in parliament).

So, according to the above three factors, we could give a potential definition of representiveness of the society, in a specific group as follows: A (military) group is representative of the society from which it is drawn, when its members are called upon to serve – and when they are capable – irrespective of race, gender, social status, or other demographic factors. Of course when one has an obligatory service, this representation is obvious; nevertheless, the more one mixes volunteers in a conscript force, the greater the danger of becoming unrepresentative of the society.

Now, coming back to the definition we gave, we see an evident problem: gender. In a draft force, and specifically in the Hellenic Military, are women represented equally? The answer is negative, but before degrading the representation of the draft force, let us make an analogy with the two state institutions we used before: public schools and the parliament. Through these institutions, we might find some representation characteristics, which are not affected by gender. Then, we will have a strong clue that military gender unrepresentiveness is of no meaning for the function of military effectiveness. We start with the totally representative institution of the public schools and later we examine the representative Hellenic Parliament, according to the Constitution's principles. Public school is analogous to a pure “draft” system where all members

of the society of a specific age are required to attend the education offered by the country. In case they do not attend, there are penalties for the parents, as well as exclusion of the children from the mainstream of society.<sup>308</sup>

The Parliament of Greece is not representative of women, as in 2008 the proportion of women was 16 percent, while their respective proportion in the total population of the country is a little above 50 percent.<sup>309</sup>

The Parliament is a close analogy to a volunteer force with steady and common entrance criteria. So, can we say that Greek women are not represented in the Greek parliament, or even in the European parliament? Although it is a generic question, we should answer that all women can vote and there are several women candidates from which to choose. The fact that some of the women candidates are not elected shows that the woman voter's first criterion is not gender but the perceived ability of the political representative for whom she would vote.

This perceived ability is composed of two factors: First, the person who is elected is capable of doing the required task; second, that same person has nothing more critical to do except the required task. This sequence of thoughts leads us to a proposed innovation of this present study: a suggestion that the way representiveness is measured by gender, is wrong; it should be measured according to the core of Greek society, the family.

Thinking representation in the concept of a society composed of families, we could say, that in a way, the family elects the men to represent it in war, and leaves women behind to raise the children of the family and gives society the chance to be reproduced in case the men are lost in the war.

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<sup>308</sup> Meaning that the person without a high-school degree cannot move to other studies and not many jobs are waiting for him in the future.

<sup>309</sup> Hellenic Parliament, <http://www.parliament.gr/> (accessed November 17, 2008); National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," *National Surveys* (2006).

In fact, that was the concept historically in Europe, where in the Middle Ages and before, each family in the village or town sent forth a “representative” in order for an army to be formed. Later on, that concept was standardized, and we had the stereotype of the man-soldier.<sup>310</sup>

In Europe in general and especially in Greece, family plays a significant role and many obligations are dependent on that core of society.<sup>311</sup>

This proposal explains also the findings of the first chapter, where we noticed that there is a remarkable problem with the low birth rate in Greece, and women in general are married later than they used to be some years ago. Apart from that, their unemployment rates are higher than those of men and a potential conscription would lead them to even higher unemployment rates. It might possibly be a concept that is not so well understood in the U.S., but there are many authors that implicitly, or explicitly, present the issue of the incompatible roles of the woman/ mother and the soldier.<sup>312</sup>

If we accept that change of the unit of representation from a person to a family, we could rewrite the definition of “representation” given before as:<sup>313</sup> A

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<sup>310</sup> Of course, when there was a severe lack of men, women participated and gave their lives in defending their country – we can think as an example the State of Ancient Sparta, where women participated in the Army; other more recent examples are Iran and Israel.

<sup>311</sup> For example, family-law is an extensive part of the legislature system of Greece and includes many obligations as well as benefits to families. Another example would be the tax-policy where families can – and in most of the cases do – make their tax reports as one person/ taxable unit.

<sup>312</sup> A very detailed and complete approach on that issue is found in Mady Wechsler Segal, “The Military and The Family as Greedy Institutions,” *Armed Forces and Society* 13, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 9-38; Mark J. Eitelberg, “Your Mother Wears Combat Boots. But Should She Pack a Gun?” *Presented at the 98th Annual meeting of the American Psychological Association*, Boston, MA, August 1990.

<sup>313</sup> When we say family, there is no need to be a young married couple; it might be a parental family with their children at the age of 18-20. As we noticed in the previous chapter, families in Greece stay together for a long time. Of course the women of 18 to 20 might not be mothers, but they are perspective ones, and as analyzed in Chapter III, they would “lose” critical time if drafted at that age in the military. A relative example in a different context though would be the evacuation of a ship in danger. Who do they call first? Women and children. Why do we not look for representation in loading the rescue boats? Most probably, because there is an imminent danger and the logic, along with the navy-culture, calls for preservation of families by giving to them the ability of being reproduced in the future. Thus, just as men march towards dangerous war, they also stay back in the dangerous sinking ship.

*(military) group is representative of the society it belongs to, when its members are capable to serve and are proportionally equal to the relative social groups, inside the society.*

As we see by the new definition, we eliminated the gender and the specific categories of society and we included two prerequisites for the representation goal in a group.

- Capability to serve
- Equal representation of the social groups

The first prerequisite is already fulfilled in Greece, as calling for service excludes people who are physically or mentally disabled, convicts, conscientious objectors,<sup>314</sup> and certain others.

For the second prerequisite, the equal representation of Greek society in the military, we have refined our search into only one basic concept. This concept is the socioeconomic representation, more simply described as the “rich” and the “poor” in the Greek Armed Forces.<sup>315</sup>

Hopefully, we have cut off one head of “Lernea Hydra” by giving an answer to what is representative, in broad terms, of Greek society: It is the relative representation of the socioeconomic groups of the society.

To our disappointment, a new snake head emerges: why do we need representation in the military?

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<sup>314</sup> Hellenic Republic, “Conscription Law,” 1763/88, (1988). Convicts and homosexuals are two categories that are physically and mentally able to serve but they are considered as malicious influences for the military body. The last category of conscientious objectors are mentally opposed to service, so according to a recent law, they perform another kind of national service, in the general civic sector.

<sup>315</sup> Of course, the demographic representation is one more factor to be examined; still, it is beyond the capabilities of the present study and is also considered less important from the socioeconomic factor.

## 2. Why Do We Need a Military Representative of Society?

Using Eitelberg's mental sword,<sup>316</sup> we would answer that military members should do the following.

- Be "citizen-soldiers" who can "re-present" the variety of community interests and recreate the social fabric. (Political Legitimacy)
- Ensure a capable, cohesive and effective fighting force, in symbol as well as in need (Military Effectiveness)
- Be selected and treated fairly, and in a way that distributes the benefits and burdens of service throughout society (Social Equity)<sup>317</sup>

The same author continues:<sup>318</sup>

Consequently, approximate representation must be evaluated in relation to the set of "higher" goals that have made it an important policy concern. These higher goals are depicted in the model as political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity.

As we see later when examining the MRM model, these three factors form the theoretical limits or boundaries for a representative army.

Now is the time to test the pillars of the MRM model for the Greek reality. Thus, we examine if these three factors concerning the social representation in the U.S. military stand true for the Hellenic Armed Forces and society, too. This is the first step of testing the MRM model; the second is to evaluate the theoretical limits of these factors in the Greek Armed Forces.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 31, 2008).

<sup>317</sup> These three factors as identified by M. Eitelberg, are in fact, the three factors that the MRM model is based on, as we will see later on.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> These limits are not exact as they represent social situations where definite limits are rare. For example, a social turbulence cannot exactly be described by grading it as serious. In one country it might lead to dictatorship, in another to the passage of a social beneficial law. For that reason, the main "test" for the MRM model is the first one; as to whether these three factors mentioned above, are valid and critical when applied to the Greek reality.



**a. Validation of the First Factor of the MRM Model: Political Legitimacy**

What kind of society excuses its most privileged members from defending it?

Charles Moskos

The Armed Forces are a social type body ruled by the state authorities and the government, where community interests have to be reflected on every military aspect and act. This factor is mostly about the obligation of the country to make sure that this vital part of the state is mirroring the social structure and interests of the country itself.

We will list some points that explain the validity of this factor in Figure 4.7 in the Hellenic Armed Forces. For a better presentation, we created a diagram depicting these points and the relation among them.




Figure 4.8. Elements of the Factor of Political Legitimacy, applicable to the Hellenic Reality.

- Democratic tradition: The political system of Greece is democracy. It is well known that the first democracy in the world was that of Athens.<sup>320</sup> The democratic representation is historically embedded

<sup>320</sup> This fact does not mean that ever since, Greece has had democratic governments. In at least two instances in its modern history, the country had the misfortune of having a dictatorship (1935 and 1967).

in every citizen from his early age. Consequently, justice in representation of social groups in this important state-institution (military) is vital for Greeks.

- Society's control of the military: As mentioned before, there were at least two major historical instances where the military force turned against the political legitimate leaders, suppressing democratic values and individuals' liberties. The most recent one was relatively recent, between 1967 and 1974, when seven years of military rule of the country<sup>321</sup> was in existence. That evident weakness of state control and power over the military is a deficiency that Greek society is trying to ensure will never happen again. As a result, the pure representation of the society, which elected its political leaders, will be a deterrent to military personnel who might work on a plan to demolish the political power over that of the military<sup>322</sup>.
- Demographic diversity: Even though there is great homogeneity in race and in religion in the Greek population, the unique territory of the country is an aspect of social representation that needs to be considered. In Greece, there are numerous inhabited islands, as well as remote mountain villages. To recreate the social fabric of Greek region, one should represent these communities in the military institution, too.
- Unity of the society in the case of a national war: Political legitimacy is a critical factor in the case of an urgent need for mass country mobilization for a national war. The representation in that case is critical, as it unifies the society and enhances the government's decision about going to war.
- Government considers and handles the Armed Forces as a part of the society and not as a separate group: This factor affects the equity of institutions and the personnel handled by the government, and this factor is directly related to democratic values in Greece. It is evident that having representation in the Armed Forces makes it difficult for the government to neglect or act inappropriately to that social body. We could imagine, for example, that if the state would like to pass a law for the educational institutions, they would have to consider all possible aspects of side effects to the society that is fully represented in these institutions as active or passive "actors."

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<sup>321</sup> For more on the causes of that military deviation you can read Konstantinos Paparigopoulos, *History of the Hellenic Nation* (Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975).

<sup>322</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 133, 153.

This type of state ruling, which considers the society, would provide the greatest benefit for the country. Now, what if the army was not representative? The government could probably enforce military-related measures, without considering the overall well-being of the society in the long run. Furthermore, they would possibly not get any reaction from the society that is not affected, especially in the short run, from army-related decisions.<sup>323</sup>

It is very interesting to study some historical examples of Greece that are related to this factor. For instance, Alexander the Great (356-323 BC) is said to have lost his empire because, as he was kept going into the Far East, his army became more and more unrepresentative of the Macedonian social fabric that it initially had.<sup>324</sup>

Another example from Greek history would be the downfall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 CE. In that case, we can distinguish several resemblances with the contemporary social reality. The Byzantine Empire at its final period of decline was addicted to individualistic values and self-pleasures, neglecting the social obligations. As rich an empire as it was, it hired volunteers and missionaries to defend Byzantium and its capital, Constantinople.<sup>325</sup> At first, that measure worked, even though it required huge sacrifices of men and whole cities. But, finally, when Mohamed the Conquer, a Muslim political and army leader, surrounded Constantinople, there was an immediate need for

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<sup>323</sup> This is a very fundamental sub-factor of political legitimacy, or could even be a separate factor by itself: the democratic military control by the society and not only by the government. We will have the chance to focus on that issue in the next chapter, so as to realize its special importance. For now, we will only provide a plain example, in order to show its relevance: let us consider the imaginary scenario that a country hired only mercenaries for defending its borders, (which was a real case for some European countries in the medieval times). Will the society be considered for their administration and for the missions assigned to them? Most probably not. Nevertheless, the long term effects of a decision for going into a war might be a counter-attack by the opponent into the home country's territory. This would vastly affect the society in whole; still, it would not be hindered beforehand by the society controlling its Armed Forces.

<sup>324</sup> Due to losses in his army, Alexander the Great, conscripted men from the lands that he captured. For more on that you can read: Heckel Waldemar, *Alexander the Great*. Historical Sources in Translation, J. C. Yardley (Ottawa: Blackwell, 2003).

<sup>325</sup> Named by the Emperor Constantine 272-337 CE, who officially acknowledged Christianity in Byzantium and in Europe.

mobilization of the inhabitants of the city, and a compilation of a bigger army than the existing volunteer one. This mobilization was unsuccessful, due to various reasons, one of them being the perception that it was not the civilians' job to fight wars, along with a lack of understanding of how serious the situation was.

- Avoiding the gap between military and civilians by “injecting” individuals’ ideas into the Army Body: The fabric in the military will be representative of society if civilians are represented equally in that institution and “inject” it with ideas that are commonly found in the society overall. If the military is not representative of the society, it becomes distant from the latter, and finally opposed to it. Unfortunately, Greece had that experience during the dictatorship of 1967, where the military body had far different thoughts than society regarding what was better for the country<sup>326</sup>. Another paradigm of that “gap” is also found in American society, which evolved from a draft to an AVF system, with the consequence of widening that gap at the same time. Various authors examined that social-military gap in the U.S. at the beginning of the new millennium.<sup>327</sup> In the book, *Soldiers and Civilians*, the chasm between military and society is evident, and it is also widening as years of AVF go by.<sup>328</sup> A very useful and brief analogy depicting that gap is the use of “we” for society’s opinion, and “they” for the military’s opinion, or vice versa.
- The future political elite to be “baptized” in the pool of the Armed Forces: As a low-population nation that is situated in a strategic region, Greece should be on alert for potential future wars it might be called on to fight. For that reason, Greece’s future political leaders, who will normally come from all the layers of society, should have a thorough understanding of the Armed Forces that they might have to send to war. The more representative the Armed Forces will be, the greater the chance that a large part of the parliament will be ex-soldiers. This is not only beneficial for understanding the reality and the potential of the country’s Army; it is also essential for the political Members of the Parliament to have a mental and emotional connection with the Armed Forces in general, and the individual soldiers, specifically. This might possibly

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<sup>326</sup> At that time, the soldier force was totally representative, as it used to be only a draftees-type army. The problem of unrepresentativeness was in the officer corps, which used to be chosen by not so clear and equal procedures. Fortunately, that changed drastically immediately after the dictatorship’s downfall in 1974.

<sup>327</sup> Doug Bandow, “The Renewed Call for Conscription,” *Policy Analysis* 351 (1999): 1-38.

<sup>328</sup> Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A.. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001).

happen if every Parliament member would have served in the military. These emotional links are not irrelevant to the ruling of the Armed Forces, as that organization is performing a sacrificing duty, partially based on sentimental and romantic ideologies. In fact, it is difficult for a soldier to kill another human being- even when a mass psychology is the basic motive - without having an imperative scope to serve.<sup>329</sup> This imperative scope is mostly based on sentimental-based perceptions and beliefs. For that reason, a future politician's sentimental and logical connection to the soldier will enhance the informed decision-making over military issues and will make soldiers trust more their political rulers.

- The representation of the fellow countrymen who are returning back to Greece: This is an aspect that should be considered for the Greek situation, as there is a great number of immigrants who are Greek in origin, who were, in a way, incarcerated in years past in some socialistic countries north of Greece.<sup>330</sup> This former part of the Greek population was able to return back to its home country after the opening of the borders in 1993 and later on. They were granted the ability to serve if they wanted to. Their inclusion in the Armed Forces, through a representative conscription, would enhance their social links with the society, which initially viewed them as a foreign body in the native society.

All the arguments and facts presented above are drawn from the Greek situation and support the Political Legitimacy factor, as an answer to why we should have population representation, specifically in Greece. So we are convinced to accept that first pillar of the MRM model as a valid one.

Before moving to the second pillar of the MRM model, we should look upon a possible bewilderment that some readers might have: Is it not evident that Political Legitimacy should be a universal goal of any state? To our understanding, it is not evident. Let us consider some examples: First, a non-democratic regime would probably avoid the recreation of community interests in the Army, as the ruling party's sovereignty would be negatively affected. Second,

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<sup>329</sup> For this aspect of killing while in the Armed Forces, D. Grossman, describes it in a very real and detailed way, arguing that the basic act of a war in reality is done very unwillingly (Dave Grossman, *On Killing*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. in *The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*. Canada (Little, Brown & Company, 1995).

<sup>330</sup> This is a complex situation that arose from many historical incidents after the Balkan Wars of 1908-1912 and later on.

in a state that historically has had confrontations between the tribes or regions from which it is composed, it is very difficult to seek political legitimacy through the representation of all tribes in its Armed Forces.<sup>331</sup> As a conclusion, we should say that this pillar of Political Legitimacy is valid in nations under democratic constitutions, which also do not face instability due to social conflicts.<sup>332</sup>

Next, we examine the second reason, according to the MRM model, as to why we need a representative force.

***b. Validation of the Second Factor of MRM: Military Effectiveness***

«Ουδείς Αναβαλλόμενος»

or

«Nobody is excused»

Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)<sup>333</sup>

This factor explains the need for representativeness, as far as the military itself is concerned. In other words, we focus on the military function to determine if that factor is valid in the Greek Armed Forces.

Although military effectiveness is a wide strategic subject, we will try to analyze briefly some of its most crucial elements in Greek reality.<sup>334</sup> The diagram in Figure 4.8 summarizes these elements of military effectiveness.

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<sup>331</sup> An example would be Iraq's current military force, which is constituted by only one of the two tribes of Iraq. Another example would be undeveloped African nations that are composed of opposing tribes (e.g., Congo).

<sup>332</sup> The subject whether they should or not be politically legitimate is not discussed here; the conclusion is based on whether we can apply this model's factor in such cases.

<sup>333</sup> That was the recruiting policy for Alexander the Great in the ancient era, which means all should enlist; there are no excuses for not doing so.

<sup>334</sup> This part should be also viewed in connection to the analysis of the operational factor (Drafts- Volunteers), examined previously in that chapter.




Figure 4.9. Elements of the Factor of Military Effectiveness, Applicable to the Hellenic Reality.

- **Scope of the Hellenic Armed Forces:** As is the purpose of every army, the Hellenic Armed Forces are first and foremost in place to defend the country from external enemies who might try to deny it its sovereignty on its territory. In Greece, unlike the rest of the EU countries, we have a lot of incidents of aggression and denial of the legal boundaries of the country by neighboring countries.<sup>335</sup> This fact makes the region very tense and dangerous for future border conflicts or even nationwide wars.<sup>336</sup> Due to the tense strategic area that Greece lies in and to the historic instances in Greek history, we would value that scope as the major one, without forgetting that Armed Forces can, and do ,play other roles, too.<sup>337</sup>

In this, we will find the majority of Greeks having the same opinion; in a 2001 Eurobarometer survey among the fifteen core countries of the E.U,

<sup>335</sup> For more on these issues you can see Thanos Ntokos, "Policy for a National Strategy on the Hellenic Defense," *Elamep* (2007).

<sup>336</sup> See also the opinion of the Ministry of Defense on strategic issues, "White Bible of the Armed Forces – 2007" Ministry of Defense, "White Bible," [http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all\\_publication\\_comhtml?dr\\_html\\_url](http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all_publication_comhtml?dr_html_url) (accessed September 15, 2008).

<sup>337</sup> Peace keeping/stabilizing operations in other countries are very usual nowadays for the Greek military in the context of NATO forces. Apart from that, nowadays the army assists the society by giving aid during big events or natural or other disasters (e.g., earthquakes in Greece, Olympic games of 2004 in Athens, etc.)

Greece and the United Kingdom were the only countries that perceived the main role of the military to be “preparing for and waging war” in a proportion of ninety percent.<sup>338</sup>

We present Figure 4.9 for the additional reason of showing the fact that approximately 0 percent of Greeks questioned, answered positively as to whether the Army symbolizes the national unity, which directly relates to representation.




Figure 4.10. Roles of the military, according to Europeans<sup>339</sup>

Regarding the scope of an Army, several authors present a dual military function: one in peace and the second during times of war. By dividing the scope of the Army into these two periods, they find social representation as a less critical factor in peacetime, when armed forces play a role of employment of last resort and alleviate the unemployment problem of the society.

<sup>338</sup> Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 330 (initially from Eurobarometer Survey 54.1 in 2001.)

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., 330.



For the Greek case, we will not draw this dichotomy for two main reasons.

- First, as we described previously, 90 percent of Greeks recognize that the primary function of the military is for fighting wars
- Second, history in Greece has taught us that conflicts and wars occur rapidly, many times without prior alert. This means that, even in peacetime, Greece has to maintain a military force that can be effective at least during the first days of a conflict/war. If during peace, we focus on employing unrepresentative forces for the sake of lessening the unemployment rate, we will find ourselves in a bad situation after a potential enemy attack.<sup>340</sup>

In ancient Greece, Plato remarked that a state must be prepared for war to have peace. Essentially, this means that a nation must never lose sight of the primary purpose of its army, especially during peace, when all preparations take place.

More recently, J. Record supported the same idea and noted that:

These functions (non military tasks), however, important they have been and continue to be, are incidental to the military's main purpose, which is to fight and win wars. No military establishment that is ineffective on the battlefield that is professionally incompetent or otherwise constrained from fighting effectively or that is simply too small to do the job asked of it, can justify its existence.<sup>341</sup>

Closing that parenthesis of war and peace periods, we pronounce them as unified, leading to the same objective of defending effectively the country and preparing for potential wars/conflicts. Consequently, as national wars are the first priority, representation is a central axiom for those that will defend the country.

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<sup>340</sup> This does not mean that this function of the military is not an actual one; what it means is that we will not focus on secondary army objectives (lessening unemployment rates) rather than on the crucial one of defending the country and being prepared for war.

<sup>341</sup> National Defense University, Fort Lesley, *The Anthro Factor in Warfare* (J. E. Endicott: Washington, 1988), 226.

- Representation brings confidence by the society and consequently high morale to the Armed Forces

Considering the Greek military as a representative one, at least until now,<sup>342</sup> we realize that families that send their children to serve will be supportive of the military, too. This is evident in a survey conducted by E.U. in 1997 and 2000 (Figure 4.11, below):




Figure 4.11. Confidence of the military by the society it serves<sup>343</sup>

In 1997, the highest confidence level for its military by a society was that of Greece (85 percent), which further increased to 87 percent in 2000. Finland, which keeps a conscription army too, was the only country above

<sup>342</sup> Greece nowadays has an obligatory one year service for all men. Before 1995, it used to have only conscripts and no volunteers.

<sup>343</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327.

Greece in the level of society's confidence.<sup>344</sup> This confidence of the society is transformed into high morale for the military forces, and constitutes one of the major requirements for achieving military effectiveness.<sup>345</sup>

- The need for a large army according to missions and the geographic formulation of the country

If we were facing a military mission of enforcing peace abroad, would we need a mass representative army? Probably not. But since we are focusing on a country that has a mission of protecting its territory from invasions, we need to have a relatively large army. Moskos, Williams, and Segal would agree on that, as they have created the relevant table (Table 4.1) presented below.

Table 4.1. Armed forces and postmodern Society<sup>346</sup>

<b>Armed forces variables</b>	<b>Early modern (Pre-cold war; 1900-1945)</b>	<b>Late modern (Cold War; 1945-1990)</b>	<b>Postmodern (Post Cold War; since 1990)</b>
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force structure	Mass army	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major mission definition	Defense of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (e.g., peacekeeping and humanitarian)
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesmen; soldier-scholar

<sup>344</sup> Finland also had some border conflicts with Russia, a traditional enemy of Finland.

<sup>345</sup> Considering also the U.S. AVF and society, the gap is evident and is described by the distinction of "we" and "they," for the two groups. For more see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians*. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001).

<sup>346</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 84.

<b>Armed forces variables</b>	<b>Early modern (Pre-cold war; 1900-1945)</b>	<b>Late modern (Cold War; 1945-1990)</b>	<b>Postmodern (Post Cold War; since 1990)</b>
Public attitude toward military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Skeptical or apathetic; indifferent
Media relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and military community	Integral part	Partial	Removed
Homosexuals in the military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious objection	Limited or prohibited	Permitted on routine basis	Subsumed under civilian service
Impact on defense budget Organizational tension	Positive Service roles	Neutral Budget fights	Negative New missions

We can see in Table 4.1 that, when the perceived threat is an enemy invasion, the force structure would most probably be a mass-like army. Even though the authors place this kind of enemy threat in the pre-Cold War era, this is the reality for Greece even today. If we add the factor of the geographic diversity of Greece, (many islands and remote mountain areas), we discover an additional need for dispersed military bases and, consequently, personnel.

Someone would ask, what do mass armies have to do with representation? It is simple; when we have a small army that has to perform abroad, the numbers and ratios of representation play a minor role. On the other hand, when we have to deploy many soldiers in many places, we need to consider the composition of the military units among them, and additionally the representation of the general society's values in them.<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> An example on that would be a dispatched military unit from a developed country in a war or conflict abroad, which performs uncivilized acts (torture, rapes) and consequently lowers the morale of the whole military and society to which it belongs.

- Military culture

As we have seen before, military effectiveness is graded highly in Greece. This effectiveness is also tied in the culture embedded in the military force. Up to today, that culture is related to conscription, and consequently to the representation of all social groups in the army.<sup>348</sup> If this culture of extensive representation changes, it might negatively affect military effectiveness, too.

- Cohesion of the fighting force:

The society that draws a line between its fighting men and its thinking men, will find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards,

Sir Williams Francis Butler<sup>349</sup>

Last, but not least, we present the factor of military cohesion, which is driven by the representiveness of society in the military.

For the Greek Armed Forces, cohesion was the main reason identified for winning wars, well above the country's abilities. G. Siebold in his very interesting study of cohesion in the military,<sup>350</sup> presents the fight of the 300 Spartan warriors in ancient Greece as the first evidence of the positive relation between cohesion and effectiveness.<sup>351</sup>

The same author notes also that "the level of unit cohesiveness is defined as the degree to which mechanisms of social control operant in a unit maintain a structured pattern of social relationships between unit members,

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<sup>348</sup> A quick history of the military composition of Greece can be found in Appendix A.

<sup>349</sup> National Defense University, Fort Lesley, *The Anthropol Factor in Warfare* (J. E. Endicott: Washington, 1988), 225.

<sup>350</sup> Guy L. Siebold, "The Evolution of Measurement of Cohesion," *Military Psychology* 11, no. 1 (1999): 5-27.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, 8. There are numerous other examples of military feats done by groups highly unified. For the sake of giving honor by referring to at least one of them, we would refer to the heroic fortress Rupel, where in 1940, less than 300 Greek soldiers deterred the Germans from proceeding south towards the capital, Athens, for more than ninety days and nights. When these soldiers, finally surrendered to the Germans, without any strength left from the hunger, the latter presented arms to honor their stamina and cohesion.

individually and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit's purpose."<sup>352</sup> In short, the author suggests that the cohesion and the social relationship among the soldiers help a military unit to achieve its goal.

In a similar research study, Oliver and Harman found a positive relation between the cohesion of a military group and its outcomes, or else with the effectiveness of that group.<sup>353</sup> Apart from that, they also found a very interesting positive relation between soldiers' cohesion and their personal satisfaction, which again leads to high morale and increased performance.

As we have seen, in Greece, military cohesion is historically and culturally embedded in the Armed Forces. So, cohesion being a direct outcome of society's representation, it finally results in the desired outcome of military effectiveness.

As a result of the above analysis, we are convinced that the second pillar of the MRM model that of Military Effectiveness, is an outcome of social representation, not only in the U.S. Military Force, but also in the Greek one.

As we did for the previous factor, we question this one too, whether it is self-evident or not; or else, are there any exclusions from the rule of placing military effectiveness as a primary goal? So, is there a nation that does not care for military effectiveness, and in turn not care for a representative military? Yes, we could refer to at least one example: Luxemburg. This is the case of a small, peaceful country that has no threats from its neighbors or other countries. Does Luxemburg have to maintain a cohesive and effective fighting force? Probably

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<sup>352</sup> Guy L. Siebold, "The Evolution of Measurement of Cohesion," *Military Psychology* 11, no. 1 (1999): 5.

<sup>353</sup> Laurel W. Oliver, "A Quantitative Integration of the Military Cohesion Literature," *Military Psychology* 11, no. 1 (1999): 76.

not. So, we have found a restriction that applies on that factor of MRM analyzed above: the country in question should have as a primary mission, that of defending its own territory from enemies.<sup>354</sup>

Especially for the factor of military effectiveness, we have to note that representation provides only the basis for the effectiveness and not the assurance of a positive outcome just by itself. This means that even a representative army would not produce the preferred outcome if it lacks training and efficient administration. So, the operational factors analyzed previously in this chapter with regard to the draftees and volunteers are also relevant to our analysis. Later, at the final stage of implementing the MRM model in the Greek military, we also use these operational factors for reassuring the validity of our conclusions.

Next, we examine the final factor, that of Social Equity, and whether it can be valid to Greek society.

### ***c. Validation of the Third Factor of MRM: Social Equity***

As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocket-books rather than their persons, the state is already close to ruin.

Jean Jacques Rousseau<sup>355</sup>

While the first factor of Political Legitimacy was connected mostly to the state's ruling, and the second of Military Effectiveness was connected to the military establishment, the third factor, that of Social Equity, affects mostly the society in whole.

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<sup>354</sup> When examining this factor of military missions for Greece, it would be more complete to examine any potential future variations in the strategy and the threats that the country might face. Despite the wide content of that issue, history teaches us that this specific part of the Mediterranean is a strategic point that never loses its strategic value and had always provoked conflicts and wars. So, we are quite certain that threats will be approximately the same in the future.

<sup>355</sup> National Defense University, Fort Lesley, *The Anthro Factor in Warfare* (J. E. Endicott: Washington, 1988), 225.

How is this factor connected in Greek society? We could list quite a few reasons for that positive relation between representativeness and social equity in the Greek society. The elements connected to Social Equity in the Hellenic social environment are depicted in Figure 4.12.




Figure 4.12. Elements of the Factor of Social Equity, applicable to the Hellenic Reality

- The democratic constitution of Greece

Greece, as would be expected, has a deep-rooted democracy embedded into its constitution and laws. There are many regulations in every part of the legal system that enforces equity and equal burdens and obligations for every citizen. So, representation in the Armed Forces enhances this constitutional regulation.<sup>356</sup>

Greek democratic values were greatly driven by the French Revolution (1789), as the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire took place in 1821. Jean Jacques Rousseau, who enlightened the French Revolution with his ideas on the democratic government and society, also helped the Greeks

<sup>356</sup> In fact, article 6 of the fourth paragraph of the Greek constitution regulates that: "All citizens able to bear arms must contribute to the nation's defense." This article is accompanied by an explanatory citation, where an alternative military service is allowed for the conscientious objectors.



to picture a preferred constitution, based on the political philosopher's masterpiece, "The Social Contract".<sup>357</sup> In that way, representation of the people is an axiom for the Greek political rulers, and also applies in the sensitive and wide establishment of the Armed Forces.

- Religion

As is well known, Greeks have a strong religion and have followed the Greek Orthodox faith from its origins during the Byzantine Empire in the twelfth century. Today, more than ninety percent of Greek society is Orthodox Christian. The basic belief of Orthodox faith is that all people are equal under God<sup>358</sup>. This element of Greek culture is deeply embedded in the society and its beliefs.

- The type of operations Greek Armed Forces undertake.

As noted previously, the geopolitical environment in the region where Greece lies can be very ambiguous and dangerous. Through the years, Greece fought numerous wars against its neighbor countries. Fortunately, the last Great War to be fought was World War II. Since then, there have been many incidents where the Armed Forces fought over some border conflicts; the major one of these was in 1974, when Turkey occupied a part of Cyprus. As we can understand, the Greek Armed Forces, along with its political leaders, are mostly focused on national security threats, and their aim is to defend the country's borders. As this scope is a generic one and affects the whole of Greek society, it is very logical to place a requirement for representation on the Army that will defend all the people in the country.

- Greek Military history/ tradition

Closely connected to the factors above is the military tradition throughout the recent history of Greece (after the national Revolution of 1821). As is obvious in Appendix-1, the Greek Armed Forces have utilized the draft, in

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<sup>357</sup> Jacques J, Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Athens: Polis Publications, 2004).

<sup>358</sup> For more analysis of the Orthodox faith see Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, <http://www.goarch.org/ourfaith/> (accessed November 17, 2008).

various ways, from the past until today. So the military culture is closely related to the draft, and, as a result, to the social equity about taking on common social burdens that accompany that obligation.

- Equal loss in case of a war

In the unfortunate case of a war, the people that would defend their country and sacrifice their life should be representative of the society they defend. Due to the reasons presented above, this is a common fact for Greek society. If there is a suspicion that a specific social group was asked to offer its life disproportionate to protect other social groups, there would be a dispute in society with painful results. Greece has a sour historic memory of the society's partition immediately after the end of the World War II, when the civil war took place<sup>359</sup>. In effect, there is a subconscious memory in Greek society, which disapproves of any partition or unequal allocation of social burdens, among Greeks.

- Lack of ample resources

Apart from the ethical standpoints, we should also consider some specific real facts for the Greek case. Greece is a country that lacks physical and other resources. So, the country has no ability to spend its resources in giving extra benefits to Volunteers who would defend it. If Greece were a rich country, it could devote some of its budget to pay volunteers well enough so as to form an effective volunteer army that was capable of defending the country. In that case, we would examine the need for social representation as a second step in the army's formulation. Now, we are not even capable of the first step of providing adequate benefits to an AVF<sup>360</sup>.

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<sup>359</sup> For more information see Konstantinos Papanigopoulos, *History of the Hellenic Nation* (Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975).

<sup>360</sup> To make things more difficult, Greece already spends the largest budget proportion, among all European countries, for military functions. As a result, many arguments were presented recently for lowering the military budget to benefit public education.

Some very interesting research concerning European countries was presented by Haltiner.<sup>361</sup> The author found a positive relation between Gross National Product (GNP), or how rich one country is, and the Conscript Ratio (CR), or draft ratio, of each country, which denotes the ratio of soldiers to the overall population of the relevant age group (18-22). Figure 4.12, below, comes from that study:




Figure 4.13. The reverse Correlation between GNP and the Conscription Ratio, in European Countries.<sup>362</sup>

Greece's CR is 72 percent, the second highest; despite that, its GNP is not low enough to explain the reverse correlation form by Haltiner. The author explains this by referring to the territorial conflicts that we mentioned previously.

<sup>361</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 361-384.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., 379.

Another critical resource that Greece lacks is people. As discussed previously, the population of the country is declining and the population of young people declines more than the general average. That means that the burden will be divided among fewer people, a fact that does not leave any space for exclusions.

- Military Participation Ratio (MPR)

Closely connected to the above analysis is the MPR; this is a figure that expresses the level of society's participation in the Armed Forces. Several authors and sociologists examined that ratio and the outcomes it brings.

Andreski<sup>363</sup> first proposed the ratio. What he suggested, in brief, was that high levels of MPR can lead to the lessening of social inequality. Graeft and Mehkop tended also to agree with that finding in a recent study of theirs.<sup>364</sup> For the same subject (MPR), Weede<sup>365</sup> presented similar results but applicable only to not highly-industrialized countries, which is the case of Greece, too.

In his study, for the declining European mass armies, Haltiner<sup>366</sup> presented an evident decline of MPR in the European armies. Nevertheless, while the average MPR of Europe was around three percent in 2000, Greece had an MPR close to five percent. The author proposes as a reason for the MPR decrease, the diminishing importance of National Militaries in Europe, while for Greece, he argues that:

These (hard core conscript)...nations had become a small minority by the year 2000. Two of them are involved in border conflicts: Greece and Turkey. Another is the neighbor of the largest land power in Europe and does not rely on a military alliance: Finland.

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<sup>363</sup> Peter Graeff, and G. Mehlkop, "The Link between MPR and Inequality," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 34, no. 2 (2006): 257.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid., 257-279.

<sup>365</sup> Erich Weede, "The Impact of MPR on Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 21, no. 2 (2006): 241-258.

<sup>366</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 361-384.

Since the territorial defense component is still of great importance here, a deviation from the general pattern of the trend can be explained to a certain extent.<sup>367</sup>

In conclusion, we find ample evidence that the factor of Social Equity is more than valid in Greece, as is the case in the U.S.

As we did for the two factors examined previously, we should question whether social equity is self-evident and whether it applies as a beneficial outcome of representation to all countries and cultures, or not. Again, we find anti-paradigms, where social equity is not the preferred outcome.

- A first anti-paradigm would probably be when a country does not face a national threat: does it need to have social equity in the army? Most probably not, as it would be more critical to cope with unemployment and satisfy the need for a job (volunteer), rather than the need of equal burden during a future battle. Directly connected to that is the fact that such a type of country would probably undertake operations abroad under a coalition not by itself. So, again there is no need for representativeness, as it is not a purely national concern or need that these operations fulfill.
- Another counter-example of the need for Social Equity in the military would be when the military and the society do not have a relative history of society's representation in the army. For a country that depends heavily on an AVF, it is difficult to sustain an argument of the benefits derived from the social equity on carrying the country's military burdens. The routes of such perceptions might have their origin in religious or cultural ideologies.
- Religious or cultural ideas: many countries follow some dogmas that divide people into castes or partition men and women as unequal persons. For example, extremist religious countries, such as Afghanistan, would not like to fulfill the social equity factor, as they do not believe that all members of the society are equal among them (men-women). Another example would be countries that follow the Hindu religion, where society is said to be legitimately divided into social castes with unequal obligations and rights.

As we saw, all the above three characteristics constitute the exceptions and restrictions that apply to the final pillar of the MRM model.

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<sup>367</sup> Emphasis added.

Nevertheless, Greece is a good example where all three MRM factors are valid and applicable for measuring the outcome of the social representation in the Hellenic Armed Forces.

Now that we are sure about the applicability of the basis of the MRM model, we will present it briefly in the next paragraph. Our scope is to finally test the Greek case through that model, and derive conclusions that benefit the Greek Military.

## **E. SYNOPSIS OF THE MRM MODEL**

Before testing the full model in Greek reality, we describe it briefly in the following summary by Eitelberg.

Proponents of population representation in the American armed forces call upon three basic principles to argue their position. Briefly, military members should: (1) be “citizen-soldiers” who can “re-present” (or “present again”) the variety of community interests and recreate the social fabric of American life; (2) ensure a capable, cohesive, and effective fighting force (in symbol as well as in deed); and (3) be selected and treated fairly and in a way that distributes the benefits and burdens of service throughout society. These three areas—political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity, respectively—frame a core of concern around an age-old question: Who shall serve when not all serve?

A reasonable balance of opposing objectives is the key to reconciling differences between, say, benefits and burdens, internal organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity for individuals and equal representation of groups, compulsions and freedoms, and other areas of discord. A trade-off or compromise is similarly needed to mitigate fundamental conflicts between the goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity. Yet, the search for a reasonable balance to guide military manpower policy, even though it offers a means for reconciling sometimes conflicting objectives, is ultimately an exercise in subjective reasoning. After all, how *does* one strike a balance between realistic military needs or requirements and the perceived social good? Can one, or *should* one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate categories of demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, what *is* “reasonable?”

The American experience is one of civil-military convergence, where the outcomes and objectives of military representation are described in social and political as well as military terms. Assuming that it is possible to establish evaluative criteria and balance competing objectives, we can attempt to build a conceptual framework and functional definition of military representation.

Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” representation, a miniature reflection or copy of the larger population. Perfect representation in the armed forces is depicted in the Military Representation Model as a smaller replica of the national population, located somewhere within that body. Since the idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under normal conditions—and may not even be desirable—it is necessary to establish some boundary of “approximate representation” in the model. Once the notion of approximate representation is accepted, however, the presumed certainty of outcomes associated with perfect representation is lost. The problem is that approximate representation can mean one inch or a thousand miles, one percentage point or many more, depending upon one’s point of reference. Consequently, approximate representation must be evaluated in relation to the set of “higher” goals that have made it an important policy concern. These higher goals are depicted in the model as political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity. As long as the population of military members (inner triangle) stays within the established boundaries of being “close enough for comfort” (shown as the middle steady triangle in the model below), the armed forces are seen by most as approximately representative.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> The passage above can be found in the electronic based teaching materials of MN-4114 Course (Foundation of Military Sociology/ Psychology), which Professor M. Eitelberg teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/MN4114\\_Eb/content](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/MN4114_Eb/content) (accessed July 10, 2008). For a full presentation, see Appendix E.




Figure-4.14. Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation (MRM)<sup>369</sup>

Now that we have concluded the presentation of the model itself, we can attempt to put it through the last test, and if successful on that, too, we can apply it to the Greek reality.

## F. IS THE MRM MODEL VALID IN GREEK REALITY, IN RESPECT TO SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS?

### 1. Validation of the MRM's Two Main Principles

Eitelberg model has two main principles.

<sup>369</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 21, 2008).



- Social representation in the army is “measured” by three factors: political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity
- These three factors that represent the outcome of social representation in the army are not solid. They move between boundaries that cannot be completely specified, as all three of them are qualitative measurements that cannot be judged precisely and collectively by social scientists. In addition, it is difficult to predict the magnitude and the significance of each outcome for every different country. For example, the reactions of a developed society when a bigger proportion of a social group sacrifices itself to a war would be much greater than in an undeveloped society.<sup>370</sup>

We have already shown that the first design principle (the three basic factors) of the MRM model is valid in Greece.<sup>371</sup> What remains now to be examined is the flexibility of the boundaries of those factors. If we show that these factors, apart from being valid, are flexibly defined in the Greek society too, then the two design principles of this model are fully validated. Thus, they could be implemented to the Greek reality, to provide a solution on the issue of constructing the best soldiers’ base for the Hellenic military.

Let us consider each factor separately.

- The first MRM factor’s flexibility validation: Political Legitimacy: The question is: Are there absolute values when measuring Political Legitimacy? Evidently, the answer is no. When we consider the government and the parliament, which is the top public institution that mirrors the country’s political legitimacy, we surely do not have absolute values, not even absolute limits. For example, the party that rules the country, in most of the elections, gathers less than half of the country’s votes; still, it is considered representative. In the same public establishment, the parliament, a party is not elected when its votes are below three percent overall. In effect, three people out of a hundred are not represented in country’s

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<sup>370</sup> An analogy that we can draw for this theoretical model is cooking. We have many elements to add when cooking food. The proportion of each one determines the outcome. By measuring the tastiness of the final product we estimate that the “representativeness” of the cooking elements was right from the beginning. Still, not all of us have the same taste preferences; so, we might disagree over the elements’ proportion. On the other hand, we all would agree that there are no specific rigid recipes for using each element.

<sup>371</sup> See present chapter paragraph D2.

decision-making. These percentages fluctuate among countries, which is evidence of the flexible nature of the factor of political legitimacy.

- The second MRM factor's flexibility validation: Military Effectiveness: Is that factor flexible, too? The answer again is yes. The reason for that is that we already have 40 percent of youth that delay their enlistment and one third of that forty percent (about twelve percent) will never enlist.<sup>372</sup> Apart from that, approximately two percent of Greek society is made up of conscientious objectors who do not serve.<sup>373</sup> Despite the approximate twenty percent of the society that does not participate in the military,<sup>374</sup> Greek Armed Forces are generally considered highly capable and effective.<sup>375</sup> So Military Effectiveness is not hurt by this 20 percent unrepresentativeness. In conclusion, this factor is also a flexible one which moves between some limits.
- The third MRM factor's flexibility validation: Social Equity: This factor is the required outcome for every democracy around the world and, despite the progress most of the countries are making, it still remains an unattained goal. Apart from that generic remark, the fact presented previously (20 percent unrepresentativeness in military) is also a proof that social equity is not absolutely met. If we consider specifically the 15 percent of those that never serve although they are obliged to do so, we could easily figure out that their burden is carried among the shoulders of the rest, who do not avoid their service to the country. Despite that fact, there is no

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<sup>372</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

<sup>373</sup> "Omiri," Site for Conscripts, <http://omhroi.org/modules/> (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>374</sup> Adding those that never show up for enlisting (15%), with the conscientious objectors (2%) and other categories that do not serve (mentally or physically unable) or serve less (those with many kids-6 months service) we would roughly get at least a percentage of 20 percent, or 1 out of 5 that is part of the society but not of the army. So roughly we would say that the social representation in military is less than 80 percent. This rough estimation, is verified by a research made for European Armies by K. Haltimer (Philippe Manigart, "*Restructuring of the Armed Forces*," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 379, who found the conscript ratio of Greece to be 72 percent (average value between 1970 and 2000)

<sup>375</sup> Greek forces are effectively participating in several operations around the world, under NATO, UN and EU forces.

social turbulence in Greece or any public objection.<sup>376</sup> This fact proves that the last factor of social equity do not have specific values, but only some acceptable boundaries to move within.

Finally, we came to the point of verifying also the second principle of MRM model: the flexibility of its preferred outcomes. Now we are ready for the next step: to proceed with the application of the MRM model.

## **2. Applying the MRM model in Greek Reality: The Solution**

### ***a. How We will Proceed***

Before applying the model, we should answer some possible questions of our readers:

**Q:** What are we looking for by applying that model in Greece?

**A:** We are trying to find the best army synthesis according to the socioeconomic distribution of the Greek society.

**Q:** Are we going to find specific numbers/proportions for designing the best army?

**A:** Most probably, not. It is difficult to find specific numbers when the factors that measure the outcome of representativeness are relative by themselves. Despite that, we will find the proper system we should follow (e.g., total or no conscription or a mixed system).

**Q:** The fact the three factors embedded in the model are valid does not exclude the possibility of having more factors that could also measure the outcome of social representation.

**A:** That is true; nevertheless, we consider those three as the most critical ones. Apart from that, in this phase of the paper, we apply the MRM model as designed by its creator. In the next chapter we expand the model a little more and identify an extra factor that might be considered, too.

**Q:** How are we going to use that model in Greek society? What about the military?

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<sup>376</sup> Of course the situations would be more difficult and tense in case of a war. We can imagine that if somebody was avoiding his service, then there would be real social messiness. Of course, in the case of a war the enlisting practices would probably change dramatically, by not considering as valid excuses for not serving, most of those that are considered valid during peacetime.

**A:** We will take advantage of the logic theory and the mathematical method of “Proof by Contradiction” first described by the ancient Greek philosopher/mathematician, Aristotle.<sup>377</sup> The substance of that procedure is that, if we only have three potential outcomes and we eliminate two out of the three possible solutions, then the right solution is the third one, even though we did not show it explicitly.

***b. The Application of the MRM model – The Solution for the Military Design of Greece***

Using the “Proof by Contradiction” method described above, we first set the data of the problem. There are only three possible systems for designing the soldier base of the Greek Armed Forces.

- Full conscript system (draftees only)
- Semi-professional system (mixed draftees and volunteers)<sup>378</sup>
- All volunteer system (volunteers only)

We chose to examine the first and the third one, which can give more evident results than the second one. We test each system for the three factors of the MRM model, and if the system fails for even one of them, we consider it as not proper for the Greek case.

Let us start with the first one.

(1) Full Conscript System. As is obvious, in this system we would have only draftees and not volunteers.<sup>379</sup> We will examine this system according to the three MRM factors / outcomes.

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<sup>377</sup>“ Reductio ad absurdum” is a Latin phrase. Generally, it is also known as Proof of Contradiction. In logic and mathematics it is a method of proving something. The phrase can be traced back to the Greek, “η εις άτοπον απαγωγή.” This phrase means “reduction to the impossible”. It was often used by Aristotle. The method of proving something works by first stating something is true. Then other things are deduced from that. In the end, there is contradiction. This contradiction then shows that thing stated first cannot be true. Extract from Wikipedia: [http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio\\_ad\\_absurdum](http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum) (accessed October 10, 2008).

<sup>378</sup> In fact, that is the system in force today.

<sup>379</sup> We will only consider the system which is already in force in Greece, that of obligatory service for all men; not the conscription by lottery or any other partial conscription. We leave the period of conscription undefined, but relatively close to today’s one year.

- First Factor Test: Political Legitimacy: It is obvious that when all youth are called under arms, the society groups are represented equally; nevertheless, we will consider the elements of political legitimacy, analyzed earlier, and consider if they are fulfilled or not by that system.<sup>380</sup>
  - Democratic constitution: equal participation is parallel with the democratic constitution of the country.
  - Military control by the society: when all sons of Greek families participate to the Armed Forces, these families tend to have an opinion which is a type of control for the military.
  - Demographic Diversity: again it is obvious that this is achieved through the obligatory service.
  - Unity of the society in the case of a war: since no one is excluded, war becomes a matter that unites instead of divides.
  - Government handles the military as part of the whole society: this element too, is obvious, as the control of military through the society is intense.
  - “Infecting” society’s perceptions/ideas into military: since all youngsters participate, they will bring with them their own ideas along with their families’ idea and ways of thinking into the military.
  - Future politicians to be “baptized” into the army experience: this too is an explicit advantage of the draft system.
  - Representation of the former Greek immigrants, who return to the country: the draft system gives the basis for this accomplishment; nevertheless, it is up to further state regulations to include this group to the military force.

Thus, we conclude that the draft system is capable of providing political legitimacy to military service. Next, we will test the elements of the second factor of social representation: military effectiveness.<sup>381</sup>

- Test of the Second Factor: Military Effectiveness: As we did for the previous factor, we test each of the elements identified earlier for that specific factor. We should not forget, though, that this factor has to be considered in conjunction with the analysis made earlier

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<sup>380</sup> See also Figure 4.8.

<sup>381</sup> See also Figure 4.9.

in this chapter, when operational learning/training factors were examined for the draftees' army. Let us look now at each element of military effectiveness separately:

- Fulfill the scope of national defense: In a draftee army, people in unison defend their country, so this fundamental scope of the Greek army is aligned to the draft system.
- Support from the society, resulting in high morale: As everybody's son will participate in the army, it is normal for society to support and express its gratitude to the soldiers.
- The need for big army for National Defense missions: Surely, the draft system assures the biggest number of soldiers, which is especially useful in defense operations.
- Military culture: This is a factor that depends on history and cannot be absolutely definite. Before now, the culture in the Greek Armed Forces was for the draft; despite that, this is slightly changing recently to a semiprofessional culture. Surely though, the military culture is not familiar with a total absence of draftees.
- Cohesion of the fighting force: This is an advantage of the draft force when considering the representation of all society-which is considered cohesive. On the other hand, cohesion has another parameter: that of duration of the common service among soldiers. For example, a professional group that stays together for three years or more becomes well-acquainted and, in effect, cohesive. On the other hand, a draftee force will change its station every six to twelve months.<sup>382</sup> Finally this factor is quite ambiguous and requires trends from both draft and volunteer force. Nevertheless, in general, a draft system should not possibly detract from cohesion of the Armed Forces.
- Operational/Training/Learning: As analyzed thoroughly in paragraph B1 of the present chapter, this is the point where the pure draft system presents the greater inadequacy. The continuous need for training, the breakage of learning curves, and the restrictions on operational assignment of draftees,<sup>383</sup> make that element and subsequently the military effectiveness factor not valid for a hard core draft system.

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<sup>382</sup> This of course happens when they are not self identified as a minority-group of the society. In that case they will be cohesive among themselves, but not with the rest of the military.

<sup>383</sup> Except for the reduced time period they spent in remote military bases-where is mainly the operational need- they also do not participate in operations of Armed Forces abroad (except for a national war).

Inevitably, we conclude that the pure draft system did not pass the test of the MRM model and is not applicable to the Hellenic Armed Forces<sup>384</sup>.

Consequently, there is normally no reason to examine the final factor of the MRM model, but for having a complete picture of the appliance of that model in a potential Greek pure draft system, we will proceed further.

- Third Factor Test: Social Equity: This is a factor that we can easily identify in which representativeness plays a significant role. so, we expect that the draft system will support that factor. Still, let us look at its specific elements:<sup>385</sup>
  - The principles of democracy: calls for representation in all the state's institutions. Thus, a draft covers that element's directive regarding the Military Institutions.
  - Equal burden on Armed Forces operations: it is also evident that the burden is divided equally among the society/army members with a draft system.
  - Greek military history: the draft system has been in force uninterrupted through Greece's recent history.<sup>386</sup>
  - Equal loss in case of war: As the contribution of soldiers is equal from all socioeconomic castes, the unwished loss would probably be equal.<sup>387</sup>
  - Lack of ample resources: This too, is an advantage of a draft force, which saves public money and contributes a big number of soldiers to the army. This is the reason why the military participation ratio is higher in countries with a low gross national product.<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> According to the proof by contradiction method, since one element is not true, the overall initial assumption is not true.

<sup>385</sup> See also Figure 4.12.

<sup>386</sup> Sometimes though, the Draft System was complemented by other volunteer-type systems in parallel, as is the case today.

<sup>387</sup> This is also dependent on other administrative orders from military regarding for instance special treatment of the upper socioeconomic classes. (e.g., service in safe regions and not on the warfront). This was an allegation made for U.S. Military Administration during the USA-Vietnam war.

<sup>388</sup> Philippe Manigart, "Restructuring of the Armed Forces," in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 379.

As expected, the draft system completely covers the factor of social equity.

Yet, since it did not pass all the MRM outcome tests, the pure draft system is considered not applicable to the Hellenic Armed Forces and society.

We will proceed with the same test for a potential all volunteer force system.

(2) All Volunteer Force Military System. Under this system all soldiers would be volunteers. We apply the MRM model to that system, beginning with the first factor test:

- First Factor Test: Political Legitimacy: This is an ambiguous factor for an AVF and is highly depending on the specifics of each country under examination, along with the historical period in which the examination takes place. Of course, in the present study we will focus on Greece, and we will assume that no big social, economic or other changes will take place. In the following, we examine the specific elements of political legitimacy:<sup>389</sup>
  - Democratic constitution: It is not a negative factor for AVF, as volunteers enlist through democratic procedures, laws and admission tests.
  - Military control by the society: For this and the subsequent elements that compose this factor, we need to figure out the socioeconomic structure of the volunteer force. Fortunately, we have specific data that will help us in determining the social representation of the volunteer force. First of all, we know that the existing volunteer force is composed by at least twenty percent that have only concluded the compulsory education.<sup>390</sup> In addition, the number of volunteers who have a university diploma<sup>391</sup> is close to zero (0.05%). Next, we will combine this fact with the official data

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<sup>389</sup> See also Figure 4.8.

<sup>390</sup> The middle school (the first three of the total six years of the middle level education-children ages 10 – 14).

<sup>391</sup> John Androurakis, "Volunteers," *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).



tables from the Ministry of Education of Greece.<sup>392</sup> The Figure 4.15 provides a clear picture of the numbers of youth (18 to 22 years old) participating in the higher level education:




Figure 4.15. Trend of high level educated Youth in Greece (1987-2005)<sup>393</sup>

From the Figure 4.15, we extract some very useful information:

- The overall youth population of Greece from 18 to 21 years old in 2002 was 712,000 persons, while those of the same age studying at universities were 324,000. This shows that 45 percent of the whole Greek population was university students.
- The population of youngsters 18-22, was steadily being reduced from 1995 and is projected to be reduced more intensively till 2010. On the other hand, the population studying at universities is steadily increasing, thus, the percentage of youth at universities is increasing.<sup>394</sup>

<sup>392</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

<sup>393</sup> Ibid.

<sup>394</sup> Another survey by the same university, this time for age group of 18-21, gives us similar and even higher university participation by this age group (Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

We can combine the above facts with what the Minister of National Defense (DoD) noted in an interview, which is that approximately 40 percent of the youth avoid being drafted and get postponement from serving.<sup>395</sup> This postponement according to the Greek law is granted for health reasons or, more frequently, when studying in a university. The above statements are validated in Figure 4.16 , which comes again from the Ministry of Education and shows the percentage of those who entered universities and other educational institutions in 2008.




Figure 4.16. Ratio of High School Students entering the Public Universities in 2008<sup>396</sup>

If we combine the above data, we would get an evident equation:

<sup>395</sup> Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231> (accessed October 27, 2008).

<sup>396</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

Percentage of those In Universities = Percentage of those who Postpone their Military Service<sup>397</sup> = 40 percent

Let us review what we have found thus far.

- Approximately 40 percent of the youth eligible for service avoid it
- That forty percent comes from the higher education youth group, which not only avoids being drafted, but also does not want to enlist in a volunteer force. In addition, this proportion represents approximately the total percentage of university students of Greece.
- While the staffing needs for the military, we assume, will be steady, the population of the youth group that might serve becomes less; to make things worse, the population that achieves the entrance exam of universities grows bigger every year; thus, it is possible that a greater percentage of young men will avoid military service or enlistment in the future

So, roughly, we would say that 40 percent of upper educated people do not want to enlist, and avoid military service, too. One could ask: how is this related with the socioeconomic status? The answer is that education, even when it is public, as in Greece, is closely related to economic and finally socioeconomic factors as we have shown previously in Chapter III.

Now, after that useful overview of the composition of the Volunteer force, we can proceed with our analysis. Specifically, for the pending test of the element of military control by the society, we examine it in the next chapter; so, for now we leave an unanswered question here.

- Demographic diversity: This is a weak point of the AVF. Fortunately, we have some data that show the following dispersion:<sup>398</sup>
  - 45% of the volunteer force comes from Macedonia
  - 15% comes from Thessaly
  - 13.3% comes from Thrace

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<sup>397</sup> We should note that we refer to the same age group 18-22, which normally face the dilemma of being drafted or enlisting in the military.

<sup>398</sup> John Androurakis, "Volunteers." *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008).

- 13.3% comes from southern (inland) Greece
- Other small proportions come from the rest of the country

It is evident that southern Greece (including Athens), which counts for more than 50 percent of the population, gives only 13.3 percent to the volunteer force, while the northern regions, which are known for their high unemployment rate, contribute approximately 75 percent of the volunteer force. Normally, we could assume from this invalid match that AVF is not politically legitimate; yet, we overcome that factor, as one might argue - possibly correctly - that Greece has not many demographics or other differences in its population and it is a relatively homogenous country. So, considering these results ambiguous we proceed to the next element.

- Unity of the society in case of war: considering the composition of the AVF military force, a definite and solid 40 percent of the upper educated class is not participating. It is normal to argue that the 40 percent, close to one-half of society, will be detached from the military in case of a war. In effect, no unity will be achieved. This is the first element that the AVF clearly fails to accomplish. The same will happen with some of the following elements of Political Legitimacy, which as a factor excludes the solution of an AVF for Greece.<sup>399</sup>
- Government handles military as part of the society: Again this is not true for an AVF, due to the fact that only the lower-educated sixty percent is present in an AVF.
- Injecting society's ideas/perception into the army: It is not only the fact that the perceptions of the lowest educated 60 percent of society will be "transferred" to the military, but also the 40 percent who don't join the military, have higher education, and technical knowledge that the military needs.

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<sup>399</sup> Again, for the completeness of the study we will continue to examine briefly the rest of the factors even though the application of the MRM model excludes the proposal for an AVF in Greece.

- Future politicians “baptized” into the army’s experience pool: This is a very critical factor that the AVF fails again to accomplish. We can see some results that came out of this discrepancy in today’s American politics.<sup>400</sup> We examine this factor further in the following chapter.
- Representation of the former immigrants in the Armed Forces: This is an element that should be examined in accordance with socioeconomic status. Due to the lack of relevant data, we consider this element as neutral for the AVF.
- Second Factor Test: Military effectiveness: As we have already proved in Chapter I, AVF is very effective when concerning the operational/training/learning elements. Next, we will focus on the composing elements of that factor:<sup>401</sup>
  - Fulfill the scope of National Defense: As an effective force, volunteers would probably defend the country properly.
  - Support from the society: Normally, they will have support from the society as volunteers constitute a part of the society, even though they represent the lowest sixty percent of the socioeconomic structure.
  - The need for a big army for National Defense missions: This is another element that an AVF can’t fulfill without great government expense.
  - Military culture: Even though a mixed system is currently in force in Greece, a volunteer military is not in the culture of the Armed Forces, due to the continuous use of draftees for roughly two centuries. On the other hand, there is no evidence that this culture could not change.
  - Cohesion of the fighting force: As described previously in the draft system testing, this element is quite unclear to judge, as there are two parts of cohesion in a fighting force: one that comes from the satisfactory representation of the society in the military groups, while the other is derived from the duration that this group stays together. On the first element, the draft system has the lead, while on the second, the AVF surpasses.

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<sup>400</sup> Roth-Douquet, Kathy, and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*. 1 ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

<sup>401</sup> See also Figure 4.9.

The AVF test for the second factor of the MRM model (Military Effectiveness), gave neutral to negative results. As that AVF system is already excluded according to the first factor of the MRM model (Political Legitimacy), we briefly conclude the test on the third factor.

- Third Factor Test: Social equity: As approximately the upper half of the Greek socioeconomic castes will not be represented in a potential AVF, we expect the volunteer military to fail the test of social equity, too. Let us examine, each element separately.<sup>402</sup>
  - The principles of Democracy: Even though it is a democratic principle to choose what you want to do personally, when it comes to a community matter, democracy dictates that all people should get equal dividends from the obligations and the rights that occur from a civilized society. One of the fundamental benefits of a society is the safety that it provides to its members. Yet, this benefit is accompanied by **an obligation to contribute to the military force**. With an AVF system, the upper socioeconomic class does not participate in the military force.
  - Equal burden on operations: This, again, is a negative aspect of a Volunteer Force, as it is a direct outcome of the unrepresentativeness of the Armed Forces.
  - Greek Military History is against the AVF, as never before was this system applied. Of course, this does not mean that if applied, it will not be accepted. Nevertheless, there might be a hindrance to change.
  - Equal loss in case of war: Unrepresentativeness also strongly affects this critical factor, as historical memories of those who avoid the highest duty to the country never fade completely.<sup>403</sup> The AVF fails this important element, which becomes even more important as Greece will possibly be called to fight National Wars.
  - Lack of ample resources: The AVF fails also in that Greece cannot afford a large volunteer corps for two reasons: first, there are not many financial resources to sustain such a force; and, second, the personnel pool to be enlisted is small as the population of Greece is not large.

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<sup>402</sup> See also Figure 4.12.

<sup>403</sup> We see that in the U.S., there is still discussion about the Vietnam War, and which social group was sacrificed and which avoided the obligation of fighting.

Evidently, the AVF failed in the third factor of the MRM model, too; the AVF Social Equity factor and, overall, did not pass the test of the MRM model.

According to the “proof by contradiction” method, we eliminated the first two military-structure options. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the most effective military structure for Greece is the mixed system, or the so called “semi-professional” one.

(3) Semi Professional System. Based on the MRM model and the specifics of the Hellenic society and Armed Forces, this study was led to the semi-professional structure as the most effective of all three structures available.

We will not examine this system analytically like the other two, as its validity is already proven by the logic method of “proof of contradiction,” and for the additional reason that it is a very difficult task to do, due to the multiple potential combinations between draftee and volunteer mixes<sup>404</sup>. This could be the subject of a subsequent study that contains more specific numbers and uses mathematical and computer models to be solved.

Nevertheless, a more political suggestion would be: not to reduce the draft force from today’s levels before having adequate evidence to do so. This is proposed for two reasons: first, it is difficult to rise later on, if needed, the proportion of the draftees, due to the social turbulence it will bring. Second, it is evident that the youth population of Greece is projected to be declining, for at least ten years from today, which means that the draftee pool will become even smaller.

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<sup>404</sup> We can have from 1 to 99 percent, theoretically, of draftees or volunteers; thus, numerous combinations of the mixed soldier structure.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

As this chapter comes to an end we will quickly review its results, as these results are mainly the answer to this project.

Initially, we asked ourselves what volunteers and draftees have to offer in the Greek military regarding the three factors of economy, operations, and mobilization. We showed in rough lines that economy and mobilization were advantages of the draftees, while operations were an advantage of volunteers.

Later on, to have a more complete picture of all the military and social “actors,” we examined the military leaders’ and officers’ positions on the choice between draftees and volunteers. It became evident that lower-ranking officers preferred the volunteers, as they operate more effectively, while the higher-ranking military officers preferred both equally, mainly considering the mobilization factor.

As we continued our analysis, we asked again what represents the society, and we answered that only the socioeconomic criterion determines representation in the Greek society. Later on, we focused on why we need representation in the Hellenic Armed Forces. We examined that through the MRM model, which we validated in the Greek reality before using it.

The final step was to examine all three possible military structures by testing them through the MRM’s three factors. The draft system failed in Military Effectiveness, while the AVF system failed in Political Legitimacy and Social Equity. Finally, by using the methodology of “proof by contradiction,” we concluded that the proper military structure for Greece is the “semi-professional”, the one that contains elements from both draftees and volunteers. The exact ratios of each part remain to be solved in a subsequent study focused on that issue.



Finally, considering the first factor of the MRM model (Political Legitimacy), we would find it beneficial for our study to further explore a sub-factor, or maybe a new factor, closely related to it: “The factor of Interconnection between military and society.”

This search is the subject of the next chapter, which in turn examines the feedback of the society to the military, offering more proof to the conclusions derived above.

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## V. THE SOCIAL SPACE OUTSIDE OF THE MILITARY – THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND THE SOCIETY IT SERVES

To picture the relationship between THE military, society, and other official institutions, we can construct a diagram, which is common for democratic states such as Greece. As seen in Figure 5.1, three powers of state interact generally with the military and society.




Figure 5.1. The Three Powers of the State and Depiction of Military and Society Feedback.

This kind of division of state powers was first described by Montesquieu in his “Trias Politica,” dividing the different powers of the state into three branches: 1) the executive branch, 2) the legislative branch, and 3) the judicial branch.<sup>405</sup>

Throughout the years, numerous discussions have focused on the democratic control of the Armed Forces by the state and its institutions.<sup>406</sup> We touch on that subject only for conceptualizing the inner part of Democratic control: the interconnection of the military and the society. As Born, Caparini, and Holtmer<sup>407</sup> state in their ERGOMAS<sup>408</sup> research project, there are three types of democratic control:

- Top down, vertical control: This refers to parliaments and governments controlling A.F. (depicted by the downward green arrow on the exhibit above);
- Horizontal control: This refers to the control exercised by other social-type institutions, such as media, unions, and other opinion-formulating institutions. It is called horizontal due to the lack of official hierarchical ties between social institutions or society in general and the Armed Forces. It is depicted in Figure 5.1 by the two common-centered circles and in more detail in Figure 5.2:

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<sup>405</sup> Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” *ERGOMAS Research Project* (2000): 1-7.

<sup>406</sup> For more see: Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006); Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003); Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” *ERGOMAS Research Project* (2000): 1-7.

<sup>407</sup> Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” *ERGOMAS Research Project* (2000): 1-7.

<sup>408</sup> ERGOMAS is an association of scientists who study and analyze the relationship between the military and society, and related phenomena. It focuses on Europe. Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary Working Groups constitute the core of ERGOMAS.




Figure 5.2. The Inner Construction of the Social groups and the Military

- Internal Control: this is the third type of democratic control, which is in general the military's control of itself through its procedures and internal controls.

In a democratic state and society, the problems of controlling the AF vertically and internally are in a way already solved. The only part that seems to be currently changing is the Horizontal Control of the A.F. by the society: the interconnection between society and military.

Two main reasons explain the changing interconnection.

- First, the evolution of modern societies and youth to a different type of citizen: a citizen who is not much concerned about general society issues, but rather values personal well-being and believes in professionalism and job specialization
- Second, the different structure of Armies, which have initialized several new elements such as volunteers, reserves, social contribution service, women's service, and others

Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2003) agree with the above changes in society and the military. They note that every country has its own democratic control of the A.F. related to its history, sentiment, and tradition, as well as to the political type of government. They also comment that “the very nature of the problem...(Democratic Control)<sup>409</sup> is permanently changing, because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.”<sup>410</sup>

This second point is the one that we focus on in this chapter. As we did in the previous chapter, we will examine how the horizontal control, or interconnection of military and society, is affected by an AVF and a conscript force. The results of this study should validate, or not, the solution that we found previously. Normally, the mixed volunteer and draftees' military structure. This direction of horizontal control examination was also proposed by Born (2003); when writing the results of his article, he noted that “All the fields mentioned above.... (new topics of research)<sup>411</sup> ..are influenced by the social transformations of civil military relations in the post Cold War period. It is necessary for scholars to start researching these upcoming issues in an interdisciplinary fashion.”<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Definition added.

<sup>410</sup> Philippe Manigart, “*Restructuring of the Armed Forces*,” in *New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 131.

<sup>411</sup> Explanation added.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., 165.

First, we examine the effects of the totally draft force on this horizontal type of control.

#### **A. WHAT ARE THE INTERCONNECTION EFFECTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY WHEN ALL PEOPLE SERVE?**

As we shown in the previous chapter, the upper-socioeconomic groups are not well-represented in the volunteer force, and furthermore avoid and postpone their duty of serving in the military as draftees. So, we have every reason to believe that this 40 percent of the upper classes (socioeconomic and economic) would not serve in the case of an AVF.<sup>413</sup> Consequently, an effect of the draftee force is to gain that upper 40 percent of society. Still, is it a gain just in numbers of soldiers, or it is something more than that?

In the following discussion, we examine several cases where the participation of this part of society's youth in the military is adding benefits to the military and to society generally.

##### **1. Who is Closely Related to the Conscript? Who Cares for Him?**

Of course, the first people to care for the conscript are his parents. We see the effects of this concern as it involves the upper socioeconomic class parents.

As previously discussed, the socioeconomic status of the young is synonymous with the socioeconomic status of their parents. So, the result of an all-draft-force, is the upper-socioeconomic part of the society of a country keeping track of military-related issues. Except for the vote, these upper classes have many other means by which they influence the government on military

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<sup>413</sup> This is also the case for the U.S. AVF, see: Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

issues. This is depicted roughly in Figure 5.2, by the arrow pointing up from the society circle. This active feedback by upper classes is a major concern also in countries that use the AVF, such as the U.S.<sup>414</sup>

It is evident that the answer to the question, “who cares for the soldiers?”, is a simple one: their families. In a conscript environment, the most important of those related to the soldiers are the influential upper-socioeconomic classes.<sup>415</sup>

One could ask, what is the difference between the upper-socioeconomic class and to the lower and middle-socioeconomic classes related to the military? The answer is examined below.

## **2. Interaction of the Upper-Socioeconomic Classes with the Government**

The arrow pointing up in Figure 5.2 results from a variety of pressures on the government of a country. Especially for the upper-socioeconomic/ economic classes, there are various ways to make their voice heard to the executive branch of the state and, as a result, receive favorable treatment.

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<sup>414</sup> In a very interesting narrative type, though scientific-based, book K. Roth-Douquet and F. Schaeffer, depict the reality in U.S.: “One way to turn up the disconnect between the wealthiest and most influential class of Americans and our military is to ask yourself this question: would you be surprised to hear that actor Leonardo DiCaprio or Steven Spielberg’s son, or the daughter of the president of Yale or one of George Bush’s daughters or a Kennedy grandchild or the son of the president of Microsoft had enlisted? If the answer is yes, then why would you be surprised? What assumptions have you made about our AVF and who is the ‘appropriate’ volunteer?”. Except for the masterfully theoretical question posed above, the authors using research data, concluded that most of U.S. contemporary soldiers are strangers to the most influential segment of the society; a division that is depicted by the distinction “we” and “they”. See: Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America’s Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 30.

<sup>415</sup> Ibid. This is the case in the book, where two different families of upper U.S. socioeconomic status, found themselves related to military volunteers. Their descriptions of their changing perceptions are very powerful and also based on research data.






Figure 5.3. Various ways that Upper Socioeconomic Groups Might Influence the Executive Power of a State.

As seen in Figure 5.3, the upper-socioeconomic classes can influence the actions of government and the society in a number of ways. These are summarized below.

**a. *Rich or Famous Families***

These types of groups have two ways to influence those in charge.

(1) Directly Reach Politicians. As being in the same high socioeconomic strata, they would normally have relations with them as fundraisers or as social friends. This ability is probably the most powerful, as a politician can very easily bring an issue in the parliament through an official procedure called “question” in Greece. Politicians of all the parties often pose “questions” in the Greek parliament concerning issues with soldiers.<sup>416</sup> As we

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<sup>416</sup> See: Hellenic Parliament, <http://www.parliament.gr/> (accessed November 17, 2008) for questions posed by parliament members on suicidal rates in the army.

understand, this way of making one's voice heard is probably very effective, since an opinion is forwarded into the most official institution and touches some of the most influential people, the legislators.

(2) Use Publicity. As it would be very easy for them to find a way for publicize an opinion on an issue in a newspaper, magazine, or T.V.<sup>417</sup>

**b. Professors/ Teachers**

(1) Influence. Educators have the opportunity to discuss with and probably influence the young people and perspective soldiers and their families, too. Numerous historical incidents are seen where professors and their students sought to bring about democratic control of the military. A first example would be the resistance to the Greek dictatorship, initially in 1973, by professors and students of the Law School of Athens University, and later by the Athens Polytechnic School in 1974. In fact, these two small riots are said to have caused the beginning of the end of the dictatorship.

In U.S. history and during the Vietnam War, university professors and students had a very active position, and even marched side-by-side in protest demonstrations and other events. On the other hand, in the U.S. of the AVF today, most university professors and students admire the service of soldiers, but they just do not want the latter to be closely associated with them.<sup>418</sup>

(2) Publicity. Another ability of professors and the nation's intellectual leaders is to publish an article or write a book expressing their views. This probably does not have as instant an effect on society as is

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<sup>417</sup> We will discuss the power of contemporary media later on.

<sup>418</sup> Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 43-51. Ibid., 44, We can find some very interesting surveys done by Moskos.

caused by the media. Still, it is a slow but long standing influence on society and, more specifically, the segments of society that read related journals and books. These intellectual leaders are often called the “opinion makers” of society.

**c. *Higher-Level Public Employees***

Normally, these employees have at least an indirect connection with politicians or even belong to their close environment. The consequence of that relationship is the same as that described above for the rich and famous.

Apart from that, higher-level public employees know better the structure and procedures of the country’s public institutions and administration. For example, if a father of a soldier is a high-level employee in the state courts (without even being a judge), he could easily take care of the procedures needed for a lawsuit against anybody, in the military or not, who mistreated his son. Imagine a labor-worker in the same position; a lack of “knowledge” about using a state’s institutions might result some hesitation to sue anybody. Of course, we do not even mention the money needed to pursue a lawsuit. Higher level public employees, bureaucrats, and publicly-elected officials are often seen as the “Rule-makers”.

**d. *Journalists or Others Connected in Some Way to the Media***

In our society, the role of the media is crucial. It is very difficult to find a single person in a developed country who does not watch TV or read newspapers. These means of communication are consequently very powerful and efficient.

Nevertheless, not all people have access to forward an opinion to the media. The privileged group of journalists composes, as it is said, the “fourth state power” of the political structure of a democratic country. So, after the “Trias Politica” model of Montesquieu, the journalists and the media overall are emerging as a new power that is considered as powerful as the officially

established powers of the state. To be more specific, we do not have to be economists to know that media survive through their circulation, so through the numbers of people watching or reading them. As a result, media will pick subjects that interest a wide part of the population. In the case of an AVF, the number of interested people for Army-related topics shrinks and, on top of that, those interested have lower socioeconomic status.

Let us now imagine another case: the parents or spouses of a military member who are working as journalists and who have the misfortune to lose a beloved child or husband during a conflict. It is sure that they would give all their powers to uncover the reason for that tragic death and bring it to light. Even if there were no scandal or problem to reveal, just the news of that death would be surely more publicized. Roth-Douquet and Schaeffer examine the media coverage of U.S. military actions very graphically,<sup>419</sup> coming to the conclusion that one of the basic reasons why the gap between U.S. society and the military grows is the lack of media coverage of military issues.

A current break into the privileges of the elites and their access to the media is the Internet; various ways of communicating, without cost, such as e-mails, web-sites, blogs, Facebook, and other means, contribute to the democracy of expressing opinions freely. On the other hand, and without having specific data, it seems that the Internet is so widespread that it disperses opinions or statements, and in most of the cases, fails to verify the reality and objectivity of those who contribute their ideas in the “outer space” of the Internet.

Finally, it is quite evident that draftees are connected to all socioeconomic parts of society. Especially for the relatives of draftees from the groups we have seen that they can easily make their voice heard to the public policy makers and government officials.

The obvious next question is what results from this influence?

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<sup>419</sup> Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 51-63.

### 3. What Results from the Influence of Soldiers' Relatives?

There are two areas that elite groups could influence by their opinions or acts: the society in general and the military itself.

#### a. *Society Effects*

Elite groups can influence the military in the following ways:

- Creating better knowledge for everybody (through the media) on military issues.
- Making the government conscious of every military decision, as many people are watching that state-military relation. Through this decision-transparency of the government, all orders should be explained to the public.
- Avoiding military operations/missions which are not validated by the society. This includes operations that do not add anything to the country and its people<sup>420</sup>.

On the other hand, in an AVF, like the U.S. paradigm, evidence suggests that most of the military's decisions are driven by the military's will. The most dangerous part of this is that the high expertise of the contemporary AF gives the advantage of knowledge to military officers, leaving some of their civil superiors as followers rather than leaders. In Table 5.1 below, we observe that the military's dominance over its civilian officials is evident. Seven major decisions between 1990 and 1997 were forced by the military branch, while only four were driven by the civilian side. Additionally, one action was a compromise between civilian and military authorities.<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>420</sup> A potential negative side-effect of that is to push the A.F. to avoid all military actions, for fear that the "beloved" sons or spouses might be hurt. This becomes evident for the U.S. in surveys conducted by Feaver, where the elite-civilians are counteracting any aggressive military action. These data were collected between 1976 and 1992, regarding military-issues' decision-making. (Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 39-53).

<sup>421</sup> To that table we might add the Iraq and Afghanistan recent cases, where, if not in the beginning of the wars, at least afterwards the public opinion supported the return of troops, something that has not been initiated until only relatively recently.

Table 5.1. Whose preferences prevailed in the post-Cold War era in U.S.?<sup>422</sup>

Date	Issue	Civilian	Mixed	Military
1990	Gulf War strategy (Bush=offensive; JCS/CENTCOM=defensive)	<b>X</b>		
1992	Bosnia (intervene or not)			<b>X</b>
1992-94	Gays in the military (Clinton=yes; JCS/Nunn=no)			<b>X</b>
1993	FY 1994 defense budget (Clinton/Aspin vs. Powell)	<b>X</b>		
1993-94	Change services' roles and missions (Clinton/Nunn=yes; JCS=no)			<b>X</b>
1993-94	"Win-hold-win" (Clinton/Aspin) vs. "win-win" (JCS)			<b>X</b>
1994	Invade Haiti (Clinton/Talbot=yes; Perry/JCS=no)	<b>X</b>		
1994	No restrictions on women (Clinton/West=yes; JCS=no)		<b>X</b>	
1996-97	Try Bosnian war criminals (Clinton/Albright=yes; Cohen/JCS=no)			<b>X</b>
1997	Flinn honorable discharge (Widnall=yes; Fogelman=no)			<b>X</b>
1997	Restrictions on land mines (Clinton/Gore=yes; JCS=no)			<b>X</b>
1997	Khobar Towers responsibility of air force commanding officers (Cohen=yes; Fogelman=no)	<b>X</b>		

These operations under society's control do not have to be nation-based. Society will also have a say on multinational operations that do not affect the nation directly. This is a significant democratic control over the international policy of the country and is feasible only in cases where the media cover these

<sup>422</sup> Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 200.

operations. So, we come to the prerequisite, mentioned previously, for the media to cover military news: news must concern a lot of people, or at least those who can influence the media.<sup>423</sup>

- Another consequence of the transparency of military decisions is that youth would be less reluctant to volunteer for an institution that is transparent and clearly managed, rather than one where nobody knows what decisions are taken and society is not concerned enough to find out.
- An alienation of the military from society will be prevented and there will be no gap between civilians and those in military. This gap in the U.S. AVF is discussed in a book by Feaver and Kohn<sup>424</sup>, which describes a division that touches issues in both political and sociological realm. To avoid this gap, two factors are needed: proper media coverage on military subjects and all citizens to be “baptized” in the common pool of a country’s military. This is further explained below through a personally-developed model of interconnection between the military and society.
- Avoiding alienation between these two state foundations also prevents potential counter acts or a lack of confidence from the military side. As Feaver states,<sup>425</sup> “...elite military officers far more than elite civilians, are proved to view civilian society as troubled and in need of reform.” “In short” he adds, “public confidence in the military masks latent distrust and a deeper divide in civil military relations.”<sup>426</sup>

The above arguments constitute an overview of the social results caused by the interference of conscripts’ relatives in the procedure of horizontal control (or societal control) of the military.

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<sup>423</sup> A very interesting version of the Principal-agent theory is presented by Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003, 9-15.) This theory is, according to the author, an evolution of Huntington’s and Janowitz’s theories concerning the democratic control of the military. In our study, we will try to embed into Feaver’s theory, the society; apart from the Principal (Government) and Military (Agent). The widening of the model into the society is Feaver’s concern, too. He describes this clearly in his final proposals (Ibid., 298-302).

<sup>424</sup> Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001).

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., 160-161.

<sup>426</sup> All the above conclusions of the author come from relevant analyzed research studies executed by Triangle Institute Security Studies (TISS).

Next, we see the military results of that horizontal control of the civilians, and especially those who have a higher socioeconomic position in the state.

### **b. Military Effects**

The military would also be affected by intervention between the Principal (Government) and the Agent (Military). Mainly, this intervention might be seen as a guarantee that the proper procedures are followed by the superior executive branch representatives.

- First, there would be higher self-esteem among those associated with the AF, knowing that all people are watching them and really care about them. As Feaver and Kohn show,<sup>427</sup> there is a significant gap in confidence between the military and civilians who have no direct contact with that institution and have never served in the military establishment. Figure 5.4 shows the dimensions of confidence in the U.S. military by separate social groups.




Figure 5.4. Dimensions of Confidence in the U.S. Military<sup>428</sup>

<sup>427</sup> Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 139.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid., 140.



- A second fact is that the A.F. exhibits greater effectiveness in its operations when it is felt that all of society is participating in the military's efforts. Douquet and Schaeffer, for example, comment on the point that military personnel might ask: "Why should I fight and perhaps die for a bunch of rich and powerful people who never sent their own sons and daughters to serve with us?"<sup>429</sup> Moskos also identifies the problem of operational effectiveness. He tracks various military engagements in history and shows that "citizens accept hardship only when their elites are viewed as self-sacrificing."<sup>430</sup> He also comments that legitimacy is undermined when elites do not serve; as a result, the mission may not be supported by the general population
- The quality of volunteers would rise if they knew that all society was following them. A volunteer would like to know that he is a part of a "gun" in the hands of somebody (government) who is controlled by society. Thus, clarity and transparency of decisions affecting the military would positively affect new volunteers, increasing the education and general level of the volunteer force.
- When society watches the AF, it is sure that the living conditions of the soldiers as well as their benefits would improve over time. The reason is that the media would be more likely to "invade" military life, spotting malfunctions or deficiencies of the military system.<sup>431</sup>

Concluding the effects of soldiers' relatives undertaking the "horizontal" type control of the army, we have seen how this influences the society and the military in general. We focus mostly on the upper-socioeconomic class (approximately 40 percent of the population) that, in the case of an AVF, would not have had its young adults or spouses entering the Army. But, let us

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<sup>429</sup> Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 169.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid., 171. From that we derived the following statement from C. Moskos, "Our Will to Fight Depends on Who is Willing to Die," *Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2002, A22.

<sup>431</sup> This is the case for numerous articles such as: "Time for Ombudsman in the Army." *Eleftherotipia*, Newspaper, August 25, 2008, <http://www.enet.gr/online/online> (accessed October 24, 2008). Especially, "Eleftherotipia" (a Greek big circulation newspaper), has a daily column regarding matters that affects soldiers' lives. There are many well known internet blogs too, which focus on the soldiers' status in the Hellenic A.F.

think now: if an AVF is established, would all these influences to the state, as described above, be carried out by the lowest-educated 60 percent of the population?<sup>432</sup>

#### **4. Does Society React Similarly to an AVF and a Conscript Force?**

One might argue that, if the difference of representation in Greece between an AVF and a Conscript Force is only 40 percent of the population, the remaining 60 percent represents the majority; so, is that not representative, or, at least approximately representative enough? We even call “representative” the political party that wins an elections by 40 or 45 percent of the popular vote. So why would we question whether 60 percent should be representative?

There are two main reasons that force us to believe that this 60 percent is not representative of Greek society and, in effect, the society would not react the same in the case of an AVF compared with a total conscript force.

##### ***a. The Upper Forty Percent Portion of the Society***

First of all, that 40 percent is not a random distribution of people in the Greek society; it represents the upper-socioeconomic/economic groups that have the most power in that society, as described previously. In the case of a political party, there might be a ruling 40 to 45 percent, but the part of society represented by it is normally dispersed through all socioeconomic groups, giving them the ability to forward their claims and needs. This separation of the elite 40 percent creates in the long run a social, and emotional gap among the socioeconomic castes. We can take as an example the experience of the U.S.

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<sup>432</sup> We apply these proportions for the case of Greece based on the analysis of Chapter III.

society, which, some thirty years (less than a generation) after ceasing the conscript force, has evidently developed significant differences between elites, or the ruling society, and military personnel.<sup>433</sup>

Thus, if the elites or ruling classes are exempt from the military, all the Horizontal-control results described here cannot be accomplished by the non-elite soldiers' relatives. Still, one might ask again, are there no other cases where non-elite classes are represented? The low-to-medium labor class has no power in a democratic society. This potential question brings us to the second reason we give for the different reaction of the society in the cases of an AVF and a draftee force.

***b. Lack of Representation of Low Economic Classes on Military Decision Making***

Low and medium socioeconomic/economic classes are, of course, represented in various ways in a democratic establishment. Nevertheless, there are certain ways that this part of society finds a means to express its needs and demands. For example, there are labor unions that express labor demands; there are political parties that represent in a way their needs and possibly many other official institutions. Nevertheless, there is not such an institution to focus on soldiers' lives and military operations<sup>434</sup>. The reason might be that this is a role for society as a whole to play.

So, apart from the ways elites can find to make their opinions heard, non-elite groups find it difficult to express their beliefs and their complaints about the structure of the military, or more simply, the difficulties their relatives in service might encounter. Again, we are reminded of the example in the U.S. case, when social turbulence was intolerable, during the Vietnam War. Currently,

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<sup>433</sup> See European Commission, "Study on Intergrading Women In EU," Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs (2002); Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

<sup>434</sup> Except for some Veterans' organizations, which generally have not great power.

numerous soldiers' deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan are presented only on the bottom pages of U.S. newspapers, and U.S. citizens must wait until national elections to formally express their opinion on the wars.

In fact, people are still voters, and have the right to demonstration against each government ruling. Nevertheless, the critical missing part in that consideration is the media. If the media do not present subjects that concern non-elite people, it is hard to raise social awareness and resistance.

The media may be triggered largely by some elite groups that have an interest in a subject; so, we come to a dead end, which also becomes more evident when we consider that there will be no military news for the media to present. This would possibly happen, as the government will not be pressed by any powerful persons to distribute military news in public.

In conclusion, even though the majority of the Greek population might serve in a potential AVF, there would be a great division in society, as the elite groups would not serve and would consequently withdraw their interest from this National function. This elite withdrawal would probably result in a military's devaluation and neglect by the media and powerful individuals, resulting in a breakage of "the horizontal control of the military."

Prior to this point, we examined the situation for the period that a draftee or volunteer soldier is serving in the military. In the model that we present later, there is one more parameter: the draftees or volunteers after leaving the AF and the influence they would furnish on the overall society. This point is discussed below.

## **B. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF DRAFTEES AFTER LEAVING THE ARMY?<sup>435</sup>**

The society in every country is a living organism and its memory is not short; it carries perceptions and historical moments, just as people do. So, we find it relevant to examine the influence of the draftees themselves in society after completing their service. We should not forget that these draftees will be the future governors, teachers, and workers, and will represent every segment of the society. This “baptism” in the military waters will follow them in their lives, in several ways.

### **1. Affection and Knowledge on Military Issues**

Most men who serve in the military are interested in learning news about the Military later on in their lives, or even in contributing to the solution of a problem that bothered them while in service. If, on the other hand, a person had not served, he would probably not be affected by many, if any military issues.

In the Greek conscript system, all men are expected to serve in the military; therefore, as civilians later on, a wide variety of people - from the country's president to the last labor worker - will all have ideas, as well as strong feelings for matters concerning the Greek A.F. These feelings are not only “cold” knowledge; they are based on a deep experience and a sentimental tie to a unique part of a man's life.<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>435</sup> We will focus mostly on Draftees as their number leaving A.F and their representation is wider than the volunteers. Volunteers in Greece normally stay in service for long and they do not quit; most of those leaving A.F. are officially rejected. (John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” *Scopia.gr* (2008), [http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop\\_2.as](http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as) (accessed October 24, 2008)).

<sup>436</sup> As we all might have heard from ex-soldiers, they always complain for some instances in their military life, but the critical thing is that they always mention and remember this special part of their life. These active society members, as ex-soldiers, help diminish the gap between military and society.

This interest from veterans for military issues helps in reducing, or, in the Greek case, in not creating, the gap between society and military. Military personnel and civilians will have at least a common understanding and a sort of shared experience, upon which they look at the military and its related issues.

## **2. Being a Knowledgeable Voter on Military Issues**

A physical consequence of the first factor presented (affection and knowledge), will inevitably result in a civilian who cares somewhat about military subjects while voting. So, as voters are knowledgeable and concerned for state-military relations, so would be the political parties. In that way, the feedback from the voters will force the political parties - and consequently, the ruling party - to include in their political agenda specific military proposals and plans that they will follow. This happens today in Greece, where all political parties have entered into a discussion on the Army of the future. Even the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense were asked several questions, posed by the public to legitimize their choices.<sup>437</sup> This element, too, also helps in not creating a gap between civilians and military personnel.

If we consider this political participation of ex-conscripts in military issues, we could in turn imagine what would happen in an AVF; primarily, the AVF gets the “civilians” out of the Army. This means that soldiers are only those who are professionals, and society does not contribute its members for manning its army. A conscript is a civilian who interrupts his normal life to serve the country. As we mentioned before, he brings his ideas into the military and, later on, he takes with him the military’s perceptions, along with sentimental influences. As a result, the A.F. without this civilian injection becomes a closed system, unaffected by social ideas and perspectives, and, moreover, unable to pass its ideas and perceptions

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<sup>437</sup> See Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231>. (accessed October 27, 2008); Hellenic Socialistic Party (PASOK), “Programmatic Declarations,” May 2007, <http://www.pasok.gr/portal/gr/000F4240/Data/Binder1.pdf> (accessed October 26, 2008); Hellenic Parliament, <http://www.parliament.gr/> (accessed November 17, 2008).

to society in general. The latter part of that argument, the affection of ex-soldiers for military-related subjects, brings to the surface another beneficial effect of the draftees for the military.

### **3. Willingness to be Mobilized**

The mobilization factor of a draft force is discussed previously. As stated, mobilization is a clear advantage of a draft force, as the soldiers who will be called in case of a war or other imminent need are more knowledgeable and they contribute more to the military operations.

Still, aside from the knowledgeable participants in the mobilized military units, there is another element embedded in the mobilization factor. This is the willingness and the psychological state of a mobilized soldier. This element is, again, in favor of the draftee force; we can easily imagine the instance where a country with an AVF is calling civilians to arms. This country's military will face three problems: first, is the lack of knowledge by the mobilized civilian-soldiers; second, is the civilians who will avoid being mobilized; and, finally, is the fear of the unknown and the inherent pessimism of those who do not avoid participation.

The second problem, that some people might avoid serving, should be expected. Indeed, the people who are called to serve do not have an idea of the army; further, they would be called during a dangerous situation. If, on top of that, they do not believe in their country's military effectiveness or the reasons for the draft itself, they may be reluctant warriors, flee from serving, or express their views in protests.

The third problem is the psychological state of those who are mobilized during a dangerous situation. In fact, this might be the most important problem, as it is better for an army to have fewer people than to have more with low morale. So, these civilians who are willing to be mobilized, or cannot avoid it, would probably have an inherent fear of the dangerous situation, along with a lack of knowledge on military life and procedures. This is not only a lack of

knowledge of the military's technical weapons or procedures, but it includes also their inherent uncertainty of how they would communicate in a military environment, how they would react in certain situations, and many other questions or issues they might have regarding the military-life norms. Inevitably, all these uncertainties and fears could create a poor morale, a tendency for pessimism, and potential problems in unit cohesion. These feelings are a real "poison" in a military environment, especially in cases where danger exists; this creates a group effect and a mass psychology toward pessimism. For military commanders, to overcome these situations, especially during wartime operations, is a very difficult task and can require harsh measures.

On the other hand, in the case of a draftee or mixed-type military force, an ex-soldier when mobilized, knows at least the psychological and sociological expectations of soldierly life and overcomes the problem of familiarization quite easily. Of course, he still has the fear of imminent danger, but even that might be viewed differently by him. The psychological perspective of that reembodiment of a soldier can be viewed by him in the following way: a group that protects the whole society, and of which he used to be a part, is in dire need and calls him back for help to defend the Nation.

So, this perspective contains the following.

- A group bond or preexisting cohesion.
- The knowledge that he is valued and capable enough to help.
- A likely shared, upper/ethical goal of the group<sup>438</sup>.

As we see, the bond with the military is very beneficial for the A.F. in the case of a potential mobilization. Still, the cases where the mobilization might

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<sup>438</sup> These three parameters are the basis for many organizations, companies and institutions, which want to create strong bonds with their members/ employees. Another case where all these aspects are being employed for attracting youngsters is the modern video games which in some occasions "fill" the gap of a youngster to be useful and to contribute to a social upper goal. This goal in some case is war; so many video games replace the real army experiences with an electronic replica, while they do not forget to embed in these games social and personal psychological features.



occur are not so many; more common is the everyday interaction of civilians who are ex-soldiers. The discussion below, along with a model that accompanies the theory, focuses on the relations among ex-soldier civilians.

#### **4. The Social Relations among Different Socioeconomic Groups**

This is probably one of the most beneficial effects of the draft in a society, although it is not examined deeply in literature. Of course, we are entering now into a purely sociological aspect, which is not the purpose of this project. Nevertheless, we skim the surface of that element with some brief points and also present the Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model.

First of all, let us examine the instances in a person's life where he will meet and make friendships with people from other socioeconomic groups. There are probably only two: public schools and the military. We all remember ourselves keeping and talking to some friends from school days. Really, does that not change our perception of looking at things that do not touch our lives? Is the following phrase familiar in any way to us: "Oh yes, I used to have a friend back from the school days, who finally become a.....I can tell that ...(his salary/working hours are not at all satisfactory!)" .Probably, yes.

Some of us still keep friendships from our schooldays, people who help us visualize society and life through various lenses and perspectives and not only through our personal views. Furthermore, psychologists would assure us that connections to a person from our past not only bring back memories and past perspectives, but also awaken the psychological profile we used to have at that time. As it turns out, military connections are a more powerful "social glue" than school for a number of reasons.

##### ***a. Military (Draft) is Even More Representative than the School***

If we compare the only two connecting institutions in the life of a youngster, we realize that school is surely representative of all socioeconomic

groups, as it is obligatory for all children to be educated. Nevertheless, school is only representative of the area in which it is located. So, a school in a village would have the village society, or a school in a city would be representative of the people living in that city only. But in a school, we would generally not find farmers mixed with city boys and citizens of poor suburbs studying together with children from rich suburbs.

On the other hand, a military draft system is the peak of any social representation institution. Not only do all the people serve, thus offering “perfect” representation,<sup>439</sup> but also all these soldiers are mixed geographically in various military units. In these units, soldiers might have no social or working connection between them; for example, farmers might meet rich boys from big cities, a conservative might meet a communist, an atheist might meet a religious person, and many other social interconnections that would normally not happen in our everyday lives, in the way we have formulated our lives, strictly constrained in our own private social cell. Would we go deliberately in any phase of our life, and meet a farmer or a person from another distant profession and listen to their ideas, perspectives, or problems? Probably not; yet, the military gives us that opportunity, which is, as we called it, a kind of “social glue.” The military is thus a “melting pot” that unifies many different people for a common cause.

#### ***b. Discovering Ours and Others’ Personalities***

Not only the environment of the military is new to a conscript, but also it might be the first – and in some cases the only- time to be away from his family home.<sup>440</sup> This will bring the soldier a new perspective of his personality: the psychological feeling of the self-sustained man who is able to cope with life and its difficulties without the help of his beloved ones. It is an actual and psychological feeling at the same time, that empowers the youngster and makes

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<sup>439</sup> All soldiers are between 18-26, so having completed their school years; they are in time to have in a way formulated some kind of personality and individual views of the society.

<sup>440</sup> The family home might be the parents' house or a married couples' house.

him take a look at the world around him without prompts from his close relatives. The simultaneous awakening of all soldiers' personalities helps in formulating strong friendships among them. These friendships or bonds often stay with them later on, as they would probably have many instances of coming together and thinking back on those "funny" and harsh military moments. It is said, too, that no bond is stronger than a shared hardship, if these soldiers are called to serve in war.

**c. *Tight Relations among Different People in Cases of Harsh Conditions***

Of course, the military is not only a social gathering for military training. It is mainly operations, missions, and sometimes even war. All these hard times help people create common experiences and strengthen their relationships. After coming out of the difficult conditions and back into civilian clothes, they would always have affection for the military and their "buddies" with whom they served, side-by-side. Dangerous situations always form connections between people that lived through these conditions together. Even outside of the military, there are a lot of known cases where people who have lived through life-threatening situations gather regularly to meet each other and discuss not only their fearful experience, but other matters, too.<sup>441</sup>

So, finally, we have seen why military is even more powerful "social glue" than the only other socially representative institutions, such as public school. But, finally how does this "social glue" works?

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<sup>441</sup> Notable examples of successful peer-support programs include Oklahoma City following the Murrah Building bombing, New York City after 9/11, and Louisiana in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. (See: Daniel Fisher, Kay Rote, LaVerne Miller, David Romprey, and Beth Filson "From Relief to Recovery: Peer Support by Consumers Relieves the Traumas of Disasters and Recovery from Mental Illness," *Resource paper presented at the after the Crisis: Healing from Trauma after Disasters Meeting, April 24-25, 2006*, Bethesda, MD, Updated July 2006.

**C. THE “INTERCONNECTING MILITARY-SOCIETY” MODEL (IMS), OR “YOUNG BEES ON SOCIAL FLOWERS”**

To visualize all of the arguments stated above, we created the IMS model, which shows in general terms the interconnection achieved in a society through military conscription. This interconnection in turn is a basic element for the society to achieve its initial goal: the “horizontal” type of control of the military.

As explained in Figure 5.1, horizontal control takes place inside the society-military environment. The Interconnecting Military-Society model (IMS), takes place in the core of society, and examines the connection of various socioeconomic groups with the military and vice-versa. Finally, it also shows some other relations created among socioeconomic groups due to military service. Figure 5.5 depicts the basic Social-Military relations examined and the outcomes produced.




Figure 5.5. The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the case of a draft Force.

A brief explanation of the IMS model follows:

## **1. IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of a Draft Force**

First, we explain the symbols in the model:

- **Society circle:** The double-broken circle represents all the people in the society, except for those who have a position of power in one of the three forms presented in Figure 5.1.<sup>442</sup> Military and Society groups are included in the double-broken cyclical society line. The outer line of the block arrow heading out of the society circle represents the feedback by the society. This denotes the ideas/perceptions of the whole society and not of any specific group.
- **Downward arrow towards the society circle:** This arrow, also shown in Figure 5.1, represents the state's legal and executive administration of the society, through established laws and procedures.
- **Upward block arrow (beginning in the society circle and pointing outwards):** This is a feature of every democratic society, where the people give their feedback in various ways to those who govern. The ways that a society can interact with the authorities are many and, especially for the military issues, are previously described in paragraph A. This block arrow pointing up mainly represents the outcome of the "horizontal type" of control of the military. This control is not a direct-type control from the society groups to the military, but it is mainly an indirect demand from the authorities of the country. For example, if a large number of parents believe that their sons are mistreated as soldiers, they will not address their complaints to the military unit or to their son's commander; rather, they would most likely address that problem to the political authorities using any available means. Again, they might protest, talk to the media, talk to politicians, make a lawsuit, or whatever else they might consider. Then, the political or legal authorities would react to their demand and correct any mishandling of the military personnel. As explained previously, this government reaction would come as a result of the volume of people reacting, or to the volume of publicity put on that issue<sup>443</sup>. So, we imply that authorities have in their mind the military issues. This is a very critical point to realize, as later on we demonstrate graphically why

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<sup>442</sup> State, juridical, and executive powers.

<sup>443</sup> For those that have a color copy of the model, the outer line of the downward green (administrative) arrow is red. With red we symbolize the feedback, ideas or even reaction for military issues.

one or more separate socioeconomic groups cannot perform the horizontal type of control and need all of society to achieve that. For example, if it were true that this upward feedback (or horizontal control) arrow, was not one but many, each one connected to each socioeconomic group, then the substance of representation might lose its meaning. The reason is that, if every group and especially the lower ones, could address their military issues to the government, then the horizontal control of military would have been achieved directly from each socioeconomic group without the need for all social groups to react. In that way, even if some of the socioeconomic groups would not be represented in the military, the horizontal control would have been achieved by the rest of the groups. So, representation of all socioeconomic groups in the A.F. would not be obligatory for society to achieve the “horizontal” type of control over the military. But, evidently, this is not true.

- Circles inside the society circle: In the society circle, we represent the various socioeconomic groups with different circles. The middle circle represents the military force of the country and represents those who come in contact with it. A potential objection on this part might be the separate representation of the A.F. as a “group” in the society. One might ask if the military is equal to the rest of the socioeconomic group circles in the society. The answer would be, of course not. The military, while not being a socioeconomic group in the society, forms a kind of a social group with several similarities to the socioeconomic ones. Some of these similarities between military and social groups stem from the fact that they are both ruled by the same state powers. Furthermore, the military corps is a self-sustained group, which especially in the case of a draft system, accepts, incorporates and, finally, returns back to the society, members from all the socioeconomic groups. Ultimately, the military is at the same hierarchical level with the rest of the society. The circles of the various socioeconomic groups represent the perception, ideas, and experiences of that distinct group. This specific circle follows the youngsters when they enter into the Army body.
- Inner arrows between social groups and the military: As we can see, each socioeconomic group has two arrows connected to it:
  - The output arrow: This is the arrow that starts from each group and ends into the military circle. Its representation is the youth that go into the Army body as soldiers. The arrows symbolize the ideas, perceptions and generic characteristics of each socioeconomic group. The outer line of each input (to the military) arrow denotes the familiarity of youth with the A.F. before entering the corps. This happens in the case of a

draft system, as older men in the family would have already served and surely passed an idea - even an old fashioned one - of “how it is to serve” to the youngsters. So the outer line (military familiarity) of the output arrow, states also the smooth transition of youngsters from the socioeconomic group’s life-characteristics to the military’s middle-circle (military way of life, perceptions of the A.F.).

- The input arrow: Is mainly the arrow that returns from the military to each socioeconomic group<sup>444</sup>. The military culture returns to each socioeconomic group through the ex-soldiers who have been “baptized” by that culture for a year (in the case of Greece). Now the society is “injected” with the army’s perspectives and culture, while before, the military was ‘injected” by each socioeconomic group’s culture. The medium for these “injections” was, of course, the youth who served in the conscript force. These youngsters could be characterized as the “culture bees” on “society-group” flowers. By giving and taking crucial substances (ideas, experiences) among the various social groups (including the military), they manage to fertilize the whole society and product a common social reaction/outcome, depicted by the outward from the society circle arrow (feedback/reaction by the whole society, regarding military issues). So now all socioeconomic groups and, in fact, all society members have some common memories or experiences. This is why connecting lines are now created among the various social groups.
- The lines interconnecting the various socioeconomic groups: As we noted before, the common experiences among youngsters that have served create a common point of interest which can help them to be connected during their after-military life. Boys, who lived together for a period of time and shared some common moments, will probably continue to keep a friendship even though they might belong to different socioeconomic castes. This friendship or even acquaintance would have been very difficult to form if these people were not put in that same military pool.<sup>445</sup> This interconnecting line between socioeconomic circles, is the bond which unifies society’s perceptions and beliefs for the military. This is the line that represents also another beneficial outcome for the society in

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<sup>444</sup> For color copies, this has, as its outer line, a line the same color as the socioeconomic group that the soldier came from. Still, the larger inner part of the arrow is full of the red military color (military culture).

<sup>445</sup> The novel part that accompanies this project, will probably give a more viable picture of that relation.



general; it connects the socioeconomic groups under one theme, and not only for that (military) theme. Thus, it helps the society to move together, in the circle, towards the future and not leave any socioeconomic group behind or ahead.<sup>446</sup> If we make the analogy of the society as a living body, the socioeconomic groups would be vital parts of the body; the central part (military) would be the heart and lungs, where blood comes in, is revitalized, and goes out; and finally the connecting lines would represent the veins that transfer the blood to the body's vital parts. If one part is disconnected from the veins (circles interconnecting arrows), and stops receiving blood (common society culture), then this part will be rotten and, as a consequence, the whole body (society) will be unhealthy and unable to produce a common output (Red block arrow or Horizontal Control Arrow).

As we have now concluded the presentation of the IMS model in the case of a draftee force, let us see what this model shows in the case of a Hellenic AVF, and what results come out of that model. Following is the depicted “reaction” of the IMS in that case:

## **2. IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of an AVF**

In Greece, as we showed in the previous chapter, at least 40 percent of the educated and upper socioeconomic groups will not participate in the military, so what the above figure shows is analyzed in the following lines. The interconnecting (input-output) arrows between these elite groups and the military disappear.

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<sup>446</sup> The block arrow at the bottom symbolizes the smooth and unified movement of the whole society circle in the future, like a wheel, composed of several parts.




Figure 5.6. The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the case of a potential Hellenic AVF.

The same happens with the line which used to interconnect these elite groups with the rest of the society-groups. Now, due to the lack of “bees” going

around the “social-group flowers,” the society is not fertilized, which causes its outcome to be diminishing, disrupted and without containing any military issues. This is depicted by the upward feedback block arrow, which used to include military feedback to the state powers, and now has broken lines in it. By this, we mean that now that society does not have a common voice on military issues, elite groups are the most likely to make their voices heard to the authorities regarding any demand or feedback they might have, but not on military issues..

Next, the downward towards the general society circle arrow (administrative authorities) breaks its relations with the military, as most of the authoritative members belong to the elite groups, which have not served in the military. That is why that arrow has a broken outer line (not carrying the actual military culture).

Finally, a schism is created in the society between high and low socioeconomic groups, as they now lack common experiences, friendships, and possibly common goals that, in the occasion of a military draft, might be the sustainment of a viable and democratic military Force. This is the main reason that creates the gap between economic or governing elites and the military. This same gap for the U.S. is fully presented through various American and other authors. Still, as the IMS model implies, this is not a gap between military personnel and elites; it is mostly a gap among society groups, which can be defined differently for each country's case.<sup>447</sup>

One might ask “why do we want that horizontal control? It might be better if the society were not involved as a whole in military issues.” We try to answer this question below.

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<sup>447</sup> In the Greek and most European countries, these separate social groups are defined by their socioeconomic status.

**D. DOES SOCIETY AS A WHOLE NEEDS TO HAVE A SAY IN MILITARY ISSUES?**

Who is going to guard the guards?<sup>448</sup>

Plato (5<sup>th</sup> Century BCE)

The same question might be put in many ways: “Does a society need to have a say in a major social group under arms?” or “Should a society have an opinion on who is going to be killed for defending it?” or even “Does a society have to control the corps, which under arms, carries its country’s flag to foreign territories?”

Now that we have broken down the question, it is very easy to answer “yes”, to each part. As we have shown previously by the IMS model, the horizontal control of the military that we seek will not come if all socioeconomic groups are not proportionately represented in the military force.<sup>449</sup>

Additionally, we could ask: “Do the various groups need the military to formulate a highly valuable goal?” Of course, this is a difficult question to answer, but in these days, we tend to value most our own personal goals, the military could serve as an institution that, apart from connecting the social groups, will also give a sense of a shared, highly-valued goal: sustaining a strong army and defending the country. As noted previously, in the case of a draft, the army can also serve as the most powerful “social glue,” as a common ground for persons from all walks of life.<sup>450</sup>

Finally, one might suggest that the military in total is representative even by maintaining an AVF, as officers dilute the unrepresentative society mix of the volunteers. This is true, as we have seen in Chapter III. The criteria (points) for

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<sup>448</sup> This age-old question comes from Plato in his writings for the “Ideal Republic”.

<sup>449</sup> The volunteers force as we have shown - for Greece - is not going to be representative unless big changes happen to the whole society and military status.

<sup>450</sup> Apart from the school, which is in a way not as strong, a “social glue” as the military, as analyzed in the previous paragraph 4.

entering in a military academy are close to those needed for the most highly-valued universities where elite youngsters attempt to go. Nevertheless, this study is not examining the inner relations of the military (officers-soldiers, etc.), but rather society's focus on the military in total. While the Greek military needs 75,000 draftee soldiers every year, it only needs approximately 500 officers for its academies.<sup>451</sup> As we understand, the social control of the military is achieved by the large numbers of relatives connected to the soldiers. The officers' relatives, even if they come from middle and upper-socioeconomic groups, are not many. Furthermore, these relatives might not see the military from the perspective of a soldier. As a last comment, officers do not usually become civilians soon enough to be mingled again in the society as military veterans.

In the IMS model, we find that horizontal control comes from the society in total, indirectly through the state's authorities. It is neither an issue linking the military directly to authorities nor an issue linking society directly to military. Thus, politicians and other authoritative civilians should have both personal military experience and a unified feedback from society on military-related issues.

The analysis of this chapter, along with the IMS model, focus on the "horizontal" control of the military by the society. This part of military control was created as a new factor for the MRM model that we used in the previous chapter.<sup>452</sup>

The analysis of the present chapter shows clearly that a draft-type military ensures horizontal control of the military and, beyond that, an interrelation among many social groups. This outcome does not counter the proposed military type of Greece. What was proposed previously was a mixed Volunteer and conscripted

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<sup>451</sup> See Evangelos Meimarakis, (2007), <http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231>. (accessed October 27, 2008); Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_home.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 25, 2008).

<sup>452</sup> "Horizontal" control of the military might also be considered as a sub-factor to "Political Legitimacy"; one of the triangle sides (factors) of the MRM model.

force, which would also accomplish the demanded social representation in the military for its effective operation. Thus, the “horizontal” control analysis verifies the validity of our proposal on the semi-professional type of the Hellenic A.F.

In effect, these two models (MRM and IMS) are not substitutes, but rather complements and they are both examining the issue of Social Representation of the Military Force in its whole.

By concluding our analysis in this project, we would like to emphasize again its basic advantages and disadvantages, come from the same element: the length and the breadth of the subject of the Social Representation in a military force. The advantage comes from the fact that the project is not a “closed-system” analysis, but an interconnecting analysis among social groups, institutions, traditions, perceptions, and many more. The deficiency of that project is that it might not have been deep enough on all of those issues. Nevertheless, even in that deficiency, we can find a bright side, which is the opportunity for future research. This is especially true for the IMS model, which was produced for this project; it needs a lot of testing and possibly amending to be validated for official use in the future.

The innovation of this project comes in the second part, where a novel-type story will build on the project’s data and validate our proposals through other types of lenses: those of sentimental logic and bare reality. We hope this novel-part will be a great help to those teaching relevant topics, as they might do so by analyzing in class parts of the story that are based on experiential data and analysis.

Finally, in the following brief chapter, we summarize the proposals developed in this project.

## **VI. PROPOSALS**

As we intend this part to be used as a quick memorandum of the project's proposals, we present them again briefly, drawing heavily upon material discussed previously.

### **A. TYPE OF MILITARY STRUCTURE**

This project resulted in a proposed Military Structure of a semi-professional Armed Forces. In other words, based on the present study, the preferred soldier's base for the Hellenic military is a mixed one, with volunteers and conscripts. The ratio of the two different parts of the soldier's base is not defined in this project. Nevertheless, we would suggest not reducing the number of conscripted soldiers, and, consequently, not changing the duration of conscripted service, without conducting further research. The reason for this is mostly political, as it would be difficult to reduce military-service and then increase it later. Politically, this would be a very difficult measure to pass to the society.

We now give a brief "road-map" of how we reached this conclusion. First, we started with the analysis of the age group of those completing high-school and having to decide between joining the military or seeking further education followed by a civilian-type job. Then, we analyzed the factors affecting youngsters when they choose to enlist, and we found out that these factors were mostly socioeconomic. The next step was to refine the meaning of the socioeconomic factor, especially for the Greek situation. We came up with a rough equation between socioeconomic and economic status. We also discovered, through data analysis that at least 40 percent of the society, a large portion of the upper socioeconomic segment, would not participate in the military in the case of an AVF. Consequently, we concluded that an AVF in today's Greece would not be representative of all the socioeconomic groups.

This was our first intermediate result on the project. At that point, we had a clue, but we did not have a tool, to measure its effects in the society and in the military force. That is where Eitelberg's qualitative-type model (the MRM) came into place. First, before implementing the MRM model, which was created for U.S. society, we checked its validity for the Greek military and society. After a thorough analysis, we found out that the MRM model is also applicable to Greece. Next, we implemented the model for two different and quite distinct cases: a pure draft Soldiers Force, and the case of an All-Volunteer Force for the Hellenic military.

In the first case, the model resulted in an inefficient army, due to the failure of operational factors and the breakage of the soldiers' learning-curves. In effect, one of the three MRM factors, Military Effectiveness, failed in this total draftee force. So, we rejected that option. The second option we chose to test through the MRM is the AVF. This type of force structure failed in two MRM-factors: Political Legitimacy and Social Equity. Thus, it was rejected, too.

Finally, to find the preferred solution, we used the mathematical-logic tool of "Proof by contradiction", which states that if we only have three solutions available and two are rejected, then the third solution should be accepted. Thus, we concluded that the semi-professional Military type is the one that best fits the Greek case.

## **B. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY**

As an additional outcome of the analysis conducted on this subject, we also proposed that the Hellenic Military should keep a very crucial element: Social Representation. Whatever the type of the military structure chosen, the military should keep the representation of all the active socioeconomic groups of the Greek society.



This proposal came as an outcome of the analysis of two parts. First, we analyzed the Political Legitimacy factor of the MRM model. This factor evidently failed when the structure of the military was unrepresentative of society. Second, we developed and analyzed the IMS model, which employed the concept of “horizontal” control. “Horizontal” control of the Military by society is absent when the military is unrepresentative of that society.

The validity of this proposal became more evident by using the IMS model. This model was created for this specific project to discover a new aspect of the MRM model, or to be a supplemental tool for it. The IMS model indicates that social representation in the military can achieve three objectives at the same time:

- Performs the “horizontal” type of control to the military by the society as a whole;
- Makes those who have a type of state power knowledgeable and affected by military issues; and most critically,
- Creates the required interconnections among the social groups, to keep the society-body unified and viable.
- A future study could examine the validity of the IMS model, and possibly incorporate it in the MRM model, to cover more aspects of the subject of Social Representation in the military.

### **C. WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY**

According to our analysis, women should only serve on a voluntary basis, having in parallel some valued benefits related to their future ability to be employed. These benefits might be educational or points-bonus for public-sector jobs.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>453</sup> Usually public-sector jobs in Greece are accepting new employees by using a point-system in which, for every educational or experience characteristic of the candidate, a number of points is assigned. In the case of a women’s draft, an adequate point-bonus can be given for their service, which in effect will help them to come closer in qualifying for a public-sector job which they applied for.

Additionally, we propose that women serve for one year in total, (as do men), possibly divided into two semesters of service, to help women undertake that task if they volunteer to do so.

Finally, we propose that, for better efficiency of that measure, the Ministry of Defense publicize the female positions required for the next semester, so that women would be able to choose a specific position and an area that suits them for a period of six or twelve months. In that way, women will be more eager to serve, knowing beforehand the area, the position, and the duration of the service that they will be assigned to complete.

Furthermore, the Hellenic Military will be more efficient, as it will fill positions that are needed, knowing also beforehand the duration for which this position will be filled.

We developed this proposal, by using logical questions, such as;

- “Are the women capable of serving?”
- “Do we need to conscript women?”
- “Do any potential problems result from conscripting women?”
- “What are the alternatives?”

In all the above queries, we were fortunate enough to have specific research data from European and Greek sources. Thus, in the first question, we easily answered that women are perfectly capable of serving. Except for the historic references of Hellenic history, we have real data from the current situation, where women serve in all branches of the Hellenic military as officers, petty officers, and volunteer soldiers. From the analysis of their past and present service, along with some parallel research in the U.S., we concluded that women are at least as capable as their male counterparts for serving the nation.

The next question might be answered in two ways, in a practical way as well as a theoretical manner. First, the practical answer: we need to conscript women to fill the gap created by fewer numbers of men eligible and willing to be conscripted. Next, the theoretical answer: women should also be represented in the military, so as to have a socially representative force.

The counterarguments for the above answers refer basically to the facts arising from the problems created by women's conscription. So, through survey data analysis, we showed that, by conscripting women, the problem of having fewer men eligible to serve is actually worsened, as the already low-birth rate would continue to drop when women are conscripted. Regarding women's representation, we set in this project another option of measuring that aspect of representativeness; up until now, we considered the representation of the men and women separately. In this project, we suggested an alternative type of representation: family-core representation. If we consider the representation of all families in a society, it is no longer a matter of gender, but rather a matter of socioeconomic representation of the families in the society. So the families, in a way, elect to send their men (or women), as volunteers to defend their state and leave most women behind to bear and raise the new generation of the society. This, of course, is an old idea, upon which most historical armies were based. Evidently, it is against the contemporary individualistic society; still, it seems to be a quite evident argument. Women, compared with men, do not offer any distinct social characteristic other than a factor related to gender in the military. At the same time if an elite group is not participating, it surely poses a deficiency in social representation. Apart from this theoretical argument, Greece has a real problem of a low-birth rate, and it cannot bear to have obligatory service for women. Consequently, we propose a military service for women only in a voluntary basis.

A main cause for the problem of low-birth rate is, as shown by official surveys, the financial issue and, more specifically, the lack of full-time jobs for women. This is the reason why we propose that military service for women be

accompanied with some employment benefits, which might be diplomas in specific areas (e.g., computer use), or even extra points when participating in public-sector exams.

Finally, to make women's military service easier, we suggest the option of serving for two semesters, instead of a continuous full year. With this proposal, we hope the problem of low men's participation in the military draft will be alleviated without creating another potential problem for women and Greek society generally.

#### **D. RESERVE FORCE IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY**

Even though we did not examine the specific subject of a Reserve Force in the Hellenic Military establishment, it became obvious at several points of this study that a well-organized reserve force should be established. Thus, we propose a further deep examination on the preferred future state of the Reserve Forces, in order for the military structure to be most effective in coping with its future needs.

Three reasons led us to propose an extra focus on Reserve Forces. First, the moderate financial situation of Greece does not allow for big spending on preserving the number of soldiers required for defending the whole country. Thus, a large number of soldiers should be mobilized in case of a conflict or war.

Second, the strategic position of the country has historically created tensions and wars in the region. For the near future, there is no evidence that this situation might change. In effect, a relatively large number of soldiers are needed in case of a conflict.

Third, the technology of the Hellenic Military systems has vastly evolved, following the general trends in Europe. As a result, the soldiers needed in a potentially dangerous situation should not only be many, nor only gathered quickly, but also be familiar with up-to-date equipment, weapons and modern strategies that are connected to the latest technology.

All these factors lead us to believe in the need of a modern restructuring of the Reserve Force, to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the Hellenic Military, when mobilized.

## **E. FURTHER RESEARCH POINTS**

As mentioned in the previous chapter and elsewhere, this project was broad enough to contain many factors embedded in Social Representation issues. As a result, some points were examined only superficially.

So, we offer plenty of opportunities and related topics for a student or a researcher to examine in the future.

For example, we propose the following topics for further research.

- The socioeconomic structure of the Hellenic Armed Forces<sup>454</sup>
- The precise ratio of volunteers and conscripts needed for an effective Hellenic military force.
- The specific benefits that would be most attractive and helpful for potential female soldiers<sup>455</sup>
- The number of reserves needed for the Hellenic A.F.
- The implications or applications of the MRM in other countries.
- Further validation of the IMS model and its connection with the MRM<sup>456</sup>.

As we come to the end of this project, we hope that this work elevates our knowledge and understanding of a very sensitive sociological aspect of every military in the world: Social Representation in the Armed Forces.

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<sup>454</sup> Like a relevant U.S. study, the one proposed above might use postal codes of military personnel to identify their socioeconomic status. This focus group can also be watched for a period of five to ten years, to identify if the initial status became higher or not.

<sup>455</sup> That research might also examine the proper period for women's service, along with the proper position for them to serve.

<sup>456</sup> This type of research might also analyze further the theoretical and practical meaning of "horizontal" control of the A.F. by a society.

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## **VII. NOVEL - “THE CHOICE”**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This novel part is about the choice of a youngster to volunteer for the Hellenic Armed Forces (AF) or just wait to be conscripted and continue his civilian education and career, hoping for better results. This novel and all the characters are fiction; still, the story is based on facts coming from surveys and research. Basically, the novel's characters are based on results that came after the scientific, first part of the project. This second novel part adds coverage of the sentimental and other missed aspects of the first part. Furthermore, this part adds the innovation of teaching a sociological subject through a practical application. This method of teaching, apart from being interesting, triggers lively conversations, which is a pure gain for students and teachers alike. It might also be characterized as a progression of the case-study.

The story takes place in Athens in 2008, in a suburb which is neither rich nor poor. We could say its habitants have average socioeconomic or economic conditions. The company of children in the school will represent socioeconomic levels not far above or below Greece's average. As children mingle in the high school, we also see contradicting options and abilities that go with them as a result of their socioeconomic status. Later on, we follow them in the military, and some years after, in Hellenic society.

To keep the novel short, as it is mainly designed for teaching purposes, we adhere to a technique of presenting and analyzing only certain critical moments of protagonists' lives. We call this technique, “snapshot” story. As it is physical, this novel could be greatly amended; and, in fact, this would be a positive side-effect of that innovative author's attempt.

More specifically now, we present the initial protagonists of that novel in rough form:

**JOHN:** Seventeen years old, brown hair, black eyes, moderate height and quite a good-looking boy; very pleasant in his company and ambitious enough to try for the better. Moderate achievements in high school grades, but quite successful in subjects that require mathematical logic. His close friend is Alex, and last year he had his first girlfriend, Vivian. John's parents are called Kostas and Evi. They are both working in moderately paid jobs in the private sector. Even though the family gets two salaries, their economic status is medium to low. His parents are both high-school graduates, without any higher university education. So, we would position them to medium-to-low socioeconomic status. John is the sole child of the family.

**ALEX:** Seventeen years old, blond hair and blue eyes, average height and in general a good-looking boy; very clever and successful in his studies; a top student with great academic achievements. Alex is not very social; still, his friendship with John is close. Shortly after starting the final year of high school, he found a girlfriend called Mary. Mary is a distant cousin of his friend, John, and she is one year older than Alex. Alex's mother is called Irene and his father Neoklis. His father is fond of ancient names, and named his son after Alexander the Great. They are both highly educated, but only his father is working, as a high-ranking public servant in the Department of Justice. Alex's mother is taking care of the household and his sister Eleni. Their income is quite high; in addition to the father's high salary, Irene owns two apartments in Athens, which she rents. So they clearly belong to the high socioeconomic and economic status.

**VIVIAN:** She is a good looking girl and John's girlfriend. They met last year when they were sitting next to each other in a high school class. She is a good student, and her parents belong roughly to the middle socioeconomic group. Vivian is planning to study music after completing high school, as she loves playing the violin.



**MARY:** She is John's cousin and Alex's girlfriend. Mary and Alex met at a school party and fell in love. She finished high-school last year, took part in University introductory exams, succeeded, and is now studying Political Science at Athens University. Her parents are rich and they belong to the high socioeconomic status of Greek society.

**NICHOLAS:** He is a cadet in the Naval Military Academy. Nicholas is a neighbor of John, and successfully completed high-school three years ago. He is a good student and succeeded in the Naval Academy's introductory exam with a high grade. His parents are well-educated, but of medium income. His father is a non-commissioned officer in the Air Force, and his mother has been working for 15 years as an administrative clerk in a private company. Nicholas's parents are close friends with John's parents, as they live across the street, and the women, for the last four years, commute together in the morning as their jobs are close and they have the same working hours.

## **B. THE BOY'S FRIENDSHIP AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD**

***Alex:*** *Let's take neighboring desks to be close to each other.*

***John:*** *Yes, why not? Do you remember last year when two teachers threw us out of the class for talking? It was fun! Still, my parents did not think so!*

***Alex:*** *Do you remember that we had a perfect day after that, going on a day trip by ourselves. It was the first time I took the train for such a long distance.*

***John:*** *have taken it many times with my parents; that are how I knew the route to that wonderful countryside.*

***Teacher:*** *You may be seated. Welcome to the final year of your high school studies. As you know, this is the most critical year for you if you want to take part in the introductory exams of public universities of Greece. The achievement of a University degree will lead you to a better-paying job and a better future in general. To do that, you have to study hard, much harder than IN your last two years. You do not have to employ private tutors: the knowledge you get from public schools is good enough to succeed in the University introductory exams.*

***Alex:*** *If I had not hired private math and literature teachers, I would not even make it to the final high school exams!*

***John:*** *I wish I could have a private tutor. I'll ask my parents to hire a math tutor for me, at least for this final year.*

**Teacher:** *Not you again; Alex and John. I see you are stuck close again, just like the last two years. Try to be nicer this year and not talk to each other and disturb the class like you did last year. Especially you, John: your grades are not so good. You have to try harder.*

**John:** *I know. I will do my best this year.*

**Teacher:** *I hope so. Now let's move to the first section of our book.*

John was finally enrolled in a private tutoring class, which aided him in mathematics and literature studies, such as sociology and history.

On the other hand, Alex had two private teachers coming to his house for the third year now, to teach him the five basic high school courses, along with the English language. This cost Alex's parents nearly 600€ per month.

This amount of money was close to John's mother's monthly salary. All these thoughts came to John's mind while walking back home from his private tutoring class. *"Am I worth this amount of money that my parents are spending right now for my private tutoring,"* he thought.

He was puzzled with the question that seemed to remain unanswered: *"What next? What will be my next step if I do not succeed in the general exams? And he continued to whisper to himself..."the worst thing is that I do not have a solution, even if I do succeed and am accepted in a university!"*

He slowed his steps and took a small notebook out of his pocket. He does not remember how he got this habit, but for some years now, he has used a notebook to clarify his thoughts on paper, by making a list or a diagram or even a picture.

He listed the expenses, as money was his big problem. The monthly income of the family was 2000€, and even though he was the only child, his family found it difficult to cope with the expenses. They lived in their own apartment, but they had to pay 400€ per month for six more years on the monthly mortgage payment.

If he did not succeed this year, he would have to study again, without working, and take the university exams once more next year. The strange part was that, if he succeeded in entering a University, the expenses would be even greater:

<b>IF I DO NOT SUCCEED IN ENTERING A UNIVERSITY</b>	<b>IF I SUCCEED IN ENTERING ANOTHER CITY'S UNIVERSITY</b>
PERSONAL EXPENSES: 500€	RENT: 300€
PRIVATE TUITION: 250€	PERSONAL EXPENSES: 500€
	TRANSPORT AND OTHER BILLS: 400€
	TOTAL: 1200€
	PART TIME JOB: - 400€
<b>TOTAL: 750€</b>	<b>TOTAL: 800€</b>

John: *"So, even if I work part time, expenses will be greater in a University out of Athens, and this will last at least 4 years! Things would be better if I could succeed in an Athenian University; but my past grades do not allow me to have such a hope. I could not possibly ask my parents to get an extra loan for me and for the following 4 years at least. This would be too much for them".*

Even though John's thoughts were blue, he had a happy feeling as it was Friday evening and a whole weekend was ahead. John and Alex had arranged to meet for a movie the next day.

As he took his keys out to unlock the building's central door, he heard a familiar voice from the other side of the road. He saw someone in a nice hat and a white shiny uniform, handling a small sword. It was the first time he had seen Nick, his neighbor, in uniform. Nick was three years older than John and he succeeded in entering the Naval Academy. His life had been harsh for the past three years, but next year, after graduating, he would be an officer on a ship, with great professional and occupational prospects.

It was not that John had not thought of becoming a cadet and later on an officer. He had, but he also knew that Military Academies required acceptance

points as high as the best universities of Athens. Still, he was determined to give it a try, as this would be the solution to not be a burden to his parents while studying, and until finding a steady job, too. Military Academies pay your salary and tuition, and more importantly, you have a secure job from the moment you graduate.

*"I need to study a lot for that," John muttered to himself as he used to.*

**Mrs. Georgia:** *Good evening John. Do you have your keys or you want me to open the door for you?*

**John:** *Hello, Mrs. Georgia. No, I have my keys, I was just thinking of something. Please, after you.*

**Mrs. Georgia:** *Thank you, John. Please say hello to your mother.*

**John:** *Of course, good night Mrs. Georgia.*

John was always puzzled with Mrs. Georgia and her husband. He always thought that a married couple should have children. They are both close to 40 and they have been married for 10 years now, and they still have no children. John was listening to his parents talking about that a few times. His father said that these kinds of couples make the birthrate to drop ...” *and then the Minister of Defense asks for more soldiers! How can we find them Mr. Minister? Since women are not willing to bear children any more and they are thinking only of their career?”* as he said.

His mother, on the other hand, supports Mrs. Georgia, as she says that she was unemployed or she at best did not have a stable job for the first five years of their marriage. When they recently tried to have a baby they discovered that artificial insemination, which again is a great expense, so now they are getting a loan for that.

John, not being quite sure if Mrs. Georgia and her husband did the right thing or not, abandoned these thoughts, unlocked his apartment door, and rushed into the living room to watch his favorite TV serial.

### C. THE STATUS

John looked at the paper he was given by his school director skeptically. He had to fill in his choices for the upcoming general exams in high school.

Should he choose to be a lawyer or even a doctor? He was imagining himself wearing the white, typical doctor-robe and walking quickly in the hospital's corridor, handling the case of a patient who needs an operation.

When he lowered his gaze to his desk, his dreaming stopped abruptly at the sight of his past quarter grades. Even if he was to do great in the final exams, his past marks did not allow him to dream as they were pretty moderate. He knew well that only the top students could succeed in getting into Medical or Law Universities.

He decided to call his best friend, Alex. John knew that Alex would go for Computer Engineering. He was a good student, and his ambitions, along with those of his parents, were high.

**John:** *Hi Alex. It's John.*

**Alex:** *John, I was going to call you right now. Have you completed the forms they gave us?*

**John:** *No, I called you for the same reason. To tell you the truth, there is no meaning for me, and you know my grades. What about you?*

**Alex:** *I will put as first choice the Computer Engineering School, and, second, I will probably pick Social Studies. Hey, why don't you pick a university that you like outside of Athens? You can be accepted with lower grades there!*

**John:** *I have thought of that, but I can't see how this is possible; my parents are not wealthy, as you know, and I would need to rent an apartment in another city. They can't afford it.*

**Alex:** *One time when I was at your house your father was talking about military volunteers. I know you like it. I got sick of us playing your favorite martial video game!*

**John:** *That's a possible option for me. What do you think?*

**Alex:** *I think it is made for you. Military nowadays is "in," although my father never liked it. He always used to say that militants in 1967 organized a coup d'état and destroyed the country's democracy, while at the same time he*

*boasts that he served 24 months back in 1977, after the dictatorship had collapsed.*

**John:** *Yes, but now he does not want you to go to serve. I remember,; the other time he was telling me some tricks, through which he would try to help you avoiding serving!*

**Alex:** *I know. All parents are contradictory sometimes, aren't they? I have to go now, my private math teacher came, and I am not prepared for the lesson. See you tomorrow.*

**John:** *"See you".*

John would not need Alex to realize that being a volunteer is a solution for his situation. He grabbed his personal notebook again and wrote:

- A) **Not good grades**
- B) **Poor economic condition of the family**
- C) **No future economic family prospects**
- D) **No highly educated parents to force him**

But why does it have to be that way? He then drew arrows for each of the sentences he wrote. At the same time, he thought that if there were a class that included writing in small notebook, he would certainly be an expert!

A) Not good grades

- **If I had good grades I would convince my parents to give it a try for something bigger.**
- **I know they would listen**
- **At least they would let me make a try for a short period and if I could not make it, I would still have the choice of Volunteering for the military**
- **With good grades I could also go to a Military Academy. I would not bother my parents financially and I would have a steady career and a good salary – like Nick.**

John heard Nick's mother while talking to his mother, saying that she is relieved that she and her husband do not have to pay a fortune to educate Nick and still he is well educated with a career in front of him.

"To be honest, Nick tried hard and his grades were not top, but still better than mine" John whispered to himself.

Looking again at his notes he wrote in capital letters:

- **GOOD GRADES: MANY ALTERNATIVES, VOLUNTEER MILITARY = AN OPTION**
- **BAD GRADES: FEW ALTERNATIVES, VOLUNTEER = ONLY REAL OPTION**

And he continued his melancholy thoughts by examining the second reason that forced him to consider being a volunteer.

B) Poor family economic condition

John thought to himself: "It will be a great burden for my family to sustain me financially for 4 years while attending university, 1-2 years until I find a good job, and not to mention the 1 year I would go anyway in the military as a conscript! TOTAL: 6-7 years. That's a lot for them". He continued writing:

- **My parents' jobs in the private sector are risky; the same would be the case for my potential future private job.**
- **Future in general seems uncertain in the labor market.**
- **Unemployment rate is high; so, even if I get a degree, it is difficult to find a good job.**
- **It is not only that my parents do not have much money: their pension is at risk. So if I need their help after some 10 years (let's say to marry), they would not be able to assist me.**
- **On the positive side, at least they at present have medical coverage, not for any "difficult" disease, but for the usual stuff.**
- **Another positive argument would be to go for the public sector, after getting a university diploma. But this sounds difficult, too.**

When John saw again his notes, he laughed at the comment he made about marriage. He was 17 by that time, adding 10 years would make him 27.

“That is not too late to be married”, he thought.

“Still it is about one more lifetime for me”. But again, he remembered other men from his neighborhood who were married well above 30.

“If I try to go to university and then the draft, I guess my first standard salary-payment will come,” he browsed his notebook pages “...aha...in...7 years!” Silence.

“Then we’re talking about 10 more years to afford a household, loans, and even kids!”

This was a characteristic of John that made him special compared with the rest of kids his age. He was very mature in thinking of his every future step; or maybe he just had to be mature.

It was already late at night, and John was making his future plans. He felt sleepy, but on the other hand he did not want to leave his thoughts incomplete. He grabbed his pencil:

C) No future economic prospects

John argued to himself : “I know that if my parents were at the same salary level, but had a prospect for better days in the future they would force me to study and go to a university. I believe that because...”, and he wrote:

- **They care for my well-being**
- **They cannot hope for a general improvement in employees’ income; they should have specific reasons to believe that they will afford to sustain me while at university**
- **If they could, my parents would wish the family to be elevated financially and educationally through my potential university-enabled job**



“I can put myself in their position: they are not sure about themselves; they cannot force me into an unsure option of attending university. Imagine then, if they run into bad luck, maybe lose their job, or perhaps some medical matter or something else serious that could require me to drop my studies. What then? I would have to look for any possible job, and, worst of all, lose the opportunity to volunteer, as I will probably be older than the maximum age that is allowed for applying,” he thought.

Then, John thought of his last reason that pushed him toward the choice of volunteering for the Military:

D) Not high family education

“I can clearly understand that, if my parents were university educated, they would advise me to follow their model.”

- **Usually parents wish their kids to do better than them**
- **They would appreciate the education as a means of culture and not only as a “weapon” for gaining money in a job**
- **Maybe they could also help me to get better marks in school or even arrange private tutors in classes that I needed help**
- **On the other hand, I recognize that if I do not succeed in university introductive exams, they would probably force me to be a volunteer. Still, it would not be their first choice nor mine!**

“What is my boy doing up so late at night?” whispered his mother while pushing John’s door open.

“Nothing mom. Just keeping some notes for tomorrow’s classes;” he said, closing his small note book and nervously arranging his stuff on the desk.

A goodnight kiss from his mother dispersed his thoughts and helped him fall asleep peacefully.

## D. THE PARTY

The last year of high school is close to an end and the students are preparing for their favorite part of the year: the graduation party. This will take place in a big restaurant of the neighborhood, with a DJ and plenty of drinks. All students are eager for that party and are happy to help arrange the last details.

**John (on the phone):** *Alex, is your girlfriend, Mary, coming to the party?*

**Alex:** *How could she miss such a night? She has already talked to your girlfriend, Vivian, and they are trying to find out what they will wear. How about you? Will you wear a tie?*

**John:** *No, you know that I am sporty guy. Are all four of us going together? What do you think?*

**Alex:** *Yes, why not? I will ask for my father's car and if he gives it to me, we could go for a ride after the party!*

**John:** *Cool!*

As is the case with all pleasant things, time passes quickly. The graduation party was over and the two friends and their girlfriends found themselves sitting at the beach next to Alex's father's parked car.

**Mary:** *The May moon is said to be the brightest.*

**Alex:** *It depends on the clearness of the atmosphere.*

**Vivian:** *I drank so much that everything seems blurry to me now.*

**John:** *Try not to show it when you get back to your house, as your parents will blame me for that.*

**Vivian:** *Don't worry. They'll be sleeping, and I won't see them until tomorrow morning.*

**Mary:** *What are we all doing tomorrow?*

**Alex:** *If you are asking me, I will be sleeping all day.*

**Mary:** *I do not mean that, you fool. I mean what we are doing in our futures?*

**John:** *The answer is easy for you, Mary, and for Alex, too: you will stay with your parents and finish University. After that, you will try to find a job and continue to stay with your parents; and then you will hopefully stop staying with them and get married! Vivian is also a good student, and her parents will help her to study music that she so much loves. Later, she will abandon me when she realizes I am not a university guy and I will probably be away, serving in the military.*

**Vivian:** Do not talk nonsense. You know that I will not love you for your university degree, and I will patiently wait for you to finish your one year service in the army.

**Alex:** Mary, will you wait for me to come back?

**Mary:** If I do not find anything better to do!... OK, OK I'm teasing you! Of course I will wait. It's only a year, and if your father arranges for you to serve near Athens, we will be seeing each other at least every week. Actually, now that they are talking about conscripting women, I would like to go. I would like to have military experience in my life, and I would love to know later on that I served my country for a period!

**Alex:** Can you take my place? I will lose valuable time from finding a job. But now that I am thinking of you being conscripted, it would be a disaster. Our whole life will be set back more than a year. You would serve a year, and after that you would be looking for a job, God knows for how long. You might easily find a job during your last year of university, when you might get several options from your teachers and from other institutions.

**Mary:** Ok, you are right. But if the service time was less for women and there were training in an area that I could use in a future job, I would seriously consider it.

**Vivian:** I would not say the same. The military is not a good place for women. Only totalitarian nations conscript women as draftees. The history of civilized nations shows that women have raised children and kept their families while men fought. Not that women could not make it in the military, but it is the nature of woman to give birth and take care of her children. It's just the natural way of things.

**Mary:** You sound so conservative!

**Vivian:** I do not say that women should not work. I merely suggest that women not be interrupted in their lives. Do you know that we will have fewer young people in our population by 2050 and double the proportion of old guys over sixty?

**John:** Vivian, you have an artistic nature and cannot accept a military life. But let's leave that and lie down to watch the full moon!

The next day found John thinking about his service. Apart from probably being in a difficult financial situation during his potential future university studies, he was also required to serve a year as a conscript. He felt his life was like a car without enough gas for moving to the future. On the other hand, all the rest of the

guys of his company had their gas tank half filled or even completely filled by their parents, so as to move for at least five to six years until they could find a job and pay for their own gas.

John had a problem of finding gas for the next few years. His “personal consultant” was there. He grabbed his notebook and scribbled:

**Be a volunteer in ARMED FORCES**

<b><u>+ (Positive)</u></b>	<b><u>- (Negative)</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Steady salary</li><li>▪ Higher salary than the average job I would have in the private sector</li><li>▪ No burden for my family</li><li>▪ Full medical coverage</li><li>▪ Good pension-if I live to get it!</li><li>▪ Medical coverage for my parents</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Difficult job</li><li>▪ Probably stationed away from my relatives and friends</li><li>▪ Vivian will leave me, for sure</li><li>▪ Always follow orders from military high-ranking officers-live in a strict environment</li><li>▪ Go to operations abroad or wherever the politicians decide to send you.(Really, will they always be right?)</li><li>▪ DO I HAVE TO KILL?</li></ul>

At the last entry, John was stuck and was thinking of military movies that he had seen in the past.

Closing his notebook, he thought the decision was much simpler: the Volunteer Army was the employer of last resort, or the “gas station” of last-resort! Nevertheless, he decided to give a try on the general high-school exams which lead to public universities, and after that he would make up his mind.

**E. THE CHOICE**

It was of no big surprise to John when he spotted the general exam results posted outside the high school door:

Alex Papadatos: Succeeded in Computer Science Department – Athens University.

Vivian Roussos: Succeeded in Arts School - University of Athens

John Papadopoulos: Failed

John could not tell what he exactly felt. On the one side, he felt disappointed; at the same time he felt oddly relieved. He felt free now, since he would not have to make a difficult choice. Since he did not succeed in entering in a university, volunteering for the Armed Forces seemed a one-way road.

Alex ran toward the school door, but before starting to read the results, John hugged him and congratulated him for his success. Alex started cheering with his hands up. After a minute, he learned about John's failure.

**Alex:** *It does not matter John. You will make it next year when you will be better prepared. You will come to my university, and we will be together again soon enough.*

**John:** *I wish I could dream that. I do not think that I will give it a second try.*

Immediately after, John was on the phone with Vivian.

**John: (talking on the phone):** *Vivian, good news!*

**Vivian:** *Tell me that the results came out!.*

**John:** *You will be studying Arts in Athens, your first choice! Congratulations, my love!*

Vivian answered back after a small pause, a loud cry, and a five minute hug with her parents!

**Vivian:** *Thank you, I love you! Tell me the good news for you, too!*

**John:** *Unfortunately, I can't. I will have to make my choice shortly."*

The conversation went on for a long time, but John's mind was stuck on how to find "gas" for moving his "vehicle" into the future.

As always, John's family stayed for a while after dinner to discuss any news or issues they might have. Kostas, John's father, began:

**Kostas:** *John, we know that you did your best for these exams. Forget them now and you can do better next year. We will try to get you a private teacher to prepare you.*

As John was hearing his father's words, he realized at the same time that his father was as puzzled as he, and that he knew that John's future would be insecure if he chose to go on trying for university studies. Not only that, John would put all his family at risk if one of his parents were fired and they had to obtain a loan for John's studies. Recently, he had heard on the TV news that the unemployment rate was steady, a little below 10 percent, and youth's opinion, all around Europe, was that the unemployment rate in the future would worsen.

John did not know if his parents did it on purpose or not, but he saw daily newspapers lying on the living room table with bold headlines:

***"2000 positions in the Navy for volunteers. This September is the deadline for applications".***

Without reading the rest of the article, John made up his mind: "I will be a Volunteer," he thought to himself.

The following week, a month before the deadline, John and his father entered the recruiting office of the Navy.

The posting on the wall was clear: **"Applicants should be between 17 and 26 years old, over 1,60 m height and with a high-school diploma. They will all go through medical and physical exams along with an interview."**

Evidently, John had these minimum requirements, and his father completed an application form for him.

***Kostas (father):*** *Good luck my boy. I have a feeling that you will be accepted. They will hire more than 2,000 volunteers.*

***John:*** *Yes, but do not forget that every time up to now, there were 2 to 5 times more applicants than positions.*

***Kostas:*** *Still, I have a good feeling.*

John knew that his choice was made by considering the whole family and not himself only. If conditions were different, he would like to give himself another chance for succeeding in university introductory exams. Of course, the fact that society appreciated the Hellenic Armed Forces was a determining factor for John. Several times, he had read surveys in papers where that appreciation touched the 90 percent level. Maybe the fact that he would have a decent and

appreciated job by society was the final nudge toward his decision to enter volunteer force. At least society and politicians kept a close watch on the Armed Forces so he would feel more secure.

Finally, he also liked the uniform. His neighbor, Nicholas, was his idol for that. He always looked sharp in his navy uniform.

## **F. INSIDE THE MILITARY**

(Alex and John sitting in a neighborhood cafeteria):

**Alex:** *I do not believe that a year after graduating from high school, our lives have changed so much. I am studying Computer Science in Athens University; you are enlisted in the Armed Forces, my girlfriend Mary got a part-time job using her partially-completed university studies; and, unfortunately, you broke up with Vivian.*

**John (after drinking his coffee):** *It is like playing a movie in fast forward! From the time that my mother picked up the phone last September, and I heard her cry out: "You have been accepted in the Navy", I cannot manage my time. It took me only a week to get ready and be present in the recruiting center. After that, three months of intense training and only two months ago my first position on a fast patrol boat as a mechanic!*

**Alex:** *How did you learn about mechanical stuff?*

**John:** *I did not! Just some basic training! The big training is on the job!*

**Alex:** *At least you should be happy to serve and get paid for that. In four years if you do not like it you could leave. Think of my case; I will serve for one year as a conscript, they will position me anywhere they like, without getting paid, and on top of that, postponing for at least one year my job quest.*

**John:** *I have thought of that; that is why I enlisted. Especially for me to wait five to six years without an income would be out of the question.*

After returning to his house, John could not avoid thinking about all the things that had happened to his new life. His feelings were mingled; he felt happy for the evident smiles of his parents, anybody could see that they were feeling more relaxed. He also felt unhappy for his girlfriend, Vivian, who left him as she found out that she could not stand such long periods of not seeing each other

when John was on training or operational trips. Additionally, he felt sure for himself, but still disappointed that he was away from his friend, Alex, and the rest of the company.

After that he questioned himself: "What Alex said was weird. Really, why are we getting paid, while draftees are not? Finally, we do approximately the same job!" Even in his new life, John kept his notebook-habit, for resolving difficult quests.

#### **WHAT A VOLUNTEER HAS TO OFFER TO THE MILITARY**

- Service of at least 4 years in a military unit
- Experienced worker, able to use high-tech equipment, after a while
- Add efficiency in military drills as after a period of repeating procedures and drill the time needed to perform a task drops to the minimum
- The chain of command is stronger, because volunteers understand and are embedded better in the military hierarchy as they are professionals
- They participate in operations abroad, where danger is sometimes present.

#### **WHAT A CONSCRIPT HAS TO OFFER TO THE MILITARY**

- Service of 1 year - usually broken down to one semester at each one of two military positions
- Little expenses for the state
- In total, conscripts cover the mobilization factor of the A.F. in the short term (the forces needed at present), and the long-term (the forces needed in case of a war or major conflict)
- They represent the society in the army, bringing with them a civilian "air" and ideas
- As a result, they bring the focus of the society on the A.F. and help towards the logical use of army and the improvement of military life-conditions.

When John realized that it was past 1 am, he preferred to go to sleep, as he had to get up in just 5 hours to go to his ship.

The military life for him was very harsh, especially in the beginning; but, as the months went by, he made good friends with the rest of the volunteers. There



were no conscripted sailors on his ship, as was the case for most of the ships, which were manned only with volunteers, officers, and petty officers. The relations on the ship were quite warm, and as he was learning his job as a mechanic, he felt even better. All the rest of the volunteers were boys and girls from cities with high unemployment rates, and their family financial situations were even worse than his. None of them had a university diploma, but they were well-suited for the job, as it was not science, and by doing the same things all the time, one finally learns to do it right.

There were not a few times that Nicholas, as an Ensign now, visited John's ship at port and asked him if he was doing okay. John knew that his mother asked Nicholas' mother for that favor.

John had also good relations with the conscripted soldiers who served on the military base where his ship was docked. Sailors were from all around Greece. There were some poor guys and some rich guys; there were some illiterate men and some others with a graduate degree; there were some farmers and some others from big cities.

His friendship with some of them helped him to happily pass his free time during his duty days. You could learn everything about Greece if you stick to the sailors' company, as John used to say. Fights were also a humorous incident for that strongly mingled conscript company. There were not few times when Peter, a guy from a poor family, would argue that the system is unjust and although he wanted to study and become someone, although his family's financial situation would not allow that. Another guy, George, who came from a rich family, was telling him that he did not study enough and did not have good enough grades to make his dream come true.

In any case, all these conversations and arguments were very amusing. Sometimes officers would participate in these small conscript "parliaments" and have fun with them, but also listen to their problems.

Once, John's friendship with one sailor who in his civilian life had a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering enormously helped his ship. After calling his friend to repair a major fault in one engine that nobody knew how to fix, the friend repaired it, and in a few hours the engine was operating again. Even the Captain of the ship called the sailor, along with John, to thank them.


There was another incident, when John once again greatly appreciated the help given by the conscripts. I should remember to tell it to Alex. Next time he will argue that only volunteers should serve. And he continued his monologue: Since we defend the country from our enemies, why should I take on the burden of those who do not want to enlist? Why should I sacrifice myself for Alex's family, when Alex himself does not care for their safety and prefers to seek his personal goals? He had little to do with Alex, but John was trying to counter him, as most of the time Alex was telling John that after the four years' postponement of his conscript service, he would try to avoid conscripting in any way he could. His argument was mainly that he would lose critical time from his employment "hunting" period; and, furthermore, volunteers are paid to do military service. Another of Alex's arguments was that police do not require conscripts: they do their job with volunteers, so why cannot the military do the same?

John remembered all these arguments and got furious. He decided to fight back with the help of his secret weapon: his notebook, of course.


He put down three main factors that should be accomplished through the Armed Forces of Greece, and further analyzed these in elements needed for his country.

## **FACTORS NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY FOR GREECE**


### **I. Political Legitimacy**



### **II. Military Effectiveness**



### III. Social Equity



Finally, he thought of something he heard on the radio recently: The number of children of Greece is declining, and the ratio of those entering universities is increasing. So, the available pool for picking volunteers will be less, as no volunteer up to now has a university diploma. Apart from that, he thought of the potential scenario of positive expectations on the economic future, in Greece or in Europe. Who would volunteer then? “Surely not me”, he thought.

#### **G. THE CONSCRIPT SOLDIER**

Finally, Alex could not avoid it, and, after completing his university studies, he was called to serve in the Navy as a sailor for a period of one year.

His father tried to find “loopholes” in the conscription laws to avoid service by his son, but he failed. The Hellenic constitution was clear, anyway: “All Greek-origin youngsters, capable of bearing arms should participate in the Hellenic Armed Forces.”

Neither Alex, nor his father, would like Alex to be characterized as incapable or a conscientious objector, as this “title” would follow him in the rest of his life, and destroy his employment dreams.

Now Alex was counting on John for making him more familiar with the military life.

**Alex: (talking on the cell phone)** You know, John, this is the first time that I have left my home for more than a week. The initial conscript training will last more than a month. Still, my parents will be able to visit me next week.

**John:** Do you miss home?

**Alex:** At first, greatly. Now my feelings are mixed. I see another side of life. I got to know the rest of the conscripts, and we are talking a lot. We make up a good group. Some of them come from places in Greece that I did not know existed. This is fun!

**John:** How do officers treat you?

**Alex:** They are quite good. We do not have any problems, except for a low-ranking one, a lieutenant, who is a very hot-tempered guy. He always yells at us. At first I was afraid; now, I know it is just his way and I am trying to avoid him. The interesting thing here is that there are some volunteers, like you, who have only two years in the force, and they order us around, like officers!

**John:** Imagine me being there, I would yell orders at you.

**Alex:** I would jump on you and fight as we did in the school! Anyway, I am kind of relaxed as time goes by. To tell you the truth, I was a little afraid of military life before getting to know it. Now that I am living in that environment, I do not think that I should have been so worried.

**John:** Your mother is still worried, though, isn't she?

**Alex:** You bet she is! I am trying to convince her that I am all right.

**John:** Now, have you changed your mind, about the necessity for conscription, or do you still believe that only volunteers should serve?

**Alex:** Not yet. I still believe that the volunteer army would be more effective. Take me as an example: I am undergoing a month's "freshmen" training. Later on I will be in a unit for five months, and after that for six months in another remote unit, including one month of regular leave. What am I supposed to learn during that period? And even if I learn something, I will not have time to offer it back to my unit. On the other hand, volunteers like you, have more time to offer and practice their knowledge on military issues. You became a ship-mechanic, without knowing anything at first, and now as you tell me, you feel that you can handle any situation. Not to mention also that officers are mostly based on volunteers to do their job. Only the high-ranking ones make speeches for the need for conscript soldiers!

**John:** You might be right about the effectiveness, but what about the legitimate issues of serving your country? What about the equity, especially in case of war? Do not tell me that you believe that war is out of the question for

Greece. Every now and then we have a broader type conflict, and apart from that, our history is full of battles. Imagine the mobilization needed in the case of a war. Will a volunteer army be adequate to defend our country?

**Alex:** "OK, a volunteer military would not be enough in that case; but, then, I would not object to being conscripted and participating."

**John:** You are saying that now, but remember what you said before being conscripted. You were trying to avoid it even in a peace-time situation. Would you have the courage to serve when a war is imminent? At least now, as you said, you have an idea how to move and survive in the military life; later on, it would be easier for you to rejoin army, in case of a war.

**Alex:** I do not know for the future, but now I have to go to my shift, as a good gate-guard. We will talk tomorrow. Bye.

**John:** Bye, freshman!

In a way, the two friends were helping each other live military reality. The ideas and perceptions exchanged between them helped them rationalize some military irrationalities.

While John had a steady position on the same ship for the fourth year, Alex was close to the end of his conscript service.

**Alex (discussing on the cell phone)** I have just one month more, my friend. Then I will take 30-days leave, and that's the end of my military uniform. At last!

**John:** Have you thought of becoming a volunteer later on?

**Alex:** Don't joke with me, my friend! I do not see the time to go on with my life. What about you? Have you thought of becoming again a civilian?

**John:** I do not feel different than a civilian. I see this as my job and every year that goes by I feel surer for that. Now I am the most experienced mechanic on the ship, as I have been longer than anyone else. I feel also more secure financially. The salary is not so high, and I could possibly find a job in the private sector that would pay more, but the stability of the military job is precious for me. My parents cannot sustain me if I were unemployed for long. And it's not only that. Do you remember the difficult operation that my mother had to undergo? The Navy paid for the whole thing, and it cost 15000€. For you to understand it better, this is close to the annual income of my dad!

**Alex:** I know, John. This job is a safe port for you. Ah! And not to forget that your job had another positive side-effect!

**John:** What?

**Alex:** Do you remember Rita? She was in the first year of high school when we graduated.

**John:** Yes, what about her?

**Alex:** She called me at the Facebook yesterday to chat, and she told me that she saw you last week in your uniform and really liked you! She asked me if I have your e-mail address.

**John:** ...and have you given it to her?

**Alex:** Of course not. I do not like to distract you from your lonely military life!

**John:** I will kill you!

**Alex:** OK, I am joking. She will e-mail you.

**John:** I buy the beers next time!

**Alex:** Next time, beers are on me, as hopefully I will be a wealthy civilian again.

**John:** Come on Alex, you were always so negative about conscription and military; now that you are leaving it, did not you find anything good or interesting?

**Alex:** I do not really know if there is a positive side. I would say it was a very dynamic experience that formulated my personality in a way. Meeting the diverse people that make up the Navy might not have been possible in any other setting, and I might never have this opportunity again. I ran into illiterate shepherds and university professors, from the very poor to the extremely rich. I liked learning how they see life. You can see some of them in my Facebook profile. We became friends and exchanged contact info to meet later on. A guy called Tony has a small cottage in Macedonia, Thessalonica, and he invited me to go there when we are both out of the Navy. You can join us if you want.

**John:** Yes, why not? At last you found something positive in your service.

**Alex:** I suggest you do not ask my girlfriend Mary about that. She is furious with my six-month absence. I saw her only twice during that period.

**John:** Yes, but imagine later on; you might have to see her everyday if you get married. That might be worse!

**Alex (laughing):** You might be right! I am off now; I will go to my 1520<sup>th</sup> hour of duty as a gate-guard!

**John:** At least, the positive side in being a volunteer is that you get to do more interesting things. Bye, good luck!

**Alex:** Bye.

## H. THE INTERCONNECTION

John would not believe that during his vacations he would get up at six o'clock in the morning to watch the sun rising.

**Tony:** *John, what are you doing up that early?*

**John:** *If I did not experience by myself this sunrise, here at your cottage in Thessalonica, I would not believe that the sunrise is not always the same. You know, this is my first big leave of 20 days since the time I enlisted in the Navy. I completed eight years on the same ship, and now I got a new cool position as a mechanic on a base near Athens. That means...*

**Tony:** *I know what it means, my friend. I used to be a conscript in the Navy with your friend, Alex, don't you remember? It means that you will have no trips and except for the duty days, you will be sleeping at your house every night with your sweetie! Now that I mentioned, is Rita still sleeping? I hope she likes it here. It is the first time you brought her with you. I was getting bored seeing you alone, and Alex with his girlfriend Mary.*

**John:** *I know, Rita couldn't get leave easily. You know how private sector jobs are, and imagine she works full shifts for 900€ per month. But there is a reason we are here together. It is all part of the plan.*

**Tony:** *What plan?*

**Alex:** *Will you let anyone over here to sleep? What are you doing awake that early? Tony, are you doing your shift as in the old days?*

**Tony:** *Yes, I am doing the 2 to 8 night shift, as you always got the best shift, by fixing the Commander's computers!*

**John:** *Ah! That's why he was calling me to talk until late at night: he "offered" his shift to you, Tony!*

**Alex:** *Ok, I admit it. I had better shifts than Tony; but wait a minute; you were discussing something else before, something about a plan.*

**Tony:** *Yes. John, tell us about your secret plan.*

**John:** *You will get to know shortly! But please do not spoil the moment, let us all watch the sun rising over that green valley. I imagine it like a golden-wing horse riding over the edge of the darkness, and light all the living creatures, awakening their minds and their hearts.*

**Tony:** *I will bring coffee; John might write some poems for us today!*

The golden flying horses of sun gallop through the area of Tony's ranch and continue on to more western areas.



**Mary:** *It is the fifth time that you are hosting us here, Tony. But this time you surpassed even yourself in cooking. This pork with honey and plums was superb!*

**Rita:** *I do not know about your past successes in cooking, but being my first time here, you really astonished me!*

**Tony:** *I have my good days, but getting compliments from women is very encouraging!*

**Mary:** *Do not say that. My job did not allow me the time to learn how to cook.*

**Rita:** *Sorry to disappoint you, Tony, but me either. I am not an expert. The only reason I am still fed is that my mother cooks for me as we stay together.*

**Tony:** *But, Rita, you do have a job, don't you?*

**John:** *And you think that private-type jobs are like the Navy. We are working the same hours and we both have only high-school diplomas; she gets 300€ less than I do. If you do not get married, it is difficult to move out of your family's house.*

After leaving the dining table, they moved to the spacious wooden decorated lounge. They all sat in big sofas around the lighted fireplace, holding their glasses of homemade wine.

The conversation went on and on. Their diversity made the company eager to discuss all issues on which their opinions differed. The girls tried to stop their boyfriends when the military-centered discussions seemed unending.

When John found a break in the discussion, he put his arm around Rita's shoulders, raised his hand, and asked the company for a moment of attention.

**John:** *First of all, I would like to thank Tony for inviting us here once again, and for his always warm company.*

**Alex:** *Yes, speech, speech!*

**John:** *Cut it, Alex, I have more to say. I regard all of you as close friends and I would like to share a very personal moment with you tonight. As you know, Rita and I have been together for quite some time.*

**Alex:** *Thanks to me and the Facebook. Don't forget that!*

**John:** *Yes Alex, I owe you that lucky moment of my life. So, Rita is pregnant!*

**Rita (standing up):** *John, we said to discuss it first between us...*

**John:** *There is no need, Rita, I have made up my mind.*

His movements were nervous and evidenced his intentions. The company watched him kneel in front of Rita and take out a small box from his inside jacket pocket.

**John:** *Rita, will you be my wife?*

Nobody really heard any answer. Rita was laughing and crying at the same time, hanging onto John like a treasure, while the rest of the company was clapping and yelling with happiness.

After some hours of celebrating, the men were left alone in the lounge.

**Tony:** *Sorry guys, this is the last champagne I have.*

**Alex:** *Don't you think that five is enough? John is going to be married and we will end up alcoholics!*

**John:** *This was the best day of my life. You are real brothers to me. I want you to know that.*

**Tony:** *Ok, brothers. Now, before John's golden horses wake us up, go to sleep with your beautiful girls; they will be waiting for you. It's been more than an hour that we have been drinking alone here.*

**Alex:** *Goodnight, my friends. Do not wake me for the morning shift.*

**John:** *Goodnight, I am going to my future wife!*

**Tony:** *Goodnight, future father!*

## **I. THE INCIDENT**

Happiness glows on Rita's face, while holding her two-year old son in her arms and showing pictures of her wedding to a girlfriend, sitting together in the sofa at John's and Rita's new home.

**Suzy (Rita's friend):** *I am jealous of you, Rita. John seems to be a very good guy and you have a wonderful son. I am close to my 30s now, and I just got a job after finishing the university.*

**Rita:** *They are not all so bright, Suzy. Thank God we all have our health, but this house was paid through a loan and the biggest part of my salary goes to the monthly payments. We live on John's salary.*

**Suzy:** *What should I say for myself? I did not even attempt to live alone by renting. I am still living with my parents.*

**Rita:** *Life is not easy, is it? Now, I will make the table and you will have dinner with us. John normally should have been here by now, but he must have been delayed with some extra work. Since he started working on the naval base, we are much better as most of the days he is free from duty and comes back to the house without having to be away on long trips.*

The phone rings, and Rita rushes to answer.

As her friend Suzy observed Rita talking on the phone, a bad feeling came over her. Suzy did not realize how she found herself talking on the phone as Rita was standing speechless with her eyes staring straight ahead and no sign of emotion. On the other end of the line, a person who called himself the officer of the duty had to repeat to Rita's friend Suzy that John was seriously injured while driving a truck with supplies on the Naval Base.

As the two families and Rita's girlfriend Suzy were waiting in the lobby of the Naval Hospital of Athens, a doctor in a white robe came out without no emotion on his face.

**Doctor:** *Are Mr. John Papadopoulos' relatives here? Only John's father had the courage to stand up. All the rest were staring at the doctor, as if they were not there, but they were seeing a cinema-film instead.*

**Kostas (John's father):** *How is he? Will he get over it, doctor?*

**Doctor:** *Mr. Papadopoulos, I am really sorry...*

The moments, the days, the weeks that followed, were a fierce sea for the two families and John's friends.

**Alex (Talking on the phone with Tony):** *Tony, my whole perception of life changed after that incident. A piece of me is missing.*

**Tony:** *Even though I got to know John after you did, I feel that we were together for a whole life. Did you learn how the accident happened?*

**Alex:** *He was driving that damn truck.*

**Tony:** *Do not tell me that it was the so-called "killer-truck?"*

**Alex:** *Yes, that was it.*

**Tony:** *You remember once that I had an accident when driving that very truck on our base? The brakes did not operate at all, and then the engine surged. Fortunately, I rear-ended the truck ahead at a very low speed and I was not injured. These trucks are awful -- they should recall them.*

***Alex:** Yes, I know. I remember your accident. What is incomprehensible is that the Navy does not give compensation to John's family because the committee that investigated the accident concluded that it was John's fault.*

***Tony:** No way! John's father must appeal that to find the truth and even sue the Navy or the truck company for that.*

***Alex:** I told him the exact same thing, but he does not know the legal procedures and apart from that, he does not have the money to pay the lawyers for getting started with the trials. Besides, he is considering the probability of losing. Then, he would put his family and Rita in a worse condition, as they would be required to take a loan to pay the lawyers.*

***Tony:** Unfortunately, he is right, Alex. I suggest we try to help him, as an honor to our friend. After all we could have been in his position. These old trucks are killers.*

The two friends settled on a plan. They would use Alex's father, who knew the legal system quite well, and a friend of Tony's, who happened to be a local parliament representative. The first man would submit a type of suit, for which one does not have to pay any money, meanwhile the second man would submit a formal question in the parliament about that specific accident and other similar incidents involving that type of truck. The representative was convinced by his local voter, Tony, for two reasons. First, he also served in the Navy and could not imagine himself or his son, later on, being subject to that danger. Second, all his voters were ex-conscripts, and all military issues were of great concern to them. Alex's father did not have to be convinced, as he was devastated by the loss of his son's best friend.

It took only three months for a second committee to change the conclusion of the first one:

**"The specific type of truck, due to its age and to design faults, is not considered safe for the Navy and should stop being used. Regarding the accident of the 27<sup>th</sup> of September of 2008, which caused the death of the Volunteer John Papadopoulos, it is our solid opinion that the driver had no responsibility for that."**

This official judgment gave a 100,000€ compensation to John's family, and more than that, gave a feeling of closure to John's family and friends.

Alex and Tony were very pleased, as they offered a final honor for their lost friend, John. However, in fact, this was not exactly the final honor.

## **J. THE EPILOGUE**

**Rita (sitting in the lounge couch, at Tony's farm in Thessalonica, Macedonia):** *I really needed this small trip. Three years now, after the incident, and I cannot pull myself together. At last, thanks to your help, I paid back the loan with those 100,000€ and I do not have to pay monthly loan payments. Still, life is difficult because now expenses are rising for John Jr. as he will start school this year.*

**Tony (after lighting the fireplace):** *Rita, why do not come here to stay? You can work with me in the cottage and at the same time take the child to a very good private school that is only ten minutes from here.*

**Rita:** *You do not mean that, do you?*

**Tony:** *In fact no. I have something else in my mind that I do not have a way of expressing.*

**Rita:** *If it is honest, I can take it. Go on!*

**Tony:** *Rita, I loved your husband John as my best friend. I admired your relationship, too. Through this misfortune, I started to value you even more, and now I want to ask you something that you were asked in this same place five years ago.*

Rita opened her eyes widely with surprise, her heart beating like crazy. She was not able to think what was logical or right. She just found her hand over Tony's, and their eyes meeting with surprise and hope.

Finally, the warmth of the fireplace died out, but the golden-wing horses were flying over them to warm up their new home.

***Dedicated to a cousin of mine who, during his conscript service, lost his life after an accident with a truck that had a faulty brake system.***

**Efthymios Domazos**

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## APPENDIX A. A SYNOPSIS OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES HISTORY<sup>457</sup>

The constitution and maintenance of a well-trained army was always the goal for the Greeks. The deciding reason for that is the everlasting crucial geopolitical position of the Greek territory. In ancient Greece, (Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Macedonia of Philip and Alexander) the choice to create an army of free citizens with a common national conscience and ideas always existed. In the Byzantine years a paid system of soldiers was initially used. That system quickly presented big weaknesses; so the government frequently took some measures to the direction of obligatory enlistment, with the parallel support to the institution of the “Akrites.” These were the people who lived in the frontier regions, and who would be the first to face any enemy invasion. As time went by, the utilization of paid military personnel for the needs of the Byzantine army was considered by many as one of the causes that weakened the Byzantine defensive system. Finally, that led to the fall of the Byzantine Empire.

During the time of the National Revolution of 1821, the core of the military corps was constituted by armed teams that had been developed in the mountains of the country and fought the Ottoman Empire. While the Revolution was developing, Greeks realized that they had need of a regular army. As a result, in the year 1825, a partial obligatory enlistment was established; it used a lottery draw among a group of people (one soldier between the ages of 18 and 30 for every 150 residents).<sup>458</sup>

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<sup>457</sup> Data derived from: National Military Conscription Agency, 16, <http://www.stratologia.gr/enhmerwtika.htm> (accessed November 10, 2008).

<sup>458</sup> In fact, that was one of the proposals by Professor C. Moskos, regarding a potential solution for the U.S. return to the Draft System. The same proposal was also supported by many other authors.

By the beginning of 1880, the system of catholic enlistment was established in Greece, with an obligation for all men to serve for three years. This system survives up to the present day, along with a voluntary branch of the Armed Forces.

In 1958, Law 3850 was published, which created the first legal frame for conscription and also the provision for the three services of the armed forces (Army , Navy and Air force). Later on, Law 720/1970 and Law 1763/1988 defined all issues relevant to conscription. These two latter laws are still in effect with the amendments of Law 2510/97. Today, this legal base constitutes the regulative basis of conscription and Volunteer Corps in the Hellenic Armed Forces.



## **APPENDIX B. BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN SERVING IN THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES<sup>459</sup>**

- In February 22, 1944, the “Company of Volunteer Women Force” is created in Cairo with 16 active members and 229 backup.
- The first women in the Armed Forces appeared officially in 1946 with their enlistment in the School of Nurses; after four years of training, they are named Lieutenants Junior Grade and they staff the Military Hospitals.
- Law 705/77, “The enlistment of women,” is published in the Government’s Paper on September 19, 1977, which obliges all Greek women from the ages of 20 to 32 to enlist for duty in the Armed Forces in times of war or mobilization. The duration of the military service is 14 to 24 months.
- In 1979, the first women are trained in the “Women Training Center” in Athens.
- In 1980, one group of University Educated Women is constituted from the volunteers with the purpose of creating members with the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade.
- In 1990, Law 1911 permits the entrance of women into the Military Academies.
- In 1991, the first women who acquired degrees in the Military Medical Schools graduated.
- According to Law 1407 of 1983, in a case of pregnancy, a year leave is granted to all military women personnel , regardless rank.
- The changes of duty environment for women now mainly follow mainly the changes of duty environment of men.
- How important it is for women to enlist in the Armed Forces is shown from the following examples: In 1994, for 81 women’s positions in the Hellenic Air Force, there were 8,667 candidates; in 1990, for 250 women’s positions in the Hellenic Navy, there were 2,000 candidates.

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<sup>459</sup> Data derived from Ilias Kapetanakis, “Conscripting Women: An Evil or a Necessity? (2006), <http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-main.asp> (accessed October 26, 2008).

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## APPENDIX C. THE GREEK EDUCATION SYSTEM<sup>460</sup>

### A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

Education in Greece is compulsory for all children 6-15 years old; namely, it includes Primary (*Dimotiko*) and Lower Secondary (*Gymnasio*) Education. The school life of the students, however, can start from the age of 2.5 years (pre-school education) in institutions (private and public) called "*Vrefonipiakoi Paidikoi Stathmi*" (creches). In some *Vrefonipiakoi Stathmoi* there are also *Nipiaka Tmimata* (nursery classes) which operate along with the *Nipiagogeia* (kindergartens).

Attendance at Primary Education (*Dimotiko*) lasts for six years, and children are admitted at the age of 6. Along with the regular kindergartens (*Nipiagogeia*) and the *Dimotika*, All-day primary schools are in operation, with an extended timetable and an enriched Curriculum.

Post-compulsory Secondary Education, according to the reform of 1997, consists of two school types: *Eniaia Lykeia* (Unified Upper Secondary Schools) and the Technical Vocational Educational Schools (*TEE*). The duration of studies in *Eniaia Lykeia* (EL) is three years and two years (a' level) or three years (b' level) in the Technical Vocational Educational Schools (*TEE*). Mutual student transfer from one type of school to the other is possible.

Along with the mainstream schools of Primary and Secondary Education, Special *Nipagogeia* (kindergartens), *Dimotika*, *Gymnasia*, *Lykeia* and upper secondary classes are in operation, which admit students with special educational needs. Musical, Ecclesiastical and Physical Education *Gymnasia* and *Lykeia* are also in operation.

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<sup>460</sup> Greek Education System, [http://www.ypepth.gr/en\\_ec\\_page1531.htm](http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_page1531.htm) (accessed August 10, 2008).

Post-compulsory Secondary Education also includes the Vocational Training Institutes (*IEK*), which provide formal but unclassified level of education. These Institutes are not classified as an educational level, because they accept both *Gymnasio* (lower secondary school) and *Lykeio* (upper secondary school) graduates according to the relevant specializations they provide.

Public higher education is divided into Universities and Technological Education Institutes (*TEI*). Students are admitted to these Institutes according to their performance at national level examinations taking place at the second and third grade of *Lykeio*. Additionally, students are admitted to the Hellenic Open University upon the completion of the 22 years of age by drawing lots.

The following graph presents concisely the structure of the Greek education system, as it consists of institutions of the formal, classified or unclassified education.

Formal education is characterized by the fixed length of study, the possibility of repetition and the award of a formal school-leaving certificate which is the official authorization.

As a consequence of the classification of the education institutions, a title (school-leaving certificate, degree etc.) is compulsory for students at each education level in order to continue to the next.

It should be outlined that the graph offers a general overview of the education system with its main aspects being supervised by the Ministry of Education and which form the major part of it. However, a broader analysis shows that the total of the education services provided for in Greece form a much more complex, multilevel and differentiated infrastructure. Moreover, many other educational services, classified or unclassified, are provided for in the formal education system, either in co-operation with it or completely independently.

A detailed description of the Greek Education System is offered in EURYBASE , the EURYDICE database of the European Education Systems.

<b>Labor market</b>	
<b>Higher Education</b>	
Postgraduate studies (Universities, TEI- Hellenic Open University) - Hellenic Open University	
Universities International Hellenic University	
Conventional ----- Technological Education Institutes (TEI)	
<b>Secondary Education</b>	
<b>Lykeia:</b> - Musical - Ecclesiastical (self sufficient and autonomous) - Physical Education Schools B' grade - Special A' grade	<b>TEE:</b> B and A Level C and B Level <b>IEK</b>
<b>GYMNASIO:</b> (General, Musical, Ecclesiastical, Physical Education, Special) compulsory education	
<b>Primary Education</b>	
DIMOTIKO (mainstream, All-day, Special)	
NIPIAGOGEO (mainstream, All-day, Special)	
NIPIAKA TMIMATA	
PAIDIKOI STATHMOI	

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## **APPENDIX D. THE INTERVIEW OF COL. COSTAS MOUTOS U.S. ARMY RET.**

“I’m a Greek/American, having served in Greece with NATO and during the early years of the all volunteer Armed Forces for the U.S., I was a member of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. From this point of my military experience I would like to offer comments on a possible Greek Army all volunteer concepts.

The nation of Greece must consider two areas in formulating a policy:

A. Strategic needs. For defense the Greek Army needs to be as large as today’s force to address the challenge of defending a nation with vast borders as Greece has with its great number of islands. Forces have to be permanently stationed there or quickly deployed within hours. The force has to be well trained and equipped and have the close relationship it now has with the Greek nation. A volunteer force becomes “THEY” of little concern to the Greek general public. They become employees of the Government and are viewed as such by the people. As such, the effort to equip and train such force loses its support by the people. A volunteer force will probably be smaller than the present force. Greece’s small population almost guarantees such. In the event of hostilities a smaller force will need replacements (effedries) quickly or it will be defeated. In times of war people are less inclined to volunteer and it takes time to recruit volunteers, train them and deploy them. Example: if a building project needs carpenters all stops until carpenters are hired. This often takes time which is a luxury UN available in combat. The answer to small volunteer force is a well trained, equipped and available reserve of equal size or greater than the volunteer force. This will have a ready reserve of well trained individuals who would be available for call up and immediate deployment to fill vacancies in the active Army, Units of platoon (dimiries) company (lohos) and battalions (tagmata) sized units well trained, fully manned and quickly deployed to meet the defense requirements. To fight well, they must be equipped and trained as well. Minimum training will have to include a Sat/Sunday training session a month and at least

15 days a year of training in a maneuver area with the active army. Also advisors at company (lohos) level from the active army will be needed. Such reserve force must be recruited simultaneously with the active army and trained in installations by the active army to insure quality. This combination of a volunteer force supported by a reserve force might be able to satisfy the defense needs of Greece. A small defense force of volunteers only without sizable ready reserves will probably fall short of the Greek strategic needs.

B. Costs. A volunteer force will be expensive in fact very expensive to the tune of four to five times as much. The soldier now becomes an employee. You have to pay market price for each soldier and when the economy is good the price goes up. To pay minimal wages without the very expensive benefits such as medical care and retirement, the only volunteers you will get is a lower mental level and competence. You have to establish a recruiting structure with mental/physical categories for the volunteers. Perhaps a 1 to 5 designation. One being the top and five for the lowest (hazous and vlakes). Bonus will have to be paid for the high and hazardous requirements. Extensive preplanning to insure timely inputs to maintain levels needed. Obligations will have to be established for volunteers to serve in the reserves when leaving active duty to insure reserve manning and quality levels for the reserves (efedries). The same organization will have to recruit personnel for the reserve components. An example for the reserves will be soldiers will spend six months in training with the active army and six years service with the Army reserve (paid while serving). The volunteer force for the Navy and the Air Force might have to be paid more now. The incentive of serving in the Navy or the Air Force instead of being drafted in to the Army will be gone. Officers in the reserves will have to be trained at the same level as those in the active army. Armories (training locations) will be needed in all communities for reserves to train one weekend a month. Storage areas and security of weapons for the reserves is a major concern. The cost is an area of major concern. If inadequate resources to maintain the reserves are provided a small active army force is in great jeopardy in time of war,"



## APPENDIX E. PRESENTATION OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATION MODEL (MRM)<sup>461</sup>

### A. BACKGROUND

Proponents of population representation in the American armed forces call upon three basic principles to argue their position. Briefly, military members should: (1) be “citizen-soldiers” who can “re-present” (or “present again”) the variety of community interests and recreate the social fabric of American life; (2) ensure a capable, cohesive, and effective fighting force (in symbol as well as in deed); and (3) be selected and treated fairly and in a way that distributes the benefits and burdens of service throughout society. These three areas—political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity, respectively—frame a core of concern around an age-old question: Who shall serve when not all serve?

A reasonable balance of opposing objectives is the key to reconciling differences between, say, benefits and burdens, internal organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity for individuals and equal representation of groups, compulsions and freedoms, and other areas of discord. A trade-off or compromise is similarly needed to mitigate fundamental conflicts between the goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity. Yet, the search for a reasonable balance to guide military manpower policy, even though it offers a means for reconciling sometimes conflicting objectives, is ultimately an exercise in subjective reasoning. After all, how *does* one strike a balance between realistic military needs or requirements and the perceived social good? Can one, or *should* one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate categories of demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, what *is* “reasonable?”

The American experience is one of civil-military convergence, where the outcomes and objectives of military representation are described in social and

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<sup>461</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 21, 2008).

political as well as military terms. Assuming that it is possible to establish evaluative criteria and balance competing objectives, we can attempt to build a conceptual framework and functional definition of military representation.

Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” representation, a miniature reflection or copy of the larger population. Perfect representation in the armed forces is depicted in the Military Representation Model as a smaller replica of the national population, located somewhere within that body. Since the idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under normal conditions—and may not even be desirable—it is necessary to establish some boundary of “approximate representation” in the model. Once the notion of approximate representation is accepted, however, the presumed certainty of outcomes associated with perfect representation is lost. The problem is that approximate representation can mean one inch or a thousand miles, one percentage point or many more, depending upon one’s point of reference. Consequently, approximate representation must be evaluated in relation to the set of “higher” goals that have made it an important policy concern. These higher goals are depicted in the model as political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity. As long as the population of military members stays within the established boundaries of being “close enough for comfort” (shown as the shaded area in the model), the armed forces are seen by most as approximately representative.

But, government policy, social values, the economy, international relations and conflict, benefits associated with military service, public attitudes and opinions of the military, the distribution of influence across population subgroups, as well as the many other factors, can change over time and affect the way in which the goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity are defined or balanced. War, for example, can have a profound effect on how equity is perceived, as the burdens of military service normally outweigh the benefits—and what was once seen as an acceptable proportion of racial or ethnic minorities is considered

unacceptable; or, in terms of effectiveness, a once-acceptable proportion of persons with lower technical or mechanical abilities can become unacceptable for what is deemed a higher state of military readiness.




Figure E.1. Convergence / Divergence Model of Military Representation (MRM)<sup>462</sup>

## B. SUMMARY

If one is interested in evaluating a state of military “representativeness,” population ratios are meaningless unless they are placed in *context*. The Military Representation Model provides such context by using the political, military, and social issues that have been employed over the years to support having certain

<sup>462</sup> Mark J. Eitelberg, [https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114\\_eb](https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb) (accessed May 31, 2008).

levels of population participation in the American armed forces. For example, although the argument for “full-citizen participation” is as old as the American military itself, the numbers and proportion of women in the military have remained far below comparable levels in the larger society. Even today, when women account for roughly 15 percent of both the active-duty enlisted force and officer corps, and they are allowed to serve in more than four out of five military occupations, we do not find a great public outcry for the increased representation of women at levels closer to 50 percent. Why not? Why is a level of 16 percent considered acceptable, if the state of perfection is proportionately three-times as great? In contrast, African Americans (18- to 44-years old) account for about 13 percent of the national population and nearly 20 percent of the active-duty enlisted force (23 percent in the Army). A majority of American citizens, in a number of surveys, have indicated that they are quite comfortable with the racial or ethnic balance in the enlisted force. Yet, it seems that, whenever the threat or reality of armed conflict is seen, many voices can be heard criticizing the over-representation of African Americans or other racial/ethnic minorities in the military’s enlisted ranks. Why is one level of representation acceptable at some point and not another? Further, why is it acceptable to exclude certain groups—older or younger people, high school dropouts, persons with relatively low aptitude test scores, very tall or very short people, homosexuals who are otherwise qualified, women in ground combat, and so on—and not others? Don’t persons in these excluded groups qualify as citizens who should be represented when considering the argument for “full-citizen participation?” The answers to these and other questions can be found in the Military Representation Model.

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